The Arab Spring and Israeli security concerns

Three years have passed since the first spark of the Arab revolutions ignited in Tunisia. Despite the fact that the Arab Spring has failed to achieve its goals clearly and directly, Israeli research centres and institutions have held many seminars and conferences to discuss how the events taking place in the Arab world affect Israel and, in particular, its security.

Data issued recently by Israel’s spy agency, Mossad, and published in the Israeli media, suggests that the state’s strength increased in 2013 and that this was directly due to the weakening condition of the Iraqi and Syrian armies as well as the Egyptian army’s preoccupation with fighting terrorism in Sinai.

Fluctuations of security assessments

The revolutions took many people by surprise, including the Israeli establishment. Consequently, they prompted Mossad to take various stances on Arab events, particularly the repercussions for Israel. In light of this, Israeli analyst Nahum Barnea pointed out in April 2013 that Mossad’s main challenge lies in its inability to determine the direction of the Arab masses, and the direction of the revolutions. According to Barnea, Mossad’s work over the past few decades has been based on the assumption that Israel’s biggest threats are external and that the army was the main solution to them. For this reason, Mossad used many of its resources to assist the army directly.

However, the agency has realised that it cannot simply provide the army with information because the responsibility for Israeli security rests first and foremost with Mossad itself. Barnea added that it changed its main responsibility from being a provider of information to an organisation that creates products or solutions based on intelligence.

Leaked information about a secret meeting in the Israeli parliament last year asserted that Israel’s position has grown stronger since 2012. In part, this has been due to the decline in the power of the Iraqi army, which makes it incapable of threatening Israel in the foreseeable future. The Syrian army’s loss of its chemical weapons capabilities confirms Israel’s fears that the regime in Damascus could have been a major threat. The Egyptians, of course, have a peace treaty with Israel and, in any case, post-coup, the army poses no threat to Israel at all.

Israeli intelligence confirms that Hezbollah failed to increase its military capabilities in 2013, apart from the combat experience in Syria. However, the party did not gain any strategic weaponry from Syria or Iran. Nevertheless, Israel believes that the Lebanese group is capable of damaging Israel in a similar way to 2006 during Israel’s invasion of its northern neighbour.

Eye on the Gaza Strip

The media campaign by Israel and the pro-Israel media in the West against Hamas in the Gaza Strip has been accompanied, post-coup, by a similar campaign in Egypt. The objective, it seems, is to weaken the Islamic Resistance Movement even though Israel believes that it is incapable of fighting Israel, given that its main lifeline has been severed with the destruction of the smuggling tunnels by the Egyptian army. The tunnels were used, it is alleged, to smuggle weapons into Gaza, whereas for most Palestinians it was the route for everyday essentials such as food, medicine and fuel to beat the Israeli-imposed blockade.

Israel’s talk of Hamas being weaker now than it was during President Morsi’s period in office has not stopped it from attacking the Gaza Strip. Such truce-breaking strikes are regarded as necessary to finish off Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions.

The Arab Spring and Israeli strategy

Depending on how trends pan-out in the Arab arena and their repercussions on Israel, it is possible that 2014 will see the government in Tel Aviv decreasing its defence budget. Reports from Israel have pointed out that there might be changes in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), particularly in terms of an improvement in their preparedness. In addition, the IDF is looking to recruit more soldiers from the ultra-religious community and develop its bases in the Negev Desert.

However, due to cuts in the security budget, it is expected that thousands of Israeli soldiers will be excused annual military as the size of the army and air force is decreased. Among proposed changes is an increase in technicians for electronic warfare, more submarine units and an increase in the air defence systems. Various unnamed units will be reduced in size or disbanded altogether.

On the economic front, intelligence data suggests that income, expenses and savings in the average Israeli household are expected to change, while 50,000 Israelis are more than likely to join the ranks of the unemployed. Interest on bank loans and exchange rates are also expected to rise, although the value of shares on the stock market is expected to increase by ten per cent. The prices of apartments and real estate in Israel are expected to rise by eight per cent. According to economic analysts, the recession in Israel, the rise in prices and the recession in Europe, are all expected to affect Israelis in 2015.

Analysts are also expecting a 3.5 per cent decline in the average wage, which means a drop of about 350 shekels (£60) per month. Many workers will continue to be dismissed from their jobs and 50,000 Israelis will lose their jobs in various sectors throughout the year. As the Israeli shekel declines in value attempts to restore the US dollar’s value affects the prices of cars, fuel, electrical appliances, rent and the cost of traveling overseas, in Israel as elsewhere.

It remains to be said that despite dozens of conferences and seminars geared towards specialised aspects of daily life, including demographic, economic and social factors, Israel’s main concern remains its security. This will be the primary focus of all Israeli governments, especially in light of the Arab Spring, because Israel’s survival depends solely on its ability to preserve and protect itself.

This is a translation of the Arabic text published by Al Jazeera Net on 12 February, 2104

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.