One would expect that the Arab uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa since 2010 would have swept away authoritarian regimes and given way to a new democratic order. Such a seamless transition has not occurred. The Arab Spring countries continue to face instability, security problems and social and political unrest. It is easy to overstate the success of the Tunisian and Moroccan experiences but how did they weather the storm? They highlight the ways in which the instability and conflict that have mired the Egyptian and Syrian revolutions have been avoided.
A concessionary approach
Zine Al-Abedine Ben Ali’s attempt to hold on to power in Tunisia by promising reforms failed to defuse public anger; he was eventually forced into exile in January 2011. The fall of the regime set into motion a sequence of events that would lead to the election of a constitutional council in July 2011 and parliamentary elections in November the same year, in which Al-Nahda Party won a majority of 89 seats.
The National Assembly then drafted a new constitution and human rights activist Moncef Marzouki was elected president by the constituent assembly; Al-Nahda leader Hamadi Jebali was sworn in as prime minister.
Political divisions and crises ensued; Tunisia’s success in avoiding conflict can in part be attributed to the concessions that Al-Nahda and others were willing to make in order to avoid confrontation between different factions that would undermine the revolution and shake the foundations of the nascent political system. After facing scrutiny from various factions active in the revolution, Al-Nahda conducted a campaign to allay fears of a sweeping Islamist takeover. The leaders were keen to describe their party as moderate and pro-democracy and stressed that they had no intention to limit civil liberties.
The new government required the cooperation of diverse parties to draft a constitution and confront other issues. Al-Nahda wanted to demonstrate that it favoured power-sharing and vowed to form a coalition government. Its “intellectual leader” Rashid Ghannouchi contested that Al-Nahda ” cannot rule alone.” An agreement was made on 15 September 2011 to limit the Constituent Assembly’s term to one year and for the assembly to vote on a new government. A three-party coalition was formed, with the top positions occupied by Ben Jaafar of the Ettakol Party (Speaker of the Assembly), the Republic Party’s Marzouki (President) and Al-Nahda’s Jebali as prime minister.
Nevertheless, Tunisia continued to witness instability characteristic of the turmoil created by revolutionary change. From 2012 to 2013 conservative Salafists clashed with security forces and at the beginning of 2013 Chokri Belaid, a prominent left wing opposition leader, was assassinated. Likewise, Mohamed Brahmi, another opposition politician and leader of the socialist and Arab nationalist people’s movement, was also murdered. This led to a general strike and calls for the government to resign. In another attempt to calm the situation, Al-Nahda agreed with the opposition to hand over power to an interim government of independent figures, headed by Mehdi Jomaa.
The intransigence of political leaders has often caused conflict in the Arab states that have witnessed uprisings. Political compromises are part and parcel of the turbulence created by the fall of an authoritarian regime; by being prepared for compromise, Tunisia continues to make gains.
Morocco has also undergone a relatively stable reform process. Its success is attributable in part to the willingness of the monarch to grant concessions. Witnessing the violence elsewhere in the Middle East, King Mohammed VI allowed moderate Islamists to function as a political party. With such recognition, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) were also willing to accept established procedures and commit itself to the king’s step by step reforms.
Rather than inviting instability in its response to protestors’ demands, the PJD pushed the king for reforms without resorting to violence. Like Al-Nahda, the PJD was keen not to campaign on issues that might be seen to infringe on personal liberties; instead it worked on an anti-corruption programme, stressing the need for good governance, social justice and economic and educational reforms. It also tried to reassure other groups that it called for political dignity and the reconciliation of Islam with democracy. After the parliamentary elections that brought it to power the PJD formed a coalition with the nationalist Istiqlal Party.
King Mohamed sought to accept the democratic agenda that ignited people across the Middle East and North Africa. The new constitution stipulated that the prime minister would be appointed from the party which won the most seats in the parliamentary elections. By proposing a new constitution which reduced his powers, the Moroccan monarch was able to shift accountability to the parliament.
The Moroccan experience owes it success to a preference for gradual reform. Both the people and the monarchy were keen to avoid the violence and instability witnessed elsewhere. King Mohamed enjoys popular support in the country. Not only is he a symbol of stability but also a benefactor of reform. He and his people wanted to maintain the unity of the country and his piecemeal reforms were enough to satisfy protestors.
The separation of the military from political affairs
Unlike in Egypt, the military does not dominate the domestic economy or the political process in either Tunisia or Morocco. The army does not have the same symbolic role as the guardian of transformation in the country like it does in Egypt. Tunisia and Morocco were thus able to avoid the complications of a kind brought about by the Egyptian army’s counterrevolution attempts. Indeed, the military refused to support Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia’s revolution and did not have any meaningful part to play in the transition towards democracy.
Foreign involvement
In Arab uprisings across the Middle East, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have become key players in influencing the political map of the region
Foreign involvement in Tunisia and Morocco took on a different character to that in Egypt and Syria, in which external agents provided political and economic support for the regimes. In attempting to create a reactionary bloc in light of the region’s developments some Gulf States were keen to invite Morocco to join the GCC. Nevertheless, reformists in Morocco were wary that external influence could affect the reform process. Yet owing to both countries’ commitment to maintaining independence and stability, they were keen to avoid outside influence and instead underwent internal reform.
It is possible to overstate the success of events in Tunisia and Morocco. The constitutional reforms undertaken by the Moroccan monarchy certainly represent only piecemeal changes. The king maintains a good deal of power within the state and his advisory institutions continue to exercise unseen influence.
The extension of political rights to the people will continue, albeit with some difficulty, in both Tunisia and Morocco. In the latter, for example, the banned Justice and Charity movement rejects the monarchy and elements of the youth-led February 20movement, a significant group in the country’s protests, have largely been absent from the recent reform process.
In Tunisia, frequent assassinations and continued protests, especially by Salafi groups, have often ended in violent confrontation with the police. Such incidents may continue to pose a challenge to stability.
Tunisia’s presidential election is ongoing but in October this year, Nidaa Tounes, a party which unites secularists, trade unionists, liberals and some elements from the Ben Ali era, became the largest bloc in parliament. Depending on the result of the presidential election this month, political power may become increasingly concentrated in one party.
In light of this, Tunisia and Morocco will continue to struggle with channelling pluralism into positive outcomes for the political system. Their governments must also continue to redistribute power amongst those who feel marginalised by reforms. Their ability to deal with the continuing social and economic problems such as poverty and unemployment will also be likely to affect the stability and perceived legitimacy of the democratisation process.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.