President Donald Trump’s threat to invade Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, a longstanding US ally, and a member of NATO, marked one of the most serious deteriorations in transatlantic relations in recent decades. Although this deterioration formed part of a broader foreign policy trajectory that Trump had set in motion during his first term and pursued more aggressively in his current presidency, threatening to withdraw from NATO, scaling back US support for Ukraine’s war effort, and imposing steep tariffs on European imports, the European response to his threat against Greenland went well beyond previous reactions. Europe threatened retaliatory tariffs on American imports and began increasing defence spending to offset the shortfall created by reduced US financial and military contributions to NATO and to Ukraine’s war against Russia. More significantly, Trump’s threat to invade Greenland prompted an unprecedented military response, coordinated between Denmark and several European countries, led by Germany and France, with the participation of Sweden and Norway, to strengthen the island’s defence in the face of his threats. These developments have raised fundamental questions about the future of NATO should its own members find themselves in direct confrontation.
The United States subsequently stepped back from the idea of annexing the island, and recent reports have pointed to the existence of a framework of understanding between President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte concerning Greenland, although no details have yet been made public. NATO has stated that the purpose of the discussions between Denmark, Greenland and the United States is to prevent Russia and China from establishing an economic or military “foothold” on the island, claiming that Russian and Chinese vessels had been operating near Greenland. Trump, for his part, justified his demand for control over Greenland by arguing that failure by the United States to act would leave the way open for Russia or China to take control of the island. These claims point to another dimension of great power competition surrounding the Danish island. The Greenland crisis has also left a significant mark on transatlantic relations. The European response to the United States’ war against Iran marked a turning point in that relationship. Whereas the United Kingdom, Poland and Australia joined the United States in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, no Western country took part in the US attack on Iranian territory. Instead, several countries, including Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Romania, limited their involvement to providing military and logistical support, particularly through the US military bases located on their territory.
Greenland has long been a target of US efforts to acquire it. The first idea of purchasing the island emerged in 1867, following the United States’ purchase of Alaska from Russia.
The idea resurfaced in 1910 in the form of a proposed territorial exchange between the United States and Denmark, driven by the same strategic interest in Greenland’s location and abundant resources, particularly coal and minerals. Situated between the Arctic, Europe and North America, Greenland occupies a strategic position in the North Atlantic, serving as a key point for transit and surveillance between Europe and North America and forming the western end of the GIUK Gap, the maritime corridor linking Europe with the Arctic Ocean. This strategic location helps explain subsequent American initiatives, particularly after the Second World War, including the formal US offer to purchase the island in 1946 and renewed consideration of acquiring it in 1955.
Since the Cold War, Greenland has occupied one of the most important air routes between the Soviet Union and the United States, making it central to air and space surveillance.
Its location remains essential to the effectiveness of the US early warning and missile defence system, originally designed to deter Soviet missile attacks and now serving the same function with regard to Russia. For this reason, the United States concluded a defence agreement with Greenland in 1951 and established the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), providing sufficient warning time to detect any potential missile attack through its missile defence systems. Greenland’s strategic maritime position, linking the Arctic, Russia’s Northern Sea Route and the Atlantic Ocean, also makes it a key location for monitoring Russian naval vessels and submarines operating towards North America.
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Trump revived the idea of acquiring the Danish island during his first term and has renewed it in his current presidency, as Greenland’s geopolitical importance has grown with climate change. In addition to the island’s long-standing strategic role in air and maritime defence, climate change has given it a pivotal economic dimension, driven by the technological rivalry between the United States and China and competition with Russia over maritime routes. Global warming and the accelerated melting of Greenland’s ice sheet, which has increased markedly since the 1990s, have made it easier to identify and extract rare minerals and have facilitated navigation through the surrounding waterways. Geological surveys indicate that Greenland contains 25 of the 34 critical raw materials identified by the European Union, making it one of the world’s richest undeveloped regions in strategic minerals. The importance and value of these resources will continue to grow as the island’s ice sheet continues to shrink. These minerals are fundamental to the technologies underpinning modern industry, including fighter aircraft, guided missiles, radar systems, satellites, smartphones, electric vehicles, lithium batteries, wind turbines, artificial intelligence, data centres and clean energy technologies. Competition between the United States and China has recently intensified in the technological sector, the defining strategic rivalry of the present era. At its core lies competition over the extraction of rare earths, as well as their processing, refining, and use in the manufacture of magnets, batteries and semiconductors. China currently enjoys a clear advantage in this field, controlling more than 60 per cent of global rare earth mining production, as well as maintaining a leading position across other stages of the supply chain. The United States remains heavily dependent on China for refining and magnet production. China has also successfully used its dominance in rare earths during its trade negotiations with the United States after Washington imposed unprecedented tariff increases, linking the two issues together.
Environmental change and the melting of billions of tonnes of ice across the Arctic have improved navigability along its maritime routes, including the Arctic Ocean, Russia’s Northern Sea Route, and the Northwest Passage linking Europe and North America. Russia has invested heavily in developing the Northern Sea Route, which runs along its Arctic coastline, and possesses the world’s largest fleet of icebreakers. It seeks to develop the route as a corridor connecting Europe with East Asia, reducing the distance between the two regions by 30 to 40 per cent. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia had already begun using the route commercially to serve several European countries. Although its use remained limited because of its seasonal nature and the high costs associated with navigation through icy waters, it has since become largely confined to Russian trade following the Western sanctions imposed after the war.
Trump’s interest in Greenland, alongside his remarks about Canada and the Panama Canal, can be understood as part of a broader vision of competing with Russia over global maritime routes.
Greenland gives Washington a forward position in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, potentially enabling it to influence any alternative route linking Europe with Asia through the North American Arctic. At the same time, the Panama Canal offers the traditional southern route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, particularly while the northern route remains under development.
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NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s sphere, particularly following the accession of Sweden and Finland to the Alliance, has prompted Moscow to adopt extensive military measures around the Northern Sea Route, justifying them as necessary to protect the route and its nuclear bases on the Kola Peninsula. Russia is now the only one of the eight Arctic states that lies outside NATO. Trump has used these Russian military activities in the region, which are not new, having begun in 2008 and intensified in 2014 in connection with developments in Georgia and Ukraine, amid growing competition between Russia and Europe and NATO’s enlargement, not only to justify an expanded US military presence in Greenland, but also to justify acquiring the island itself. However, the 1951 US-Greenland defence agreement, which authorises the United States to take whatever measures necessary to fulfil that purpose, undermines Trump’s justification. The 2004 agreement, which serves the same objective, likewise preserves the United States’ right to defend the island, although it requires the consent of Denmark and Greenland, a condition that would not constitute a domestic legal obstacle in the event of a genuine threat to Greenland’s security. The foregoing helps explain Trump’s initial remarks about purchasing the island, from which he later retreated, particularly when viewed alongside his background as a businessman and two interrelated developments that have emerged over the past two years: growing public support in Greenland for independence from Denmark, and the continued public and political reluctance to expand mining because of concerns over radioactive contamination from mineral deposits and the intensifying competition among the major powers. More than a century has passed since the United States last purchased territory belonging to another state.
In 2019, the United States pressured the Greenlandic government to block Chinese participation in the construction of airports on the island, just as it had prevented another project involving the sale of rare earth minerals to Chinese companies. Greenland is currently witnessing a Danish and NATO military build-up, alongside the existing US military presence at its base on the island, despite the absence of Russian or Chinese naval vessels in the area. Even so, competition among the major powers over Greenland is already intensifying. Although it has not reached the point of direct confrontation or serious clashes, as in other regions, it reflects the evolving nature of the international system as it moves towards multipolarity.
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