From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb: Saudi Arabia’s difficult choices

Developments in Yemen today cannot be separated from the repercussions of the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran. The prolonged nature of this war, and the fact that it remains unresolved, arguably compel the countries of the region to reassess their strategic realities from a perspective different from the traditional approach that has shaped their thinking for decades. The US-Israeli war against Iran has brought about significant shifts in the region’s military, economic and political calculations, confronting Tehran with serious challenges and looming threats to its security, economy and future regional standing. For its part, Iran has drawn on a range of strategic assets at its disposal across the region to mitigate these threats by raising the costs borne by its Gulf neighbours. This Iranian strategy has exposed serious challenges facing the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the most influential among them, with direct implications for their security and economies. Examining the escalating confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia offers a means of analysing the challenges confronting the Kingdom today within a broader, emerging strategic perspective on the region and its future.

Saudi Arabia is facing a renewed wave of Houthi missile and drone attacks targeting its airports and oil facilities, alongside threats to Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. These targets are not new. The Kingdom faced similar attacks during the earlier years of the war in Yemen, before the de-escalation that followed the 2022 truce. That period of relative calm began to unravel on 13 July 2026, when the coalition targeted the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The Yemeni government claimed responsibility for the operation, while the Houthis attributed it to Saudi Arabia. Following this, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Abha airport, before declaring a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on 20 July. Within Yemen, the escalation has shifted from exchanges of strikes to battles aimed at changing territorial control, particularly along the western coast. Last month, Houthi forces advanced towards Mokha and areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Saudi-backed government forces then launched a counter-offensive at the beginning of this month, announcing that they had recaptured Mokha, Dhubab and positions overlooking the strait. Fighting between the warring parties continues.

Since the outbreak of the US-Israeli war against Iran, Saudi Arabia has faced mounting pressure on the routes through which it exports oil, the mainstay of its economy. Its eastern oil export route through the Strait of Hormuz has been hit by the turmoil in shipping arising from US-Iranian confrontations in the strait. As the Kingdom became increasingly reliant on transporting oil overland through the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, this alternative route was also interrupted, having assumed greater importance following the damage to its eastern maritime outlet. The East-West Pipeline was targeted in a drone attack last month, for which Riyadh held Iraqi groups close to Iran responsible, before operations resumed. The blockade declared by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia’s western maritime outlet and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait added a further, compounding burden, particularly on the passage of Saudi oil tankers through the strait. Houthi attacks on Saudi oil tankers were not confined to the waters around the strait, but extended as far as the waters off Yanbu.

These developments explain the shift in Saudi Arabia’s stance towards the Houthis. After years of seeking to consolidate the de-escalation and negotiate a political settlement, Riyadh has once again turned towards military confrontation.

Recapturing coastal positions near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become an objective linked to protecting its economic interests and exports, particularly amid the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In 2023, Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman affirmed Saudi Arabia’s support for dialogue aimed at reaching a comprehensive political settlement under United Nations auspices. By contrast, Reuters reported at the beginning of this month, citing informed sources, that Riyadh was preparing a ground offensive to be carried out by Yemeni forces with Saudi air support. The agency also quoted Western diplomats and Gulf officials as saying that Riyadh could not enter into new peace negotiations while the Houthis remained in control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This shift has been reflected in Saudi air support for the latest offensive launched by Yemeni government forces against the Houthis.

Nevertheless, a return to war offers Saudi Arabia no guarantee of a decisive outcome. The previous war, which began in 2015 and involved a Saudi-led coalition with the participation of the United Arab Emirates, failed to achieve its objective of defeating the Houthis. Nor did it restore the government that the Houthis had driven out of Sanaa, leaving the capital and most of northern Yemen under their control. Similarly, the US air campaign against the Houthis in 2025 failed to eliminate their power in Yemen, despite costing more than $1 billion, destroying weapons and facilities, and killing Houthi field commanders. The campaign ended with an agreement to halt reciprocal attacks between the United States and the Houthis, an arrangement that did not extend to Israel.

Nor will the recent Mecca Alliance between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey help the Kingdom in its fight in Yemen beyond defensive and technical support, particularly while the alliance remains in its early stages.

It is also difficult to rely on the United States, given Washington’s refusal to meet a Saudi request to participate in air strikes, limiting its involvement to providing advice, intelligence and targeting data. US strategy in the region is based on expanding the role of regional partners in defending themselves, the region and US interests within it. This explains Trump’s request to Turkey a few days ago to intervene in support of Saudi Arabia.

These developments compel the countries of the region to reassess their security calculus and strategic balances, recognising that Iran and its allies are part of the regional reality and that lasting stability cannot be built by disregarding them. Relations based on cooperation and mutual interests remain an essential foundation for such stability, alongside the need to establish a balance between the instruments of power available to the Gulf states and those possessed by Iran. Throughout the current war against it, Iran has demonstrated that it possesses significant strategic assets that have inflicted heavy costs on the countries of the region, exposing an imbalance in their ability to impose comparable costs in return. If the Gulf states possessed instruments of power that made harming their security and interests costly for Iran, the costs of escalation would become mutual, potentially encouraging the parties to seek balanced political solutions that support cooperation and future stability.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.