The King Abdullah of Jordan warned other Arab leaders to take the lead on initiating reform—or risk having it imposed on them, newly declassified British documents reveal.
The United States and the United Kingdom relied on Abdullah to encourage other Arab governments to adopt “home-grown” comprehensive reforms rather than delay action until external forces demanded it.
Abdullah’s warning came in early 2004, following the launch of the US-led Greater Middle East Partnership (GME) initiative, supported by the UK. According to records released by the UK Prime Minister’s and Cabinet Offices, Britain viewed Jordan as a model of reform for other Arab nations to follow, rather than letting the Palestinian cause serve as a pretext for delay.
Less than a year after the US-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, President George W. Bush’s administration introduced the GME to promote reform and democratisation across the Middle East. To promote the initiative, Marc Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was sent on a regional tour.
In March 2004, during a meeting at 10 Downing Street, King Abdullah told then-Prime Minister Tony Blair that he was working to persuade Arab governments to use the upcoming Arab League Summit—to be held at the end of the month—to “generate a home-grown process” of reform. He stressed that the US tendency to dictate reform through the GME was “not helpful.”
The meeting records show that Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Al-Muasher informed British officials he had discussed the matter with the Egyptians and planned to speak to the Saudis about the King’s initiative.
Dr Mohammed Halaiqa, Jordan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry, noted that Al-Muasher had spoken with the Egyptians about adopting “language on good governance, transparency, human rights, and gender issues.” He added that in Cairo, Al-Muasher had argued that if Arab states didn’t take the lead, “reform would be imposed.”
Blair supported the “basic” US vision, noting that “security ultimately depends on political stability.” However, he also endorsed King Abdullah’s approach, agreeing that Arab leadership on reform was “absolutely right” strategy.
Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Blair’s Foreign Policy and Defence Adviser, echoed this view, stating that the US wanted the initiative “to come from the region.” Grossman’s mission, he added, was intended to “promote demand”—from civil society, for example.
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Blair concluded that if the Arab League presented its own position on reform, the US and EU would support it. But he warned that if no such initiative emerged, President Bush would “feel obliged to push for it.” King Abdullah strongly agreed, reiterating his message to Arab leaders: “Take the lead [on reform], or it will be a headache.”
The documents reveal that the UK and Jordan agreed the Arab Business Council was the best conduit to outline a “blueprint” for reform.
Ahead of the Blair-Abdullah meeting, internal British deliberations concluded that Middle East reform was a “high priority” for the UK, EU, and US, and that the Jordanian king “should be a key partner in our work for Middle East reform.” However, they recognized that Abdullah needed reassurance that the UK and US understood regional sensitivities, and that Britain was promoting a “pragmatic, demand-driven approach” to reform.
A proposal to remove barriers to investment in the region was seen as reflecting this pragmatic approach.
It was also agreed that UK policy toward the Middle East should emphasize that while progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would “obviously improve the atmosphere” for reform, the lack of peace “should not serve as an excuse” to avoid necessary changes and reform. Jordan, officials argued, demonstrated that reform “can take place in parallel to its efforts on the peace process”.
In this context, maintaining a close relationship with Jordan was deemed essential. British departments urged Blair and his ministers to seek the King’s advice on issues like economic reform, women’s rights, and participatory governance in the Middle East. They also sought Jordanian perspectives on how to build regional partnerships and “get the Egyptians and the Saudis on board.”
The UK also relied on King Abdullah to “stimulate regional language and activity on reform” at the Arab League Summit, then scheduled for late March 2004. The relationship with Jordan was considered vital for ensuring “good access to areas of instability” in the region.
Blair’s advisers and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office acknowledged concerns in the region that the US GME initiative aimed to impose reforms on Arab governments. British officials were advised to reassure Abdullah that the UK sought a partnership with the region—while emphasising that “the region needs to take the lead.”
In early 2003, the British were concerned that King Abdullah might delay the Jordanian general election, originally scheduled for November 2001. British reports on Jordanian affairs concluded that the King had postponed the vote several times due to fears that Islamic opposition groups could make unprecedented gains, as well as due to regional instability—particularly the ongoing Second Intifada in Palestine.
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Tony Blair was advised that, when meeting King Abdullah, he should encourage him not to delay the vote any further. A general election was eventually held in June 2003, the first since 1997.
The Islamic Action Front—the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood—emerged from the election as the largest political bloc, winning 17 seats and securing about 10.5 per cent of the vote. This was one of the defining features of the election. British assessments concluded that the King and his new government were eager to use the new parliament to advance their reform and modernization agenda.
The documents also show that British officials were involved in internal Jordanian discussions on reform. Andrew Adonis, Blair’s head of policy, encouraged King Abdullah to lead the regional reform effort. During a private seminar on political reform held in Amman at the end of August 2003—attended by Queen Rania —Adonis wrote that the King wanted to send “a big regional reform message” and position Jordan “more strongly as the modern and open Islamic state”.
In separate discussions with King Abdullah and Al-Muasher, Adonis noted that reform-minded ministers were persuading the King to pursue “some fairly bold political reforms.” These included reducing censorship and the role of the security services, selling government stakes in the media, judicial reforms to promote individual rights, and a new political party law to encourage stronger and more representative parties in parliament.
Adonis also observed that Queen Rania was an active participant in the seminar and that Al-Muasher was a “strong champion” of domestic political reform. Ministers expressed interest in public service reform and improving service delivery. Adonis provided them with extensive material on the UK’s experience and reform programs.
Although King Abdullah “seemed impressed,” some royal court officials present were described as “more cautious.”
Due to deep divisions among Arab leaders over how to respond to U.S. pressure, the Arab League Summit was postponed from March until May 2004. There, Arab leaders adopted a 13-point “Reform Document”—the first joint regional pledge for reform by the 22-member League. However, the document linked reform efforts to a just settlement of the region’s conflicts, particularly the Palestinian issue.
In 2005, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak allowed members of the politically banned Muslim Brotherhood to contest the general election as independents. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), led by Mubarak, won an overwhelming majority of seats in the People’s Assembly (Parliament). However, Brotherhood candidates achieved significant success, winning 80 seats—around 20 per cent of the parliament—marking a dramatic gain compared to previous elections.
Five years later, Mubarak’s regime rigged the 2010 elections to prevent Islamists and other opposition candidates from re-entering parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd Party—the second-largest opposition group—boycotted the second round of voting, citing widespread fraud in the first round.
As a result, the MB was left with no representation in the new legislature. This exclusion was one of the factors that fueled public anger and contributed to the 2011 revolution, which ultimately led to Mubarak’s downfall.
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