Why is the Middle East waiting out the Trump presidency?

There appears to be little prospect of lasting peace between Iran and the United States while Donald Trump remains in the White House. This is a view that an increasing number of serious actors across the region now seem to share. Eight months into Iran war, Washington has neither broken Tehran’s resolve nor found a clear path out. The president’s own remarks point to a narrowing set of options. Trump told TIME he does not believe peace with Iran is ever possible, a striking admission from the leader still expected to negotiate one.

Tehran, for its part, has set conditions it knows this administration cannot meet, insisting that sanctions and threats be lifted before talks resume and that not a single gram of enriched uranium leaves the country. Neither side is bargaining towards a settlement. Each is waiting for the political ground beneath the other to shift.

Trump’s problem is that the ground is shifting under him first, as the 3^rd November midterms approach with his approval rating near 39 per cent and crude trading above 110 dollars a barrel. The House has voted three times to restrict his war powers in Iran, with Republican candidates in competitive seats now campaigning openly on ending the war to lower petrol prices. Facing a likely defeat, the president has promised no strikes before polling day while Central Command has reportedly been told to prepare for resuming major combat operations. Therefore, it is quite likely that Trump may order striking Iran even before the mid-term day.

Analysts have noted that a Republican defeat could strengthen this incentive, as a president with little left to lose at the ballot box faces fewer costs for escalation. Yet such strikes would do little damage control, since a Politico survey found 46 per cent of voters said ending the war before the election would not change their vote at all. Iran has meanwhile fortified its nuclear sites and warned that regional energy infrastructure would be targeted, so any parting blow risks sending oil prices even higher.

The president’s own inner circle appears to have read the same numbers and is quietly positioning itself for the aftermath. Vice President JD Vance, reportedly sceptical from the outset, has kept his distance and this week declined to endorse Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of Israel’s election.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, his chief rival for 2028, spent the same week in India on a trip devoted largely to trade rather than Iran.

Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, by contrast, made an unannounced visit to Israel a day after Trump endorsed Netanyahu, keeping himself firmly in the frame. Commentators suggested as early as April that Hegseth was being set up as the fall guy should the war end badly. His visibility since has only reinforced that impression.

The Gulf states have reached the same conclusion. They are hedging accordingly against an American policy they no longer trust to last. The UAE joined the campaign against Iran in February, yet they opened a backchannel with Iranians lately after the realization that it is better to deal directly instead of relying on the US. Moreover, the UAE, by the virtue of being in support of the Saudis vis-à-vis Yemen, is trying to find a diplomatic way to lower tensions. It signals a striking reversal in barely eight months. Having absorbed thousands of Iranian missiles and drones, Abu Dhabi appears to be securing its own understandings before Washington’s next round begins.

Yemen shows how the burden is being shifted, since the United States has twice rebuffed Saudi requests for airstrikes against the Houthis and says it will not take kinetic action for now. Instead, the UAE has reportedly agreed to resume funding anti-Houthi forces in southern Yemen. This is an arrangement that lets Washington stay out while a partner carries the fight on its behalf.

Iran’s strategy rests on patience and its leaders appear confident they can absorb another year or so of American pressure before the political weather in Washington changes. Its posture towards Saudi Arabia fits this reading more closely than the images of burning airports suggest. Houthi strikes have killed at least 19 people at Saudi airports, and the Wall Street Journal has reported Revolutionary Guard officers helping to direct them. Yet within days of the deadliest attack, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called Riyadh to offer mediation with the Houthis and insist the crisis had no military solution.

The aim is not to destroy Saudi infrastructure but to convince the kingdom that American protection is unreliable and that any opening to Israel will carry a heavy price. Riyadh has begun to absorb that lesson, but the pressure is unlikely to ease while Trump remains in office and Tehran sees no reason to settle.

The real question is how Israel reacts to all this, both during the remainder of Netanyahu’s tenure and after it. Trump has endorsed Netanyahu so he can help “finish the job” against Iran, and Israel has reportedly asked that any renewed strikes wait until after its 27 October vote. Polls give Netanyahu’s coalition fewer than 50 of the 61 seats needed to govern, raising the prospect of a weakened caretaker with every reason to keep the Iran file burning.

A successor led by Gadi Eisenkot would hardly soften Israel’s line on the Iranian nuclear programme, but it might be less willing to tie national strategy to American president’s fortunes. Should Israel strike alone after an American exit, Gulf hedging would only accelerate and normalisation with Riyadh would recede further from view.

Tehran and the Gulf have made their calculations. Both now wait for a different figure in the Oval Office.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.