Palestinian National Council elections and inseparable realities

On 4th June, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas approved the electoral framework for the Palestinian National Council following its adoption by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The announcement of elections, expected to be held in early November, cannot be separated from a series of developments that began to unfold toward the end of 2024 amid the war in Gaza, growing international calls for action, and renewed momentum behind the recognition of Palestinian statehood. This article traces the diplomatic and political developments that accompanied that shift, as well as the practical measures undertaken by the Palestinian leadership in response. In doing so, it seeks to place the forthcoming National Council elections within their wider context and to better understand the realities shaping Palestinian politics today.

During the second half of last year, the United Nations General Assembly voted by an overwhelming majority in favour of the New York Declaration, drafted by France and Saudi Arabia at the conclusion of a conference convened in response to the deteriorating political and security situation in the occupied Palestinian territories. The conference took place amid growing commitments by several influential states, including France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, to move toward recognizing a Palestinian state. The New York Declaration condemned Hamas for the 7th October attacks and linked recognition of Palestinian statehood to reform within the Palestinian Authority. These developments unfolded against a backdrop of continued Israeli rejection of Palestinian statehood, a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and any meaningful path toward ending the occupation, despite the fact that nearly three-quarters of the world’s countries already recognise Palestine. The conference itself originated from United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/79/81, adopted on December 3, 2024, which called for the convening of a high-level international conference on Palestine and the implementation of the two-state solution. It was in this diplomatic and political climate that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas sent his letter to the international community on 9th June 2025. In it, he affirmed that a future Palestinian state would be non-militarised, pledged to continue reforming the Palestinian Authority, and announced his intention to hold presidential and legislative elections within a year under international supervision to ensure their integrity and credibility.

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A series of measures taken by President Mahmoud Abbas can be traced to the political and diplomatic momentum generated by the General Assembly resolution and the New York Conference. Together, they form part of the chain of developments that culminated in the recent announcement of National Council elections and the anticipated political parties law, which is also expected to be unveiled in the near future.

On 10th February 2025, Abbas issued a decree-law that dismantled the existing legal framework governing financial allocations to prisoners, martyrs’ families, and the wounded. The new system shifted the basis of eligibility from criteria linked to imprisonment, detention, or political affiliation to social welfare considerations and economic need. The decision was welcomed by the European Union and the US administration, both of which viewed it as evidence of the Palestinian Authority’s willingness to pursue institutional and financial reform. Palestinian prisoner organisations and several political factions took a different view, arguing that the move undermined the legal and political status traditionally accorded to prisoners. By the summer of 2025, the issue had become one of the most frequently cited examples of what participants in the New York Conference described as ongoing Palestinian reforms. During the same period, Abbas introduced changes in the leadership of the security services in the occupied territories. The Anti-Corruption Crimes Court also summoned the Director General of the Crossings and Borders Authority, along with fifteen other individuals, lifted banking secrecy protections, and launched investigations into their assets and property holdings. Yet these measures remained largely procedural. 

On 16th August 2025, a presidential decree established a committee tasked with drafting a provisional constitution. The decree called for the formation of a national body to prepare a constitutional framework for the transition from the Palestinian Authority to a Palestinian state, in line with the Declaration of Independence, international law, relevant international resolutions, and international human rights instruments. The Palestinian presidency linked the initiative to preparations for the international conference on the implementation of the two-state solution and to future general elections expected to take place once the war ends and a Palestinian state assumes responsibility in Gaza. A second presidential decision, issued on 10th February 2026, ordered the publication of the draft constitution for public review. Citizens, experts, civil society organisations, and political forces were invited to submit comments and recommendations within sixty days. The drafting committee was formed in the midst of deep political division and in the absence of a functioning parliament, the very institution normally expected to manage and absorb disagreements of this kind. This alone raises important questions about the constitutional process. The final article of the draft appears to make its adoption contingent on a presidential decision, even though no legislative body currently exists to approve the constitution before it is put to a popular referendum. The most consequential issue, however, concerns the unresolved relationship between the state envisioned by the provisional constitution and the Palestine Liberation Organization. That question becomes even more significant in light of the recent announcement of elections for the Palestinian National Council, elections that have never previously been held, rather than presidential and legislative elections, the last of which took place nearly two decades ago.

Abbas also issued Decree-Law No. 23 of 2025 on the election of local councils, amending the legislation that had governed local elections since 2005. Elections were subsequently scheduled for 25 April 2026, and took place as planned. Since the Palestinian split of 2007, local elections had been held three times, in 2012, 2017, and 2022, under the 2005 law. The system was based on closed-list proportional representation. Voters selected a single list, and seats were allocated according to the ranking of candidates within that list. The 2025 law introduced substantial changes. For municipalities, it adopted an open-list proportional representation system, allowing voters to choose one list and cast preferential votes for up to five candidates from within it. Village councils were placed under a different model altogether, based on individual candidacies and majority voting rather than party lists. The law also lowered the minimum age for candidacy to twenty-three and introduced a new political requirement. Candidates are now required to declare their commitment to the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its international obligations.

The elections were ultimately held in 183 local authorities, including 90 municipalities and 93 village councils. Yet many councils were decided by acclamation, underscoring the limited level of electoral competition.

Critics also objected to the new political declaration requirement, arguing that it introduced an unprecedented test of political eligibility based on adherence to the principles of the PLO.

Fatah’s Eighth Conference also revised the eligibility requirements for candidates seeking election to the movement’s leadership bodies, significantly expanding the pool of potential contenders. Under the new rules, age became the principal criterion for candidacy: twenty-seven for the Revolutionary Council and thirty-three for the Central Committee. This marked a departure from Fatah’s traditional organizational model, which tied eligibility to years of membership and advancement through the movement’s ranks. Under the movement’s longstanding internal regulations, candidates for the Revolutionary Council were required to have spent at least fifteen years in Fatah, to be members of the General Conference, and to hold an appropriate organizational rank. 

On 4th June, President Mahmoud Abbas approved the electoral framework for the Palestinian National Council following its adoption by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The framework provides for the election of 350 members, including 200 representatives from the Palestinian territories and 150 from Palestinian communities abroad. Representatives from both the occupied Palestinian territories and the diaspora are to be elected through direct voting under a system of party lists, full proportional representation, and a single electoral constituency encompassing the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. The electoral threshold has been set at one percent.

The law establishes twenty-three as the minimum age for candidacy and requires that women account for at least 30 percent of representation. It also requires candidates and participating parties to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organization and its political program. Political parties with armed wings or formal ties to external actors are excluded from participation.

The electoral framework for the Palestinian National Council was drafted and adopted by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, even though the authority to establish and approve the rules governing National Council elections formally rests with the Council itself rather than the Executive Committee. Under the PLO’s Basic Law, the National Council is the organization’s highest authority. It is responsible for determining the organisation’s policies, programs, and strategic direction. The new framework stipulates that elected members of the future Palestinian House of Representatives will automatically become members of the National Council for the duration of their parliamentary term. Their membership will be counted within the seats allocated to the Palestinian territories, without increasing the Council’s overall size. It further provides that if elections for the House of Representatives and the National Council are held simultaneously, the seats allocated to the Palestinian territories in the National Council will be filled automatically by elected members of the House of Representatives. Official representatives have argued that these provisions regulate the relationship between the Palestinian legislature and the National Council on the basis of functional complementarity and institutional coordination, while preserving the independence and distinct responsibilities of each body.

The announcement of National Council elections differs from the commitments set out in President Abbas’s letter to the international community last year, as well as from the New York Declaration, both of which focused on presidential and legislative elections. Presidential Decree No. 3 of 2021, which called for legislative, presidential, and National Council elections, treated the legislative vote as the first stage in the election of the National Council. Article 3 of the decree provided for the completion of the Council’s formation by August 31, 2021, in accordance with Article 5 of the PLO’s Basic Law. That article states that members of the National Council are to be elected by direct vote of the Palestinian people under a system established for that purpose by the Executive Committee. Article 6 further stipulates that if elections cannot be held, the existing Council remains in place until conditions allow for an electoral process. During the Council’s twenty-first session in Gaza in 1996, Salim Al-Za’noun was elected Speaker, while members of the Palestinian Legislative Council were incorporated into the quota allocated to the occupied territories. The upcoming vote will therefore be the first election ever held for the Palestinian National Council itself. Historically, the Palestine Liberation Organization functioned as a broad coalition bringing together a wide range of political, social, and national currents. Membership in the National Council was largely based on a quota system rather than electoral competition. Seats were distributed among political factions, military institutions, popular unions, and independent figures. The new electoral framework approaches representation through a model more commonly associated with parliamentary elections in sovereign states. This points to a broader shift in how the National Council is being conceived. Traditionally, it was expected to serve as the political leadership body of a national liberation movement. The new framework places greater emphasis on its role as a representative institution elected through a conventional electoral process. That shift mirrors an earlier transformation within Fatah itself. Over time, the movement has evolved from a national liberation movement into the dominant party of the governing authority.

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The new electoral framework also blurs the distinction between the National Council and the future Palestinian legislature, formerly the Palestinian Legislative Council. To be sure, members of the Legislative Council were previously counted among the National Council’s representatives from the occupied territories. But that arrangement existed alongside a clearer separation between the two bodies, their functions, and the constituencies they represented. That distinction appears far less evident today. The trend is reflected elsewhere in the political system. Fatah’s newly elected Central Committee has chosen Hussein al-Sheikh as Deputy Chairman of the movement. He already serves as Vice President of the Palestinian Authority and Vice Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The accumulation of these positions in a single figure further highlights the growing overlap between institutions.

The realities on the ground are likely to shape the electoral process more than the legal framework itself. In much of the Palestinian diaspora, the conditions required for a comprehensive and meaningful election simply do not exist. This makes some form of compromise increasingly likely, based on a formula often summarized as: elections where possible, and consensus where elections cannot be held. The absence of a comprehensive and reliable census of Palestinians abroad reinforces that reality. Without accurate data, it is difficult to determine the size of the electorate, identify eligible voters, or establish a credible electoral register. The challenge is compounded by the geographic dispersion of Palestinian communities and by the different political, legal, and security environments in which they live. Together, these factors raise serious questions about whether elections in the diaspora can be conducted in a way that is both representative and politically meaningful. Jordan illustrates the problem. It hosts the largest Palestinian refugee population, many of whom hold Jordanian citizenship. At the same time, roughly two million Palestinians living within the Green Line hold Israeli citizenship. Together, these two groups account for a large share of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza. Yet their place in the forthcoming National Council elections remains unresolved. Jerusalem presents another obstacle. Israel’s refusal to allow Palestinian voting arrangements in the city was one of the principal reasons cited for postponing the 2021 elections. There is little reason to believe that the issue has become easier to resolve. If anything, conditions today are more difficult.

The situation in Gaza has become far more complex amid continued military operations, large-scale destruction, ongoing attacks against civilians, and extensive Israeli control over large parts of the territory. Under such circumstances, questions about how elections can be conducted are inseparable from questions about whether meaningful political participation is possible in the first place.

The New York Declaration was more than a political statement. At its core, it reflected a specific political formula, arguably a bargain involving three parties: the international community, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel. The success of that formula depends on all three acting in concert. Without that, its objectives are unlikely to be realized. Yet the obstacles remain substantial. Israel continues to reject Palestinian statehood and opposes the two-state solution. It has not only maintained its occupation of Palestinian territory but has also continued policies that Palestinians view as involving repression, collective punishment, land confiscation, and de facto annexation in the West Bank, alongside the ongoing destruction of Gaza. All of this is unfolding during what many Palestinians regard as one of the most difficult periods in their modern history. The European Union, for its part, has tied its support for the Palestinian Authority to a defined reform agenda. A 2025 European Commission document made clear that direct assistance would be linked to progress on a jointly agreed reform matrix covering public finance, governance, the rule of law, democratic standards, freedom of expression, the investment climate, and the provision of essential services. Although the European Union has committed €1.6 billion in assistance to Palestinians, the package is spread over several years and remains linked to reform benchmarks, transparency requirements, and concerns about oversight and accountability. It is also tied to the absence of a clearer political and security framework for Gaza and the West Bank. The reforms pursued by the Palestinian presidency represent a third response within this broader equation. They reflect a particular vision of how to navigate mounting international pressure while advancing a process of political and institutional change. Whether that vision can succeed, however, remains an open question. Can these reforms overcome the contradictions surrounding them and generate the degree of political consensus needed in a landscape still marked by deep divisions among Palestinian political forces?

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.