The New Ennahda

The tenth Ennahda conference is the topic of discussion in streets, coffee shops and behind the scenes. It is the main topic for May in Tunisia. In a few days, we may not be talking about Ennahda as the party may come out of its conference with a new name. Some will then fill their free time with jokes and mockery of the new name. Cynics will resort to air conditioned areas to face the heat of climate change and the heat of Ennahda’s change of appearance and actions with which it imposes rules on the political game in an area where it appears to be the only player.

Let me say that it is the only player that can actually score some goals. Some of these goals may not be against the opponents as some shots could bounce back at it. Is Ennahda expected to stand still until others start thinking of change? The law of motion says move or die. Let those standing still die while we continue building our foundation while not forgetting to be cautious.

Special Ennahda for every Tunisian

Speaking about Ennahda has a lot of emotions and is not only a rational analysis that is based on theoretical backgrounds in politics and sociology. Everyone wants a Ennahda that suits their mood and only a few would accept it as it is now. Some want it to be a memory in history after dissolving and disappearing, forgetting that if that were to happen, it would deprive them of the only task they’ve dedicated their lives to; the fight against Ennahda.

Others want it to be a pliant bloc that has no programme so they can use it as a ladder towards their own personal glory. Others want it to fight all wars for them and to hand them over a country without a corrupt system, and it is OK for it to disappear after accomplishing that task. Yet others want it to rebuild the glory of the Islamic nation so they wake up to an established Muslim nation.

But, Ennahda is not for anyone; it is for itself and for its projects, for which it is fighting a battle of existence. It is taking colour so people see it and stop denying it. It may also aspire for people to accept it and to change their demands so it becomes one of them after a long period of denial and stalemate. It  does not deny its wish to rule. All wise people will be interested in the new project.

Who is the new Ennahda?

Ennahda announced the launch of a process through which it is changing into a political party with Islamic reference. We have not heard of this before, so no one can compare it to anything else. Some compare it with the evolution of democratic Christian parties in Europe but the experience in the Arab area looks new and opens the door for discussion in political meetings which could have a major impact on theories and practice in the region. Ennahda poses a new intellectual challenge with questions deeper than the theoretical.

If the evolution of Ennahda moved towards developing new terms of reference in the religious text and towards the development of political practices, then it is legitimate to do so as an ideological movement and a political party at the same time. This, however, will stay on hold until there is a plan to propose an independent development process that has an effective social content. This will test the endeavour. Perhaps we can say we must practice until the difference is clear.

New lines of development are a thermometer for actual change

Within the required development line, the party will collide with active social forces which seem not to be busy with jurisprudence in religious text as much as with worldly gains. They have multiple contradictory demands but their priorities do not include discussing the relation of Islam with the civil state or with ways of finding harmony between worship and earning a living.

People might think that Ennahda was actually dragged into this trap. Replying to the contradictory demands of social powers lies in the ability to rebuild the country economically in a manner that allows for solving the dilemmas of employment, addressing regional disparities which made the country live in a state that can at any moment start a civil war.

Was Ennahda not supposed to change its ideology because social powers appear not to be interested in any ideological or philosophical project?

Between social greed – which leads broad categories of people to work for their own personal, sectarian and factional interests – and between the innovations of a new theory in governance, Ennahda is going through very narrow passages to impose a deep discussion that only the lazy can ignore.

As for how the new ideology (civil Islam or social Islam) would accommodate an independent development line, I believe that is that this is the true innovation expected from Ennahda now, not because it was an Islamic party (and wishes to become civil), but because it has the courage to express change from within and to accept external change imposed by the revolution after half a century of very stubborn ideas, positions and policies from all parties. Does Ennahda have the means for that?

Structural and objective barriers

Ennahda is not alone although it is the most active. It is moving along with a body that has not yet healed all its wounds. There is a real battle between different generations of the party such as those from the 1990s and the new supporters who were raised outside the secret organisation and did not learn from the same struggles. There are young people who learned religion from television Sheikhs and have closed up and maybe takfiri tendencies which the first generation is currently struggling to curb. In addition, there is a form of intellectual laziness where members of the party are no longer readers; Ghannouchi himself sadly admitted this referring to them as the generation of fast food intellect.

Social powers which I mentioned are not waiting for a party of righteous people, but perhaps the opposite is true (they want a corrupt party no matter what it is called, and they will not accept Ennahda unless they get it involved in corruption). Political opponents, from the left and right will not accept Ennahda even if it changed completely. If they accept it, that means they allow it to take over while everyone measures their own strength in comparison with it and finds themselves weak. Some have actually dedicated themselves to its hostility and assigned themselves with one task: standing in its way.

Externally, the Tunisian scene is mainly governed by the relationship with France, the most vicious enemy of Ennahda and the like. France classifies Ennahda as an enemy and does not believe its transformation no matter how much it eases its religious discourse. The French press reveals hostility towards the internal changes within Ennahda.

Despite what is said about the US’s attempt to enable a Muslim experience from adapting, caution prevails especially following what the Americans are doing to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The party is thus in hostile local, regional and international surroundings but it insists on moving on with its project. This must be classified as moral and political courage and we should expect a direct and deep impact in the Tunisian scene. Some may go as far as anticipating repercussions on the rest of the political Islamic movements in the Arab region. This gives way to a horizon of discussion and thinking, but let members of Ennahda remember that the root cause of social conflict is material gain and not intellectual pleasure. Perhaps we can whisper a congratulatory remark on the occasion of their conference’s success saying that they should change the name of the suburb where their headquarter is located to Muawiya’s Place, as Muawiya’s history should be read now.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.