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Sudan army’s strategic gains in Darfur, West Kordofan raise hope of ending El Fasher siege and the war

Khalil Charles
5 days ago

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People lift national flags and placards during a rally called for by Sudan's Popular Front for Liberation and Justice in Port Sudan on April 24, 2025, to denounce the siege imposed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on El-Fasher city and express support for its residents. [AFP/Getty Images]

People lift national flags and placards during a rally called for by Sudan's Popular Front for Liberation and Justice in Port Sudan on April 24, 2025, to denounce the siege imposed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on El-Fasher city and express support for its residents. [AFP/Getty Images]

The Governor of Darfur Region, Minni Arko Minawi, announced on Sunday that the Sudanese army and allied Joint Forces had taken control of the strategic Wadi Al-Atrun area, located in the border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Chad.

The victory moves the joint forces closer to easing the siege on El Fasher which has been surrounded by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for almost the duration of the two-year conflict. Minawi, who oversees the Joint Force, said in a tweet on X: “Our heroes in the Armed Forces and the Joint Forces are achieving great victories by liberating the strategic Al-Atrun area from the grip of the terrorist Rapid Support militia.” He went on to say: “We bring good news to our people in the Darfur region that victory is imminent, and soon we will celebrate in all the streets.”

In addition, another Joint Force spokesperson said the capture of Al-Atrun Oasis was important because it is located on a strategic road linking the Northern State, North Darfur State, and the border triangle area. The movement by the army and its allies in the desert area coincides with another movement in the Kordofan region aimed at reaching the Darfur region and ending the siege of El Fasher. The move has been importantly described as the fourth phase of the war.

The first phase was to absorb the RSF’s initial advances after the war broke out in April 2023 and encircling the army’s key military positions. The second was marked by the capture of the Nile Bridges in Khartoum; followed by the capture of Sennar, Wad Medini and large parts of Blue Nile, closing the year with significant territorial gains. In the third operations phase between January and May this year, the military pushed the RSF out of central Sudan, including the final recapture of the Presidential Palace, as well as reconnecting military camps across Sudan. Now, after the breaking of the siege on Obeid in North Kordofan in February, the military shifted its main operations to West and South Kordofan. This marks the fourth phase as it moves toward Darfur.

Reports say the military is now pushing west in an offensive toward the RSF in Darfur via three axes — one from Northern State and two through South and West Kordofan, with notable gains to date. In West Kordofan’s Khawi, the military destroyed a large RSF contingent. In South Kordofan, it advanced into a number of key locations, including the Kalogi locality, where the main base of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, is now within its reach.

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Senior RSF sources told media outlets that the paramilitary group is equipping special forces in West Darfur’s Geneina specifically trained to defend RSF-held territory and engage the military’s advancing units. Meanwhile, in the capital, Khartoum, the military resumed its push to eliminate the remaining RSF pockets in Omdurman, amassing troops in the city as well as in northern White Nile State, bordering the capital. Several neighbourhoods fell to the military in recent weeks.

In addition, there have been new developments following the Arab League Summit in which Jordan has been tasked to mediate efforts to reestablish Sudan’s diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Jordan is to guide an Arab League-led diplomatic push to find common ground for a potential agreement between Sudan and the UAE, informed sources told the Mada Masr news outlet. The Arab League has proposed a de-escalation framework, but a source in Foreign Ministry familiar with the talks is willing to consider solutions only if UAE permanently halts funding and support for the RSF and refrains from any interference, recognising the war as a domestic matter.

In parallel, Sudan’s government spokesperson Khaled Al-Eaisar issued a call asking China to urgently intervene. He accused Abu Dhabi of breaching its obligations under arms procurement agreements and end-user certificates with China by supplying the RSF with Chinese-made suicide and strategic drones which he said threaten Sudan National security.

“We in the Sudanese government view the UAE’s involvement in fuelling the war and committing massacres against the Sudanese people as grounds for the Chinese government to take a firm and urgent stance to disable the technologies used in operating these drones,” Al-Eaisar said. “That is in order to uphold its international credibility and honour its longstanding relationship with Sudan and its people.”

It is clear that Sudan is using all possible means – diplomatic, military and other means – to counteract the constant attacks that the RSF, which is assisted by foreign powers, has waged against the Sudan government for the past two years. However, observers appear to be convinced that despite the difficulties, Sudan is slowly rebuilding its confidence and politically reorganising the inner workings of its nation. The fourth phase of Sudan’s war effort is not merely to bring Darfur under its control but to reconstruct the vitality and the future prosperity of the country.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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