An accurate assessment of the potential consequences of Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah leaders is hardly an easy task. This is because it opens the door to many possible scenarios over the next few days, considering the difficulty of Hezbollah to let this loss go without taking action. The discussions between decision-makers in Beirut, Tehran, Damascus, and Tel Aviv will indicate the magnitude and nature of the response, not whether there will be one or not.
This article will draw a “Road Map” for the behaviour expected of Hezbollah by listing the motives and obstacles facing any option chosen by the movement and its allies in the region.
First: the inevitable response
The first motive behind any response to the Israeli operation by Hezbollah in general, and by Hassan Nasrallah in particular, is that his credibility is on the line, especially since he has lost much of the popularity gained after the 2006 war against Israel after interfering in the Syrian conflict.
Another motive relating to the regional escalation is that the movement seems to be in need of a “limited” confrontation with Israel to remove some of the defilement it sustained after getting involved with the Syrian crisis on the regime’s side, which really harmed its reputation.
When talking about the network of political alliances, the third motive for Hezbollah becomes clear, and we have recently noticed a clear rapprochement in its relations with Hamas. Everyone who has inside information knows that Hezbollah played a significant role in bridging the gap between the Hamas and its “big brother” Tehran. Recently, Hezbollah and its leaders have continuously used the phrase “forming a front to face the Israeli enemy” as an updated version of the old “axis of resistance”.
However, Hamas does not seem keen on establishing a parallel front against Israel in Gaza if the northern front cannot ignite in Lebanon, despite the fact that this is something Hezbollah is striving towards.
The fourth motive may be a bit unlikely, but it remains a possibility if and when the decision to start an open confrontation with Israel is made. This relates to the approaching Iranian nuclear negotiations with Western super powers. Tehran may need a war in the region in which it can use its hard power, i.e. Hezbollah, to harm Israel, the pampered child of the West.
The Syrian factor may be a fifth motive to move forward with a response from Hezbollah against Israel: No one doubts that Syria really wants to delay the Syrian crisis from becoming a priority on the agenda of regional and international decision-makers.
Second: theories for waiting
In contrast to the motives and incentives that encourage Hezbollah to respond to the Israeli assassination, the obstacles and hindrances are increasing, thus requiring the party to be patient and cautious before launching its first missile towards Israeli settlements north of occupied Palestine.
Perhaps the first obstacle is that the party is aware that its armament abilities are exhausted operationally and logistically in the various Syrian areas. Although a decision from the party’s military leadership to launch a ground attack is similar to a reserves call in a regular army and would bring fighters back to their bases in southern Lebanon, this still requires a certain amount of rehabilitation and restorations that could take quite a long time.
The second obstacle that may prevent Hezbollah from escalating matters with Israel is related to its internal front, which is not completely on board with the confrontation. Just as during the 2006 war, a split in the movement could cause the Lebanese people to fracture into supporters and opponents, today this would be a weakness on the party’s side. This is due to the fact that many Lebanese people believe that Hezbollah sustained the recent loss because it was in the wrong place at the wrong time and because it sent its fighters to Syria, to fight in a battle that the Lebanese people have little interest in.
The factor of Israel’s internal affairs and a heated electoral season may be a third hindrance for Hezbollah because this may be an Israeli “trap” that will cost the party dearly; more than it cost it during the July war. Hezbollah must carefully study the Israeli polarisations that formed after the end of the war on Gaza, which is probably a smarter move than to allow itself to be a tool for Israeli electoral propaganda.
Third: practical options
Reading the complicated political reality in Lebanon allows us to deem this first option as most likely. This option includes Hezbollah making efforts to neutralise the Lebanese arena before its assumed response for more than one reason, which I have already mentioned. However, the party does not have an “insurance policy” that allows it to be sure that Israel will not retaliate outside Lebanon in order to make Lebanon pay the price dearly.
A second option is to allow the Syrian border to be the arena for the next retaliation by Hezbollah under the pretext that its leaders were assassinated on Syrian land. Therefore, the revenge against Israel comes from the same geographical spot.
The third option seems least costly than the other two options. It entails Hezbollah’s responses targeting Jewish targets and Israeli embassies across the world. In the past few years, we have discovered that Hezbollah has military sleeper cells in several different countries, particularly in Latin America and Southeast Asia.
Hezbollah is in not in an enviable position at all. It has lost a handful of its military commanders and may find it difficult to promote the theory of “revenge is best served cold” to its supporters.
After this mass assassination, Hezbollah’s leadership seems to be like a person who has put a hot piece of potato in their mouths. They can’t swallow it because it will burn their throat, nor can they spit it out because it will dirty their clothes. This makes us sure that January 2015 will be a turning point in history regarding the confrontation with Israel. The 2006 war seems to have been a mini rehearsal of what might await both sides if either fires the first missile towards the other.
Translated from Felesteen newspaper, 25 January, 2015
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.