The Iran War comes home before the midterms

On September 15, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the conflict with Iran had cost the Department of Defense about $38 billion as of August 1. The report also traced consequences beyond military operations, including depleted missile-defense stocks and higher energy prices. As the 2026 midterms approach, it documents how a war overseas has become part of domestic economic life.

The midterms are not a formal referendum on the war. Americans will be choosing lawmakers rather than voting directly on continued military involvement. Yet the conflict is already before Congress, and its domestic costs are becoming clearer through federal estimates and reports from businesses affected by higher fuel prices.

The $38 billion estimate includes replacing expended munitions and equipment lost in combat, additional flying hours, other operations and higher fuel costs. It excludes costs borne by other federal agencies and regular military operating expenses already included in the budget. CBO also cautions that its estimate carries considerable uncertainty because the Pentagon did not respond to its requests for information.

The bill will continue to grow if fighting persists. At the relatively low level of violence seen in May and June, CBO estimates that another month would cost about $2 billion. At July’s intensity, the monthly cost would be roughly $3 billion, with further escalation potentially raising it again.

Money also measures only part of the military burden. CBO says the use of missile-defense interceptors will leave U.S. inventories reduced for several years. Its financial estimate already includes replacement costs; the additional issue is the time required to restore those stocks. Funding their replacement does not make the weapons immediately available, and the inventory shortfall can persist beyond the fighting.

For households and businesses, the more immediate connection is energy.

CBO attributes upward pressure on prices to reduced oil and natural-gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, disrupted Red Sea shipping and interruptions to refining. Those disruptions have affected gasoline, diesel and jet fuel as well as crude oil.

The effects extend beyond what motorists pay at the pump. Fuel is a cost of moving goods, operating machinery and delivering services. Higher fuel and transportation costs can therefore reach consumers through the prices of other goods and services. The size and timing of those effects vary across the economy.

Diesel offers a concrete example. Reuters reported on September 18 that the average U.S. price had reached about $6.29 a gallon, squeezing farmers during the harvest. The report identified both the Iran war and Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries as sources of supply pressure. The increase cannot be attributed entirely to the Iran war.

Higher diesel costs affect harvesting and the trucks that carry food to retailers. Their effect on grocery prices can emerge gradually as freight contracts change and businesses adjust to higher expenses.

CBO’s inflation forecast captures that delayed effect. It estimates that year-over-year inflation in the personal consumption expenditures price index will be about 0.5 percentage points higher in the first quarter of 2027 than it projected in February. The comparison is with an earlier forecast, and the estimate concerns the inflation rate rather than the total increase in household bills.

The agency expects the direct contribution from higher energy prices to diminish as those prices decline. It also expects the effects on non-energy goods and services to last longer, because higher production and transport costs take time to work through the economy. Some of the economic consequences can therefore outlast the initial disruption in fuel markets.

These costs require separate consideration. Federal spending, reduced military inventories and pressure on private budgets measure different consequences of the conflict. CBO cautions that its estimates are not directly comparable or simply additive. They describe several ways the war affects the United States, rather than a single total that can be divided among households.

November’s congressional elections will cover every House seat and roughly one-third of the Senate. The members elected will participate in decisions about the military and its funding, even though the election itself will not directly determine U.S. policy toward Iran.

Congress has spending and war powers, and its committees conduct oversight of federal agencies and programs. Those responsibilities provide an institutional connection between the election and the conflict. They encompass questions about the resources committed to military operations, their objectives and their consequences.

That connection is already visible in the legislative record. On September 15, the House voted 220–204 for a resolution directing the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran. The roll call provides a public record of how representatives voted on continued military involvement. Passage in the House does not, by itself, establish that operations have ended.

None of these figures establishes that the war will determine the election. The economic data measure costs and price pressures, while the roll call records lawmakers’ positions. Neither tells us how individual voters will weigh the war alongside immigration, health care, taxes, crime or other concerns. Nor can every change in living costs be attributed to a single conflict.

The evidence does show that the war has consequences beyond the battlefield. Public spending, weapons inventories and the costs facing farms and transport businesses are already affected. The extent of the longer-term burden remains uncertain, as does the weight voters will give it.

Americans will go to the polls while those costs are still being assessed. Their ballots will select lawmakers with responsibility for future funding and oversight. The election will choose the Congress that inherits those costs, even though it will not directly settle the war.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.