I met a professor of agriculture recently, one of the millions of refugees from Syria. He succeeded in escaping the Assad regime’s siege of Homs that lasted from May 2011 to May 2014. Abu Sadallah is 65 years-old; he struggled to get out of Syria altogether, and reached Turkey with his wife, daughter and three sons. The lack of medication for his diabetes during the siege means that he has had some limbs amputated.
We talked together about the most viable scenario after the cessation of hostilities, or if the fragile ceasefire agreement fails; the proposed partition of his country, insisted Abu Sadallah fiercely, won’t succeed. I told him that New York Times columnist Thomas L Friedman wrote in mid-2013 that Syria’s partition is inevitable. The newspaper’s former Beirut bureau chief also claimed that although partition won’t solve all of the regional problems, it might be the most humanitarian long-term option.
“Those are the pipe dreams of the US administration,” retorted Abu Sadallah. “Syria is neither Sudan nor Bosnia. From day one of the ceasefire, I figured out that they would start talking about dividing Syria to produce an equilibrium that satisfies the warring regional powers.” The professor assured me that it will never happen. “This post-colonial scheme of partition is no more than a fanciful plan that is thoroughly unattainable and is going to fuel the fire rather than extinguish it.”
On 23 February, US Secretary of State John Kerry repeated that if the ceasefire doesn’t hold or the parties to the conflict in Syria insist on fighting “it may be too late to keep Syria whole” if we wait much longer. Thus did Kerry reveal, rather bluntly, Washington’s “Plan B” which, unsurprisingly, will be the godfather of the partition of Syria.
According to Robert Ford, there is “zero prospect” of a political deal. The former US ambassador to Syria told the Wall Street Journal, “The cessation of hostilities, if it lasts, will just lead to a de facto partition of Syria.” As such, at the moment we are not talking about the possibility of partition, but what form it will take in order to maintain equilibrium among the regional powers.
The people of the Middle East have believed — in an act of self-deception — that they could govern themselves and practice democracy by overthrowing the totalitarian regimes and dictators who were planted in the region by the supposedly departing colonial powers after World War One. Nevertheless, Russia and the US are trying to redraw national borders and demarcate a new Middle East by turning a blind eye to the suffering and sacrifice that the Syrian people have endured to maintain the territorial integrity of a multi-ethnic and democratic Syria.
Kerry is promoting the idea that after a brutal five-year war, Syria cannot be maintained as a single, integrated state, at least in the conceivable future. The US official believes that the Syrian conflict has turned into an existential war that has led to the fragmentation of the country along ethnic and sectarian lines; as such, he believes, there is no harm in formalising what is, in effect, de-facto partition.
Turkey, however, rejects the plan. It is the neighbouring country most affected by the war and, recently, Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus asserted that the Kerry plan is not feasible, as it will lead not to three distinct statelets but to 30 or more enclaves. That, insists the Turkish government, will not be for the benefit of anyone, as it will end neither the atrocities of the regime nor the growing extremism in the region.
It is well known that the Syrian population is a mosaic of different cultures and ethnic groups diffused across the whole country. While Sunni Arabs make up 74 per cent of Syria’s total population, Sunni Kurds make up 10 per cent and Alawites — a Shia sect, to which Bashar Al-Assad and his family belong — comprise roughly 13 per cent of the 22 million Syrians. Ten per cent of them are Christian and the remaining 3 per cent are Druze. These statistics have altered dramatically given the huge exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries and the swelling number of foreign fighters who have entered Syria. A partition of the country would not only be based on confessional or ethnic lines, but also other factors, such as social class, urban or rural background, and even regional loyalties; all need to be taken into account.
Keenly aware of this, Turkey firmly rejects any sort of partition that may offer Syrian Kurds an autonomous statelet that would provide a cross-border refuge for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Ankara has designated as a terrorist organisation. It would also revive the Kurds’ dream of secession by having an independent “Kurdistan” that would, of course, cosy up to Assad and be hostile to Turkey. Moreover, the US regards the Syrian Kurds as a worthy long-term investment, particularly after they have proven, from America’s perspective, to be the most effective power against Daesh and so deserve to be rewarded.
Iran is a crucially influential player in the proposed plan, and was expected to support it fully. However, it appears that the government in Tehran is not entirely happy with the latest moves by the US and Russia and, despite the frosty relationship between Iran and its regional rival Turkey due to serious differences over Syria, the Turkish prime minister rather surprisingly visited the Islamic Republic last week. Ahmet Davutoglu released a statement confirming that regardless of genuine differences over a number of issues, Ankara and Tehran cannot change their history or geopolitical privileges as both countries are complementary pieces of the regional puzzle.
“The fate and destiny of our region should not be determined by outside powers,” asserted Davutoglu during his visit. Equally positive rhetoric was heard from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. “Iran and Turkey have mutual goals and interests and we must reinforce the foundations of reconciliation and stability in the region by developing joint collaboration and concentrating on defeating terrorism,” he said. “We believe that regional problems should be settled by regional countries and nations.”
Rouhani proclaimed recently that being strategic partners doesn’t necessarily mean that Tehran’s strategies correspond totally with Russia’s. That has been perceived as a clear sign of Iranian dissatisfaction with the undeclared US-Russia agreement on Syria as leaked to the media.
It is the Syrian regime, Russia and America’s most recent allies, the Syrian Kurds, who are intended to take the biggest slice of the partition pie. The Kurds have been promoting a self-governing mini-state where they can have an autonomous entity like that of the Iraqi Kurds. Such a canton system would produce an Alawite-dominated statelet on the Syrian coast that would guarantee Moscow’s long-term hold on its naval facility at Tartous.
Kerry’s plan “B” offers this federal or canton system as the most effective strategy to resolve the Syrian conflict. Its weakness is that it disregards the will of the majority of Syrians, who will not accept such schemes easily.
The revolution in Syria started as peaceful pro-democracy protests proclaiming democratic rights; it was not an armed uprising demanding an Islamic State or promoting one family, sect or tribe over any other. The mainstream media in the West has succeeded in labelling it as a civil war after bloodthirsty extremists were ostensibly summoned to justify Western passivity and inaction. Daesh not only derailed the peaceful revolution but also generated a strong incentive for the Assad regime to continue with its barbaric, excessive use of power under the pretext of fighting extremism and “takfirism”.
Thanks to Daesh, the Syrian revolution has been turned into a swamp of proxy wars distorted into a battle between Sunni and Shia. Although it was believed that the argument will be resolved by predominantly external players, it has become very clear that it is an exceptionally high-stakes game of existential issues in which concessions are difficult if not impossible. Those external players — represented latterly by Russia’s military intervention — have turned Syria into zones of influence such as the government-held area, the Syrian Kurd-held area, rebel-held areas and Daesh. The de facto partition of Syria is before us. Legitimising it will face many obstacles and challenge Kerry’s plan.
Unexpectedly, the Syrian people made their view point clear with their demonstrations on the streets of rebel-held territories immediately after the ceasefire was declared. Demonstrators chanted, “One, one, one, the Syrian people are one”, a throwback to the start of their peaceful pro-democracy protests five years ago.
Even if Kerry’s plan goes ahead, though, and Syria is divided into autonomous statelets, will it rein-in the extremists? Syrians are aware that it is the nature of Daesh to breach agreements.
The most vulnerable victim of a permanent division would be the Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Will they be welcomed back by “sovereign” entities? Or will they end up like the neighbouring Palestinians, and be homeless for decades, with pledges about the “right to return” being nothing more than worthless statements on pieces of paper?
Kerry’s plan is a stain on humanity as it gives carte blanche to all dictators and autocratic regimes to commit more war crimes against their oppressed nations. The more blood that they shed, the more that the paralysed international community will accelerate the partitioning process to provide immunity for the dictators and their henchmen, with coastal resorts bestowed upon them by way of reward for their tyranny.
Eventually, it will be the Syrian people who will continue their revolution and stand up to the challenge of Assad’s brutality and Daesh terrorism. Importing experimental US plans will simply lead to the perpetuation of the war, continued oppression and the further repression of the will of the people.
Ahmed Al-Burai is a lecturer at Istanbul Aydin University. He has worked with the BBC World Service Trust and LA Times in Gaza. Currently based in Istanbul, his main interest is Middle Eastern affairs.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.