Iraq's ticking bomb and its impact on the region

It is not difficult to conclude that what is happening in Iraq with regards to the so-called ISIS is a form of deception. It is true that the organisation is at the forefront of current events and is the most influential, but what is happening cannot be chalked up to only hundreds, or even thousands of the armed group’s fighters. If it was, what would be the need of the millions of volunteers that Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s circles have talked about? He has an army, brutal security services and tanks, as well as aircraft. There is also support from Iran (as well as the US) on various levels; would Iran supply aircraft without pilots to fly them?

The situation in Iraq is a clear declaration from the Sunni Arabs that they have completely lost hope in the political process as it stands today. They are unconvinced that it will give them a dignified existence following the US occupation, even though they played the greatest role and have been given the most credit for the defeat of the US invasion.

We are witnessing an uprising of Iraqi factions against oppression, marginalisation and exclusion, after they have exhausted every path that could lead them to a reasonable situation in which they could live alongside other Iraqis.

Sunni Arab politicians and their tribes have spent years chasing after Al-Maliki in order for him to give them something that would save face in front of their supporters, but that has been in vain. A group of these politicians formed what is known as Sahwat (literally, “revivalists”; a US initiative around 2006 to bring the dissident Sunni tribes on board in Iraq), despite their ethical problems, but Maliki betrayed them. They participated in the elections and their list of candidates was ranked first. Iran then intervened and rearranged Shiite affairs, keeping Al-Maliki as Prime Minister while he continued to exercise his policies of exclusion and marginalisation against Sunni and some Shiite factions.

Muqtada Al-Sadr’s cries against Al-Maliki are merely a form of expressing the anger of one faction of the Shiites, but the man who gave himself over to Iran and is controlled by his obsession with power, did not pay any attention at all, and remained adamant regarding his positions while disregarding the others.

Over time, the Sunni Arabs are heading in the direction of hopelessness regarding the political process. When the Arab Spring began, they decided to reproduce it by means of a peaceful sit-in in protest at injustice and marginalisation, but Al-Maliki responded with killing and death; what else should they do?

The Sunni Arabs clashed with Al-Maliki’s army in Al-Anbar and Fallujah, which resulted in holding new elections. However, the Sunnis boycotted the elections due to their rejection of the process, while others were forced not to participate due to the war. The result of this was that this faction only gained half the votes they gained during the previous election, ending in the worst result of all. The resounding response to these constant insults was the people’s siding with the state.

I have said personally over and over again, that once the state in Iraq began to decline years ago it was linked to the political process and what can be given to the Sunni Arabs, given their hopelessness towards the process, in order to push them to give greater popular support for the state, thus giving it more power. The latest battles were not solely the doing of the Sunnis (despite being the strongest); they were joined by other factions, most importantly the tribal rebels who took up arms to defend themselves. The relative satisfaction felt in Mosul, the least violent Sunni Arab city, with regards to what happened, is a confirmation of the hopelessness felt by this section of the population towards the political process.

There is no doubt that part of what has happened since the US occupation was linked to the foolishness of some Sunni political leaders, in addition to Al-Maliki and his predecessors’ sectarianism. Al-Maliki was able to manipulate these Sunni leaders at all times by granting them marginal benefits while he controlled everything in Iraq, including the army, security services and civilian institutions, in addition to an intervention that resulted in the war on the Syrian people in favour of Bashar. This provoked the Sunni Arabs who sympathise with their fellow Syrians even more.

Today, politics is absent in Iraq and the Sunni politicians have disappeared from the scene as they are backing out in shame, while the Shiite politicians are dressed for war. This is all due to Iran, which supported Al-Maliki’s sectarianism on one hand and killed the Syrian people on the other with an air of arrogance and egotism that will end naturally in the imposition of two wars at once; one in Syria, the other in Iraq.

There is an important question that raises itself in this context. Are there consequences to what is occurring at the moment on Iraq’s unity, especially in light of the current opportunistic behaviour employed by the Kurds while bargaining with Al-Maliki for concessions in their favour in Kirkuk, as well as the oil issue? They may even go as far as declaring full independence after taking other parts of northern Iraq, as well as Kirkuk, and also in light of the expansion of the separation demands (either full independence or a flexible federation) amongst the Sunni Arabs. Perhaps if this option is embraced later by Shiite factions it would be preferable to continued conflict, especially since most of Iraq’s wealth is found in the south, if we consider that northern Kurdistan is practically independent and exports its oil through Turkey in any case.

It is difficult to answer a question of this sort with certainty; the next path will depend on the developments in the region because all the issues seem to be interlinked, especially since the crisis in the region seems to be linked to the conflict with Iranian expansion which has reached a level of arrogance and power that is intolerable to the other countries in the region, including Turkey. Even if government officials tolerate this, the masses will not, as evidenced by what has happened in Iraq as well as the events in Syria.

The division option seems very dangerous as it may extend to other countries, including Iran, which also has its internal pluralism and many injustices. This will affect the Iranians as well as the Turks because it will revive calls for a Kurdish state. However, this seems unlikely in the near future, which means that the conflict in Syria and Iraq will continue to drain Iran more and more. This may cause Iran to come to its senses and accept an understanding on all pending issues in a manner that satisfies Turkey and the Arab world.

On the other hand, this is also connected to the outcome of the ongoing dialogue regarding the nuclear issue between America and the West on one hand and Iran on the other; it is connected to the internal struggle in Iran between the reformists and conservatives, especially since the former seem less inclined to escalate conflicts with their neighbours and will pay more attention to internal affairs, which was the reason behind President Rouhani’s election victory.

Therefore, the issue begins and ends with Iran. If it does not begin to recognise its size and capabilities and stop underestimating the rest of the nation, then things will not calm down. On the contrary there would be open-ended war, which would be long and expensive for everyone, because sectarian wars are the bloodiest wars.

The majority of Sunnis certainly did not choose war; it has been imposed on them. They counted on the Arab Spring to promote political change, which Iran and Syria opposed. Perhaps that is what contributed to making Iran more arrogant, especially after Egypt was eliminated from the circle of influence by means of the coup against its great revolution.

Translated from Al Jazeera net 15 June 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.