Why the West’s project to overthrow Iran’s government is doomed to fail

In the closing months of 2025, the political landscape of the Middle East once again saw the revival of a decades-old idea that, despite repeated failures, remains alive in Western power circles: regime change in Iran through external pressure, particularly military intervention. Following direct clashes between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other, the discourse of intervention has returned to the forefront of Western media and political debate. This is despite the fact that neither past experiences in the region—from Iraq and Libya to Afghanistan—nor expert analyses support the feasibility or positive outcomes of such a path. This report offers a documented, analytical look into the failures, contradictions, and consequences of the regime change policy toward Iran.

The policy of regime change in Iran has always been based on the assumption that external pressure can rapidly dismantle the country’s political structure. However, in reality, Iran’s governing system has developed a network of defensive, intelligence, and public mobilisation institutions capable of responding to such scenarios in the face of intense economic, military, and political pressures.

Contrary to popular belief, domestic protests and widespread societal discontent are not necessarily signs that the public is ready to accept a power vacuum or foreign intervention. In many instances, external pressure has not weakened the regime; instead, it has reinforced its internal cohesion and provoked nationalist sentiments.

This policy—pursued by Washington and its allies in various forms since the 1980s—has not only failed in the case of Iran but has also produced instability rather than lasting political transformation in other countries. Experiences in Libya and Venezuela show that relying on external pressure without internal consensus leads to chaos, not sustainable change. In Iran, the regime sustains itself not merely through repression but also via social connections and ideological cohesion. Thus, change imposed from the outside—without first disrupting these internal bonds—has consistently failed. The continued push for this outdated policy reflects not a solution, but a lack of strategic imagination in Western foreign policy.

The paradox of engineered collapse

Policies such as harsh sanctions or military threats have not weakened the regime. Instead, by worsening public living conditions and eroding civil institutions, they have had the opposite effect. What is presented as support for freedom in practice accelerates social and economic collapse. The case of Iraq clearly shows that toppling a government without building replacement structures results not in order, but in chaos.

Recent foreign maneuvers against Iran echo past scenarios seen in Libya and Syria, where rapid regime change brought prolonged instability instead of stability. Poorly planned interventions have led not to rebuilding but to orchestrated disorder, the consequences of which continue to unfold.

A targeted collapse without consideration for Iran’s complex social and political structures paves the way for divergent forces to emerge. Contrary to what some Western governments believe, the Islamic Republic is not just a political regime—it is deeply embedded in religious, military, and ideological institutions that form part of the Iranian state identity. Therefore, efforts to force its collapse without a gradual and deliberate replacement process lead not to liberation, but to the reproduction of structural violence.

Internal cohesion and the regime’s adaptive capacity

One critical miscalculation in confronting Iran is the failure to recognize the regime’s ability to adapt to both internal and external pressures. Despite mounting economic crises and public dissatisfaction, the ruling system has managed to maintain its position by internally recalibrating, relying on security forces, and leveraging religious and nationalist narratives.

What is sometimes interpreted as a looming collapse due to the state-society divide may instead reflect a negotiation process seen in many transitional societies. Iran’s ideological and military structures are capable of not only defending themselves during crises but also generating new legitimacy for the regime.

In addition to structural flexibility, the regime effectively employs soft power tools: control over domestic media, the strengthening of religious charities, and ideological mobilization in schools and universities are all part of the system’s legitimacy-building apparatus. Furthermore, by exploiting foreign threats to evoke a sense of “national victimhood,” the regime has succeeded in fostering a feeling of solidarity—even among some discontented segments—against an “external enemy.” These soft tools complement the hard security apparatus, greatly boosting the regime’s resilience and adaptability, especially during the crises of 2025.

Empirical evidence shows that regime change through external means rarely leads to democracy. Instead, it often empowers more extremist forces and spreads instability. In Iran’s case—given its ethnic, religious diversity and critical geopolitical position—such a scenario could have catastrophic consequences. A power vacuum would sharply increase the risks of civil conflict and separatist movements.

The absence of a clear transition plan would severely threaten not only Iran’s internal security but also the region’s stability. The emergence of extremist groups, growing violence, and waves of migration would be just some of the potential consequences of such an unstructured situation.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return serve as a stark warning of the unforeseen results of regime change. When power vacuums are filled by armed ideological groups, democracy is not achieved—it is postponed for decades. In Iran, similar conditions could empower quasi-state military factions or remnants of the previous regime, now operating in even more extreme ways. This is why any externally imposed idea of change, without an endogenous and gradual process, will only further dim the prospects of democracy.

Lessons not learned from Iraq and Afghanistan

The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear that top-down regime change—even with military might—does not necessarily lead to lasting order. In the absence of legitimate and functional institutions, what follows is power vacuums, instability, and cycles of violence. In Iraq, the structural vacuum post-Saddam allowed extremism to thrive—a pattern that could easily repeat in Iran under similar conditions.

The developments of 2025 demonstrate that, despite unprecedented pressures, Iran has not only preserved its system but, in some cases, redefined its political and security positions and rebuilt its regional standing. This seriously undermines claims that quick collapse is a viable or effective strategy.

Meanwhile, the human costs of such interventions have been far greater than anticipated. In just the early years of the Iraq war, over 500,000 civilians were killed or displaced. In Afghanistan, an incomplete state-building project meant that, after two decades of Western military presence, the entire structure collapsed in a matter of weeks. Repeating the same path in Iran—a more complex, rooted, and regionally integrated state—is not only illogical but shows a failure to learn from history.

The dead end of confrontational policy and the need for strategic rethinking

The continued use of coercive measures aimed at removing Iran’s governing structure has not only failed but has become a new source of regional instability. These strategies bring neither security nor development. In contrast, a set of policies based on dialogue, diplomatic openings, and empowering civil forces within Iran offers a more rational path forward.

Unless Western policymakers abandon the allure of quick military solutions, any intervention will merely reproduce the same crises experienced in the Middle East for decades. Only by understanding Iran’s historical, cultural, and social realities can an effective and humane strategy be formulated.

As the world moves toward a multipolar order, the persistence of force-based approaches and disregard for national sovereignty will increasingly meet resistance from emerging powers. China, Russia, and even some Arab states have shown less inclination to support confrontational projects against Iran. This trend could leave the US geopolitically isolated at a time when multilateral cooperation is more crucial than ever for addressing global crises. A rational strategy lies not in eliminating a regime but in engaging with it purposefully to foster gradual, internal change.

From the illusion of interventionism to diplomatic realism

All the evidence and past experiences reviewed here suggest that the policy of regime change in Iran—whether through crippling sanctions or military threats—is ineffective, costly, and dangerously unpredictable for the region. On one hand, Iran’s ruling structure has maintained its stability; on the other, the international community has come to feel the true costs of interventionist approaches more than ever.

If the real intention is to support the Iranian people, then the focus must be on diplomacy, respect for national sovereignty, and empowering indigenous transformations. Lasting change does not emerge from the barrel of a gun or foreign interference—it can only come from within Iranian society, where, if given space, the seeds of transformation can take root and grow.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.