The Cairo Court for Urgent Matters issued a ruling deeming the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades a terrorist organisation. This revealed the extent to which the justice and status of the Egyptian judiciary deteriorated.
Several courts have emerged as a tool in the hands of the government, issuing politicised rulings haphazardly and without any evidence or foundations of trials. The Egyptian judiciary has never reached this level as, since the reign of King Farouk, the judiciary was known for its justice and integrity.
Since 3 July 3 2013, the status of the judiciary has deteriorated, reaching the level of sentencing 500 defendants to execution for killing an officer during a demonstration where a police station was stormed. The ruling was made based on a list submitted by the prosecution and the judge did not even read the names of those he sentenced to death. This is only one example out of dozens of collective rulings sentencing many to execution, life imprisonments, or long prison sentences.
Until now, this issue remained restricted to Egypt. However, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters’ ruling accusing the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades of terrorism is a matter that affects the Palestinian cause, as well as the Egyptian national security because the resistance, notably the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, is considered a strategic front for Egypt against the Israeli army.
The Egyptian army used to consider the Gaza Strip a weak front for Egypt when Sinai was occupied twice. The equation changed after the resistance grew stronger led by the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam and Al-Quds Brigades in the Gaza Strip. This was evident in the 2008/2009, 2012 and 2014 wars.
The ruling of the aforementioned court has no relation to any cases in which it can legally accuse the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. This is a political ruling made in the context of the Egyptian political strategy adopted during the rule of Egyptian president Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi with regards to Gaza in general and the resistance in particular.
There is a lot of undisputed evidence that proves this. This strategy began by intensifying the suffocating blockade on Gaza by closing the Rafah crossing, followed by the destruction of the tunnels and destroying 1,000 metres of the city of Rafah. This aims to isolate the Gaza Strip and intensify the siege imposed on it.
These measures were accompanied by the position taken by the Egyptian authorities during Israel’s 51 day war on Gaza last July and August. This position was biased against the people and resistance in the Gaza Strip, as Egypt continued to impose the blockade during the war and did not even allow the entry of medicine, dressings and bandages, the entry of medical delegations, or the transfer of those wounded.
As for the ceasefire and Egypt’s sponsorship of direct negotiations, many of the resistance factions participating in the negotiations confirmed that the Egyptian sponsor was negotiating against the demands of the victorious resistance. It then decided to end the negotiations, leading to depriving the resistance from reaping the fruits politically from its military victory. The Gaza Strip is still suffering under the blockade that was intensified after the war.
If anyone is wondering about the purpose behind the blockade, there is no other purpose behind any blockade than to force one party to surrender after starvation and the depletion of forces.
The true question is: What does the Egyptian policy want from the Gaza Strip and the resistance factions?
We find the answer to this question in Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi’s speech at the donors’ conference held in Cairo. This is, of course, in addition to the evidence from the aforementioned incidents. In his speech, Al-Sisi said that the reconstruction of Gaza is based on two axes: first, a permanent ceasefire, and second, the restoration of the national authority’s complete control over the Gaza Strip. After having a three hour meeting with the Egyptian president, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced during an Arab League meeting that there will be no Palestinian reconciliation until three conditions are met: first, one decision regarding peace and war, second, one authority controlling all matters, and third, one weapon, meaning the disarmament of the resistance’s arms.
So, the answer to the question, “what does the Egyptian policy want from the Gaza Strip and the resistance factions?” is that it wants to end armed resistance and the state of resistance in the Gaza Strip, subjecting it entirely to the authority in Ramallah. By doing so, the situation in the Gaza Strip will become similar to the current situation in the West Bank. This meets the two conditions set by the Egyptian president in his speech to the donor countries regarding the reconstruction of Gaza; a permanent ceasefire and handing over all authority of the Gaza Strip to the PA in Ramallah.
We also find those who are surprised when they find people arguing that disarming the resistance in the Gaza Strip and the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades would not be a disaster for Egypt’s national security as well as to the Palestinian cause and the strategy of resistance and uprising in Palestine in general. This would do Israel a favour it would have never dreamed of.
So what is gained by this strategy, with all of its negative aspects? It is inexplicable, as not even Hosni Mubarak’s regime employed such strategies, even when it was at its worst. The answer, in the best of cases, is that Al-Sisi must see something in the Egyptian strategy, but this issue is too long to discuss in this article.
If what I have presented regarding the intentions of the Egyptian policy in the Gaza Strip is true, then this strategy is a fatal error not only for the Palestinian cause, the resistance, the people and Egypt’s national security, but is also wrong in dealing with the terrorism in Sinai and in Egypt. Matters in Sinai have reached dangerous limits and it must be put to an end as soon as possible.
Every experience has shown that the combat of terrorism that resorts to using arms in the Arab region is not enough and that we cannot rely on a military and security response alone, despite its importance. The response must also comprise a strong and unified popular front in order to address the internal disputes and contradictions with the spirit of reconciliation and consensus.
In Egypt, the issue of armed terrorism in Sinai must be ended in order for consensus to return between the army and popular forces that participated in the January Revolution. The continued arrest and abuse of moderate Islamist forces, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as expanding the conflict and involving youth, national, Nasserist and left-wing forces will only open the door to armed terrorist forces emerging from these internal conflicts and disputes. However, there is a common ground that is objective and which allows the forces to address their disputes and resolve them, thus forming a unified and strong national front that supports the army in its fight against violent and terrorist forces in Sinai as well as across Egypt.
This allows us to see the seriousness of the crime committed against the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades by labelling them terrorists, while it is them who are fighting on the front lines against the Zionist enemy. They have proven their ability to achieve victories for the resistance in the Gaza Strip and their guns point back at the guns aimed at the chests of the Egyptian army. Not to mention the fact that the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas and all of the resistance factions in the Gaza Strip and Palestine are acting as a guard and supporters of Egypt and the Egyptian army.
Honestly, what sort of strategy has Egypt adopted today? It has waged a war against the resistance, against any resistance and the people in the Gaza Strip, while the army is being dealt treacherous blows from the terrorism in Sinai. Meanwhile, the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, the Jihad Brigades, and all the resistance factions have stressed their keenness to establish strong cooperation with Egypt’s leadership, army and people.
Translated from Arabi21, 5 February 2015
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.