The more time passes by, the more forcefully the question of the succession of President Mahmoud Abbas is raised. This is because the president is over 80 years old and his legal term in office ended about seven years ago. But still no elections have been held; nor does anyone know when and how they are likely to be held.
All the while, the president continues to insist that he will not run for a second term, meaning that the competition over succession has already started, albeit behind the scenes. This explains a lot of the decisions and exclusions that have occurred in recent months. In addition to this, the deciding parties (Fatah and Hamas) are neither mature enough nor are they willing to hold elections, despite the fact that they continuously stress that they will do so.
What is exceptionally important about the issue of presidential succession?
First, there is the continued escalation and deepening of the Palestinian division and the consequential disruption of the Legislative Council, including the lack of agreement on the presence or absence of a speaker. On one hand, Hamas insists that Dr Aziz Dweik is the legitimate speaker of the Legislative Council and therefore if there is a vacancy in the position of PA president then Dweik should fill the post for 60 days. After this, presidential elections should occur, as was the case after the assassination of President Yasser Arafat. After his death, PLC speaker Rawhi Fattouh took over the presidency until Abbas was elected.
On the other hand, Fatah says that the parliamentary session has ended and a new PLC speaker has not been elected; therefore, the speaker position is still vacant. This may explain why the president and Fatah do not want to hold a PLC session and activate it, as stipulated by the Cairo Agreement, the Doha Agreement and the Al-Shati Unity Agreement. This is because holding a session of the PLC where Hamas has the majority, even if for one session, means that the president can be elected. Therefore, if the president’s position is later vacant, then the PLC speaker chosen by Hamas will be acting president for 60 days, after which presidential elections should be held. If they are not held, then the PLC speaker will remain president until they are.
Secondly, Fatah and the president have not yet chosen a vice president, neither in Fatah, the PA or the PLO. No one knows who the second in command is or who can occupy the position from within the PA, PLO, and Fatah. During the time of Yasser Arafat, it was well known and pretty much decided who the next man would be. Abbas was the Executive Committee secretary, the maker of the Oslo Accords, first prime minister of the first government, and when Arafat left any meeting, he would ask Abbas to head it until he came back. There was also an Arab-regional-international-Israeli consensus regarding who would succeed Arafat.
At the moment, however, no one knows who will succeed the president. There is competition, rather a heated struggle for succession among a large number of Fatah Central Committee members and independents. Even Hamas has become involved after announcing that it would consider the competition for presidency by nominating one of its leaders or supporting one of the independent or Fatah nominees if more than one Fatah candidate is nominated.
Hamas member Ahmed Yousef wrote an article about two years ago in which he called for supporting the nomination of Salam Fayyad as president. I asked a prominent member of the Hamas leadership about what he thought of this invitation to support, and he said that he personally supported it and that Hamas may support it under specific conditions. This may explain the great concern and fears reflected by some decisions made, as they stem from the possibility of Hamas allying with a Fatah member or independent figures whether or not an election is held.
So far, there has been no international, Arab, regional or Israeli position regarding who will succeed the president. There are many possibilities and a number of individuals aspiring for the position, but it is unclear who will prevail. Therefore, all sides are playing the waiting game to see who they should bet on and who they should support based on who has the greater chance of winning.
This already complicated matter is further complicated by the fact that there is no political horizon and the fact that no one knows what will happen to the Palestinian situation. Will it head towards one or several rounds of negotiations and open-ended waiting, or will it head towards a confrontation – and if so, what will be the size of this confrontation; will it include the West Bank and Gaza Strip and will it reach the extent of an intifada that may spread to the Occupied Palestinian Territories? Or will it take the form of calculated waves that move from one place to another and which focuses on one or a few specific matters rather than on everything?
There are those who exaggerate the issue of presidential succession too much and who believe the only scenario if it is not resolved before the death, resignation, or illness of the president will lead to the spread of chaos and internal fighting between the aspirants for the presidency. This may be the first scenario, but it is certainly not the only scenario. What it really boils down to is that a new reality may impose itself on everyone and may push them to reconcile before it is too late.
There are those who simplify the matter to the extent that they say if the president’s position is vacant, it could be easily filled by holding a PLO Executive Committee meeting and inviting it to choose a successor from amongst its members. They also believe that the Fatah Central Committee should be invited to choose a new leader or call on the PLO Central Council to convene and elect the president chosen by Fatah or to choose another individual to head the PA and PLO. According to those who believe in this point of view, the Central Committee is the body that established the PA and can therefore choose a temporary president until presidential elections are held.
These individuals forget that Fatah hasn’t had the majority vote in a long time, and therefore does not have the right to unilateral leadership in the PLO and the PA. Moreover, the PLO no longer possesses enough legitimacy to decide who will be the next president – the PLO clinically died after the signing of the Oslo Accords.
In its current formation, the PLO is no longer practically the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians because a lot has happened since its establishment; the “Islamic trend”, in particular, is posing great competition to it over leadership and representation. Therefore, even without holding elections or achieving national consensus and reconciliation, the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the PLO and its abandonment of its efforts to establish an alternative or parallel organisation stops us from talking about legitimacy of any measure, especially after these two parties participated in the reconciliation agreements, including the Cairo Declaration in 2005, the Prisoner’s Agreement and the Cairo Agreement. This is also true after Hamas dictated its control of the Gaza Strip, reaching the extent of many Arab and international parties dealing with Hamas, especially after Israel indirectly negotiated with Hamas to exchange prisoners and to reach a long-term truce in exchange for lifting the siege.
The issue of succession is additionally important because the president, whose term is over, has not called a PNC meeting in order to renew his term or to form a new National Committee by means of elections, if possible, or by means of agreement if elections cannot be held. This means that the president possesses extraordinary privileges and does not share power, nor is he subject to the accountability or monitoring of the PA, PLO, and Fatah. We are facing a unilateral leadership in every sense of the word.
Failing to resolve the issue of succession and the failure to hold presidential and legislative elections on time, or even to reach national reconciliation to renew the PA and PLO, all suggest that the purpose behind not making any changes is to allow the leadership to play one last role. This role is to sign a final agreement on behalf of the Palestinian people – because Israel insists that such an agreement is signed – and that it would include the end of the conflict, in all of its aspects, and putting an end to all Palestinian demands.
I wrote this article in an attempt to explain what is going on, starting from the fall of Ahmed Qurei in the Fatah conference, and his success as an independent candidate in the Executive Committee elections, as well as the actions that occurred after this, which included the rise of Mohammed Dahlan, Nabil Amr, Nasser Al-Qudwa, and Marwan Barghouti. This was followed by Jibril Rajoub’s handling of the FIFA issue and Israel’s membership in the association. It also explains the actions of Salam Fayyad and Yasser Abed Rabbo, as well as the appointment of Saeb Erekat as the PLO secretary without referring to the Executive Committee, or even the Fatah Central Committee. This all is linked to the competition and fight over succession. The president does not know what to do in the face of the dangers and complications facing the Palestinian issue after the negotiations reached a dead end. No alternative path has been followed. Instead, the resident decided to keep matters unchanged until fate decides otherwise.
The president also fears that in light of America and Israel’s disagreement over some of his policies, he would be subject to the exclusion suffered by his predecessor when George W. Bush called for Arafat to step down. This may explain the repeated talk of finding coup plans from time to time in the West Bank. Abbas is also afraid that his successor will seek revenge on him by prosecuting his children.
The vacancy of the president’s position in light of the national disagreement over the management of the transitional phase and the illegitimacy of the current institutions may open the door to a number of scenarios, the best of which is still bitter. “Fear God before it is too late”; you must hold a dialogue to discuss holding a new meeting within the context of a comprehensive vision and a complete road map.
Translated from Masarat, 7 July, 2015.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.