Oman leads opposition to Gulf political union

While the GCC seemed shocked when Oman threatened to pull out of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), if any union went ahead, the announcement should have come as no surprise. For member states, many of whom secretly oppose a union, it will have been a relief that Oman spoke out, saving them the embarrassment. And the proudly independent sultanate, facing economic problems and a potential saviour in Iran, had every reason to oppose a provocative union led by Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia’s plans for a union have legitimate economic motives, but the original security inspiration behind the GCC itself, as a counter-balance to Eighties revolutionary Iran, equally applies to their union ambitions. Most GCC members fear “post-Geneva” Iran, as well as the prospect of popular revolution on their own turf.

But Oman interprets any proposed union as unnecessarily confrontational. Over the years, they’ve made love not war with their friends across the Strait – brokering peace deals between Iran and Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UK and the US over the years. And now the Western community: the Geneva nuclear deal was secretly facilitated then publically stoked by Omani media commentary. Each new deal has pointed to Oman’s overall need for regional stability and a recognition that working with Iran is better than antagonising unnecessarily. Their role as a conduit to the former pariah state has also won them disproportionate influence in Washington and London, influence that as a small power with bolshy neighbours, they need.

Oman didn’t escape the Arab Spring – protests there started just a few days after the revolution in Tunisia and turned bloody shortly after Mubarak was deposed in Egypt. But demands were predominantly economic rather than political. And they were responded to attentively by Sultan Qaboos, whose popularity remains high. He may not be able to solve all – job creation remains a problem and stamping out bribery won’t happen overnight, but politically his response appeared compassionate and this aura has bought the regime some stability. That said, he needs Iran to keep job creation ticking along, plus the regime has just signed a 25 year deal for Iranian gas, worth nearly forty billion pounds, and the Iranian sanctions thaw will see yet more trade, and more jobs – which Qaboos desperately needs to guarantee internal stability.

In their reactions to the unfolding chaos of the Arab Spring, GCC members have at times appeared paranoid – even as their internal circumstances differ radically from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya or Syria. Most have installed vicious state security apparatuses, or bolstered existing systems. Dissidents have been spirited away, family members are harassed, tolerance for online and street-level dissent has minimised. Where external threats are perceived to be gaining a toehold nearby, aid has been hastily dispatched. As the Muslim Brotherhood fell from power in Egypt, for example, UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reinforced Al Sisi with money and guns. And all, except Oman, have sent military aid to Bahrain, as it wallows in a bloody street-level stalemate with reformist protesters.

But despite sharing concerns over internal unrest, problems which a well-formed union might address – there are plenty of other reasons why Kuwait, Oman and UAE are silently applauding Oman’s defiance. In proposing the union, Saudi Arabia is seeking to extend their own influence as much as they wish to secure the Gulf. Unionising initiatives – such as the pan-Gulf rail network and single currency, have already revealed significant differences in opinion. The UAE would object heavily if a central bank was in Riyadh not Abu Dhabi: the Qataris and the Saudis have already clashed on a number of issues. Kuwait may have memories of the Iraq occupation pushing them towards a union – but they made very clear that a union was off the agenda as the GCC met in December.

In addition, the spirit of Iranian reconciliation may be infectious. Abu Dhabi have just resolved a long-standing island dispute with Tehran, and Dubai’s rulers are excitably clamouring about the prospects of sanctions-free trade. In turn, their appetite for a single Gulf state is not great – why risk, or indeed share, the spoils of Iranian trade?

But as Oman seemingly puts the nail in the coffin for a Gulf-wide union, is Saudi realistically going to join with its last remaining advocate, desperate Bahrain?

“The Saudis don’t want Bahrain to become an internal issue,” predicts Marc Valeri, Director of Gulf Studies at Exeter University. “Bahrain has little strategic or economic value, so they’d just be taking on a new problem.”

So Oman, albeit building on a long campaign of dissent from Kuwait, UAE and Qatar, may have finally put the union to bed. If there were already so many problems why did Oman publicly embarrass the Saudis?

“It’s hard to say for sure, but my best guess is that it was a marker, to stop the Saudis being quite so ambitious,” says Dr James Worrall, at the University of Leeds. “Riyadh was becoming too aggressive, too expansionist, and it was Oman saying “we can only go so far.”

“The forum they chose to make the announcement is important too, it wasn’t at the main meeting, it was at the fringe. So although the wording was strong, it wasn’t quite as bad as it could have been.”

Worrall also thinks the move may have curried favour with the other union-sceptics “Oman is pretty marginal in economic terms. Their power on the GCC wasn’t huge before the announcement, but I think the other members will take more notice of them now.”

Despite opposition, Saudi Arabia are still pushing ahead. They may be sailing upwind for the foreseeable future.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.