Fatah and Hamas: two different projects

In the reconciliation agreement Hamas conceded to and agreed with Fatah and its leader Mahmoud Abbas and displayed national unity between the two movements during the confrontation with the enemy. Fatah should have had respect for and confidence in Hamas’ excellence in leading the resistance and destroying the image of the enemy, despite Fatah negotiating with the enemy while they had the upper hand. Yet despite this, Fatah is now hostile towards Hamas, as its leader waged a fierce media, political and security attack on Hamas, reminiscent of the early days of division eight years ago.

The change in attitude has been justified by three excuses from Fatah. First, the director of Mossad told Abbas that Hamas was planning a coup against him in the West Bank and Israel therefore arrested 93 members of Hamas. Second, that Hamas treats Abbas, as a mere figure with no real consideration for him, and they disregard his opinion on peace and war. Thirdly, Hamas attacked members of Fatah during the war on Gaza and imposed house arrest on 300 members.

In a calm discussion of these lies (not excuses), we ask, how a president, who is the top commander of the Palestinian leadership, could listen to, let alone believe the tattling of the enemy against Hamas? How could he believe that the resistance would stage a coup with only 93 people against an authority has an army of over 70,000 soldiers backed and protected by the military and security-wise by the occupation? Haaretz reported that having looked at the investigation file with a Hamas official in the West Bank, Riad Nasser, they concluded that this narrative should not be believed.

As for the second lie, it is true that Abbas and Fatah are isolated and their popularity has decreased, according to opinion polls, but who said that Hamas is the reason behind this? Why could it not be Fatah’s departure from reality, its separation from Palestinian aspirations, its miserable acts of abuse of power against its own people, and its failure to convince the people of its usefulness and in the soundness of its logic?

Dr Hasan Ahmed, spokesman of the Fatah High Leadership Committee in the Gaza Strip responded to the claims that Hamas were committing acts against Fatah by denying that that any of the movement’s activists, members, or leaders had been arrested or put under house arrest by Hamas.

These claims have been is fabricated and are nothing but dishonest hostility and increasing division between the two parties. This is motivated by the hostility nesting in the minds of those responsible for the West Bank-Fatah and their media, personal and partisan interests.

This campaign cannot be viewed as a mistake nor given the benefit of the doubt, as it comes immediately after the resistance’s victory and shortly before the second round of negotiations over the seaport, airport and prisoners of war exchange. We cannot rule out the possibility of this being executed in coordination with the Zionist enemy, the PA, and Egyptian government, and that their motivation is to deal a blow to the Palestinian delegation. This would hinder the lifting of the siege, thwart the negotiations over the airport and seaport and prevent Gaza from escaping Egypt’s geographical imprisonment, as well as weaken the political investment of the resistance’s victories, and become an excuse to hinder the signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The resistance must form a political leadership for the current phase that can prevent the coup-led Egyptian government and Fatah authority from tampering with the Palestinian internal front and from disregarding the resistance’s role in the future of the cause. The resistance must also form a leadership nucleus able to lead the cause after the defeat of the occupation and the formal representation that will be needed during this phase.

As such, representation cannot be monopolised by the nearly vanished Palestinian Liberation Organisation that does not possess revolutionary, popular, electoral, or majority legitimacy. Its institutions are fragmented and the majority of its members are remnants of a bygone time no longer engaged in politics as part of a revolution and sacrifice, but instead for position and reward.

This does not mean that there should be a new clash amongst the factions or between the factions and the PA. It means that there must be real elections soon in order to choose leaders and policies to formulate the upcoming phase. The factions must combine their ranks, arrange their affairs and demonstrate its methodology in ideology and resistance. The rivalry between Hamas and Fatah must not go on while the rest of the factions stand by and watch, as if the issue does not concern them. The resistance must not be dragged into the conflicts of its rivals that aim to hinder the national project. Fatah must take bold steps to revise its positions, rivals and friendships and reinvent themselves.

I, personally, had hoped that the reconciliation would be reached and that authority would be given back to Gaza, the crossings would be open, and that aid would be allowed to enter, and that Hamas and its fellow resistance factions would unite. I also had hoped that the blockade, which is no longer acceptable in any shape or form, would be lifted and that an innovative model would emerge from this, in spite of the authority’s weakness and the besiegement of the resistance. I had hoped that this same model, with the same level of consensus, would be transferred and applied to the West Bank. However, it seems that Fatah lacks this and is concerned by ideals other than the liberation project and national unity.

Translated from Al-Sharq, 4 September, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.