Marine bunkering services have begun at Gwadar. Meanwhile, according to reporting in June 2026, the proposed $10 billion Saudi refinery announced for the port in 2019 had yet to attract the promised investment. These contrasting experiences raise a fundamental question: where should Pakistan begin with Gwadar’s development? The strongest starting point is commercial activity with existing customers and measurable revenue. That can provide a foundation for larger investments.
Pakistani fuel, a new market
According to a July 2026 announcement by Pakistan’s Port Community System, Gwadar’s inaugural commercial bunkering operation delivered 2,500 tonnes of very low sulphur fuel oil produced by Cnergyico. Vitol conducted the operation with Pakistan’s National Logistics Corporation (NLC). Cnergyico’s coastal refining complex is located in Hub, Balochistan. Gwadar therefore offers an outlet for domestically refined fuel to international shipping.
The immediate challenge is securing repeat business. A vessel will choose Gwadar if fuel prices and the total cost of the call are competitive, and supply is reliable. Can the initial service become a sustained commercial operation?
Publishing sales volumes and net revenue would help answer that question. Investors would gain evidence of an established market rather than projections of potential demand.
Fujairah and Duqm: competition beyond geography
Gwadar faces competitors that have spent years building their commercial networks. The Port of Fujairah describes itself as one of the world’s three largest bunkering hubs. Storage and blending facilities, supported by established suppliers, give customers operational advantages. Fujairah also lies outside the Strait of Hormuz. That geographical position is no exclusive advantage for Gwadar.
In Oman, Duqm’s refinery provides an industrial foundation for the port. The Omani-Kuwaiti joint venture OQ8 announced in February 2025 that refinery throughput had reached 255,000 barrels per day, exceeding its nameplate capacity of 230,000. Duqm illustrates how sustained production and sales give economic substance to a coastal location.
Gwadar’s geographical advantages also have limits. Oil loaded at terminals inside the Gulf must still pass through Hormuz to reach Gwadar, unless pipelines first carry it to export terminals outside the strait.
Gwadar can offer another location for services and distribution. Becoming an alternative energy export route requires connections extending beyond the port itself.
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The Saudi refinery: a shifting location
Reuters reported in January 2019 that Saudi Arabia planned a $10 billion refinery at Gwadar. In June 2021, the Financial Times reported that the proposed location had shifted towards Karachi. Yet the Express Tribune’s June 2026 report again described Pakistan seeking Saudi investment in a Gwadar refinery. This history makes clarification of the project’s final location and structure essential.
For Pakistan, the distinction between proposed and committed investment has practical consequences. Building associated infrastructure around funding that remains unsecured increases the cost of waiting. Publishing the project’s implementation stage and conditions for a final investment decision would help prevent premature commitments.
Gulf investors have multiple options. Reuters reported in March 2025 that Aramco was discussing investments in two proposed Indian refineries. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also signed the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor memorandum. Pakistan is negotiating for capital within this competitive environment. Predictable access to foreign exchange and profit repatriation will form part of investors’ calculations alongside project economics.
The China route: strategic value, financial responsibility
Transporting oil from Gwadar to Xinjiang has geopolitical appeal. The engineering difficulties remain substantial. Research by Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins in the Naval War College Review examined the challenges of crossing the approximately 4,700-metre Khunjerab Pass and the associated pumping requirements. Severe cold and landslide risks also affect maintenance costs.
An independent assessment of transport costs and guaranteed demand should precede public financial commitments. The route’s strategic value to China should be reflected in its financial contribution. Any future transport agreement should specify ship-or-pay obligations and establish who bears the cost of unused capacity if throughput falls. That allocation will determine Pakistan’s exposure to commercial risk.
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Balochistan: protection and local participation
The March 2024 attack on an administrative complex near the port demonstrated its vulnerability. Reuters reported that two soldiers and eight attackers were killed, with the Baloch Liberation Army claiming responsibility. Across the wider corridor, the 2017 announcement establishing a dedicated protection force put its strength at 15,000 personnel. That figure was not specific to Gwadar, but indicates the scale of the protection mission.
Security expenditure belongs in the project’s economic accounts. Local support also affects investment durability. A 2023 field study of Gwadar’s fishing communities examined their exclusion from aspects of development decision-making. Participation and continued access to livelihoods would strengthen residents’ stake in the port’s future. Their civilian demands must be considered separately from armed violence.
Pakistan’s priority: building Gwadar’s market
At this stage, expanding maritime services with identifiable customers offers a credible foundation. Evidence of sustained trade would strengthen the case for further investment, while tangible benefits for Balochistan’s residents would give development a firmer local footing.
Pakistan’s strongest negotiating position will come from a port that earns revenue today. Larger projects should build on that record, with partners sharing the financial risks of the strategic benefits they seek.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.










