Iran’s nuclear development and the limits of coercive strategy

Both Donald Trump and Israeli leaders fundamentally misjudged the nature of Iran’s nuclear file. The “maximum pressure” campaign, culminating in a joint 12-day military assault by the US and Israel, ultimately had no tangible effect on dismantling Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Between 2005 and 2014, Iran succeeded in creating an irreversible reality on the ground: by delaying a final agreement with world powers, it used the time to complete the nuclear knowledge cycle and build a chain of expertise. This shift redefined the playing field of diplomacy and the nature of negotiations.

Unlike Iraq, Syria, or Libya, Iran did not simply import and install nuclear infrastructure. Instead, it localised and embedded nuclear knowledge by establishing nuclear physics departments at its universities, training several generations of students, and advancing its own scientific and engineering expertise. This is precisely why the Obama administration adopted a strategy of containment, seeking to manage Iran’s nuclear capacity through one of the most rigorous inspection regimes ever implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This approach sharply contrasted with the Bush and Trump administrations’ doctrine of freezing or entirely dismantling Iran’s nuclear program.

Israel was fully aware of Iran’s growing nuclear knowledge base and infrastructure. This is why figures like Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad, initiated a covert sabotage campaign aimed at disrupting Iran’s nuclear knowledge cycle. The strategy had multiple phases: first, the development of the Stuxnet virus, designed to damage centrifuge cascades at enrichment sites; and second, a more dangerous escalation involving the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists.

This marked the first time in modern history that a coalition of states systematically attempted to suppress the scientific knowledge of another country. Yet the US-Israeli pressure campaign, despite spanning over two decades, has done little more than cause short-term delays. Even after a series of military strikes and the assassination of at least ten key figures in Iran’s nuclear program, there is every reason to believe that Iran could eventually restore and rebuild its capabilities.

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Failing to recognise the fundamental difference between Iran’s nuclear case and those of Iraq, Syria, and Libya was the Trump administration’s greatest analytical error. This misperception was largely shaped by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has staked his political identity on opposing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The longer the nuclear issue drags on, the more Netanyahu can frame Iran as an existential threat, justifying his continued relevance in Israeli politics.

But the reality is this: no meaningful disruption has been achieved in Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Iranian officials have repeatedly declared that they will never accept any formula that involves shutting down their nuclear knowledge base or ceasing enrichment altogether. What they have shown willingness for is limiting enrichment levels or creating a multilateral consortium, regional or global, for uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel production.

US policymakers must also recognise that despite internal divisions and dissatisfaction with the ruling elite in Tehran, Iran’s national memory is highly sensitive to foreign pressure. It can easily ignite a powerful wave of patriotic resistance. A key factor behind the 1979 revolution was the 1953 CIA-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, which led to the rise of a regime that, in the eyes of many Iranians, betrayed the nation by capitulating to Western interests in the oil dispute.

The recent wave of military strikes and assassinations during the 12-day war triggered a surge of patriotic sentiment, even among many critics of the regime. For a significant portion of Iranians, there is no justification for the destruction of scientific infrastructure or the killing of their nuclear scientists. Instead, they view a monitored, legally grounded agreement as both achievable and desirable. The election of a moderate president last year was widely interpreted as a popular effort to return to the path of diplomacy.

Such a deal, however, is fundamentally different from a strategy that involves assassinations, airstrikes, and the use of bunker-buster bombs. Unless US policymakers revise their flawed assumptions about the nature of Iran’s nuclear trajectory, no meaningful agreement will be visible on the horizon.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.