The limits of Iran’s emerging “pragmatist prescription”

A recent Financial Times article, “Scions of Iran’s revolution call for reset with the world,” highlights a growing current among a new generation of Iranian political elites—many of them sons and daughters of the Islamic Republic’s founding figures—who argue that Iran must fundamentally recalibrate its foreign policy. Among the most striking voices is Hamzeh Safavi, son of a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) commander, and senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, who contends that Iran must decide whether it wishes to “challenge or support” the regional and global order. Central to this proposed recalibration is a willingness to moderate long-standing ideological positions, most notably Iran’s stance on Israel–Palestine.

Safavi and like-minded figures suggest that Iran could signal its readiness to operate within internationally recognised frameworks by supporting the Saudi-backed Arab Peace Initiative and its two-state solution. Such a shift, they argue, would demonstrate that Iran does not seek to undermine the international order, reduce regional tensions, alleviate security threats, and ultimately facilitate economic recovery by lowering Iran’s geopolitical risk profile. In this reading, ideological moderation becomes an instrument for strategic normalisation.

This article evaluates the validity of this prescription. It does not question the sincerity of these voices, nor does it deny Iran’s profound economic distress or the urgency of avoiding future large-scale conflicts. Rather, it argues that the proposed policy—abandoning Iran’s long-standing one-state referendum position on Palestine in favor of the two-state solution—is highly unlikely to achieve its stated goals. Worse, it may exacerbate Iran’s strategic vulnerabilities, alienate existing allies, and weaken Iran’s regional position without securing compensatory gains from adversaries.

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The pragmatist argument explained

Any serious policy recommendation must rest on more than normative aspiration or rhetorical alignment with “international norms.” Classical schools of international relations—realism, liberalism, constructivism—offer useful lenses, but none alone is sufficient for policy prescription. What is minimally required is a coherent causal logic that connects:

1. Current structural conditions (power distributions, threat environment, alliance structures);
2. The proposed policy shift (means);
3. The expected outcomes (ends);
4. A plausible mechanism linking means to ends;
5. Historical or empirical evidence suggesting the mechanism can function under comparable conditions.

Absent this chain, policy advice becomes wishful thinking.

In the case at hand, the proposed causal chain appears to be:

• Policy shift: Iran supports the two-state solution and softens its ideological posture toward Israel.
• Mechanism: This reduces Iran’s perceived revisionism, reassures regional actors, and signals moderation to the West.
• Outcome: Improved regional security, economic relief, and diplomatic normalisation, especially with the United States.

From the FT interviews, the pragmatist position can be reconstructed as follows.

First, Iran’s economic crisis—deepened by sanctions, capital flight, corruption, and war risk—requires de-escalation. Ideological confrontation, particularly on Israel and Palestine, is viewed as an unnecessary self-imposed burden that yields diminishing returns.

Second, these elites argue that Iran’s insistence on a one-state solution via referendum, while morally defensible in their view, places Tehran outside internationally accepted frameworks. By endorsing the two-state solution, Iran could reposition itself as a “responsible” regional actor rather than a spoiler.

Third, such a repositioning is expected to:

• Reduce hostility from Persian Gulf Arab states;
• Create room for regional dialogue;
• Lower Israel’s threat perception;
• Facilitate negotiations with the United States;
• Ultimately unlock economic opportunities through sanctions relief and reintegration.

At a surface level, the argument has intuitive appeal. Many states have historically moderated ideological positions to gain economic and security benefits. China is often cited as an example: a revisionist power that nonetheless operates within international institutions while prioritising economic development. The Arab states that normalised relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords also appear, at first glance, to have gained strategic dividends. However, analogies are only useful if structural conditions are comparable. The remainder of this article argues that they are not.

The Syrian counterexample: Concessions without protection

The most immediate empirical counterexample is post-Assad Syria. Following the collapse of the Assad government, Damascus adopted a markedly less confrontational posture toward Israel, signaling willingness to compromise and de-escalate. If the pragmatist logic were correct, this should have resulted in reduced Israeli pressure, improved sovereignty, and regional support.

The opposite occurred.

Israel has expanded its military footprint inside Syrian territory, occupying additional land beyond the Golan Heights. Israeli strikes have intensified, not diminished. The new central government—despite favourable Western media narratives—has proven far weaker than the Assad regime in resisting foreign incursions. According to The Economist, Syria’s economy is now even worse than during Assad’s final years, and the state’s capacity to defend sovereignty has eroded dramatically.

Crucially, no meaningful regional coalition emerged to protect Syria. Neither the Arab states nor Turkey intervened to deter Israeli actions. Concession did not produce protection; it produced vulnerability. This case shows a critical lesson that ideological moderation does not generate security guarantees in the absence of power or enforceable commitments.

Applying this logic to Iran reveals even greater risks.

No regional security umbrella

The idea that abandoning Iran’s traditional Palestinian stance would enable a coalition with Persian Gulf Arab states against Israel is strategically naive. The Persian Gulf states’ security architecture is fundamentally aligned with the United States, not with Iran. Their normalization with Israel has been driven by shared threat perceptions vis-à-vis Iran, not by Palestinian considerations. There is no evidence that Arabs would jeopardize their relations with Israel—or Washington—to defend Iran, regardless of Tehran’s rhetorical shifts.

Alienation of existing allies

Iran’s regional network in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and beyond has been built at enormous political, economic, and human cost—often paid not by Iranian elites but by allied societies. A sudden ideological retreat would severely undermine Iran’s credibility among these actors. For groups such as Hezbollah or Iraqi militias, Iran’s stance on Palestine is not symbolic; it is foundational. A reversal would fracture trust, weaken deterrence, and potentially provoke internal fragmentation within Iran’s alliance system.

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Strategic asymmetry

Unlike Syria, Iran is a central node in regional power politics. Weakening its ideological position without securing reciprocal concessions would increase, not decrease, pressure from Israel. Deterrence relies not on rhetorical moderation but on perceived costs of aggression.

The US dimension: Why this will not unlock negotiations

A second argument advanced by pragmatists is that ideological moderation would make negotiations with the United States more feasible. History suggests otherwise.

In 2003, Iran offered what is now known as the “Grand Bargain”: comprehensive negotiations addressing nuclear issues, regional security, terrorism, and even Israel–Palestine. Iran signaled unprecedented flexibility, including acceptance of the two-state solution.

The offer was rejected.

Why? Because power asymmetry mattered more than goodwill. The United States, having occupied both Iraq and Afghanistan, believed it could extract concessions without compromise. Iran’s flexibility was interpreted not as pragmatism but as weakness.

Every structural condition that led to failure in 2003 has intensified:

• Iran’s economy is weaker.
• US leverage is stronger.
• Mutual animosity has deepened.
• The US no longer needs Iran for regional stabilisation as it did during the Iraq–Afghanistan occupation.
• Decision-making in Washington, particularly on West Asia, has become more volatile and ideologically driven.

Under these conditions, moderation would not invite reciprocity; it would invite greater demands.

The central flaw in the pragmatist argument is its treatment of ideology as a negotiable accessory rather than a structural component of deterrence. Iran’s stance on Palestine is not merely rhetorical. It is embedded in alliance structures, threat perceptions, and strategic signaling. Abandoning it without enforceable guarantees would strip Iran of leverage while offering nothing tangible in return.

A policy prescription without a mechanism

The voices highlighted in the Financial Times article represent an important internal debate within Iran. Their concerns about economic hardship, endless confrontation, and the need for reform are legitimate and widely shared within Iranian society.

But sound diagnosis does not guarantee sound prescription.

The proposal to support the two-state solution as an instrument for improving Iran’s security and economic prospects lacks:

• A credible causal mechanism;
• Empirical support from comparable cases;
• Recognition of power asymmetries;
• Consideration of alliance dynamics.

Far from stabilising Iran’s position, such a shift would likely:

• Increase external pressure;
• Fracture existing alliances;
• Weaken deterrence;
• Produce symbolic concessions without material gains.

History suggests that states do not reward ideological moderation in the absence of power. They exploit it. If Iran is to pursue normalisation, it must do so from a position of leverage, sequencing, and reciprocity—not unilateral concession. Without that, the proposed reset is not pragmatic realism, but strategic illusion.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.