ISIS: Its growing roots and ways of dealing with it

ISIS, otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, constitutes the newest example of an ideological religious group under the Sunni umbrella. The formation of ISIS represents a new generation of religious organisations after more than two decades of local, regional and global transformations. Due to the American military presence in Saudi Arabia, the nineties era gave birth to a new way of thinking, known as Jihadist Salafism, which branched from the traditional Salafist school of thought. This school of thought was considered by many to be “academic” in its way of thinking because its followers preoccupied themselves with idiosyncratic details found in religious texts. Religious beliefs and texts were then revised and reinterpreted in a way that limited the role of any political ruler regardless of his political success or ability to meet the people’s demands.

In the nineties, Salafist ideology was merely a way to oppose the foreign military occupation in the country and the rulers who allowed for it to continue. The roots of this political faction’s legitimacy stemmed from it being a form of opposition and its target membership was the religious youth in society. By targeting religious youth as their key members, the Salafist faction was then required to reconsider its intellectual and religious qualifications, which was a decision that led to an unconditional support of the government. It was years before we saw this political ideology transform itself into the foundational pillars of groups such as Al-Qaeda. The rapid development of mass communication coupled with the strong organisational structure of religious movements at the time greatly benefited the manifestation of the Salafist trend and deepened its roots within the society and defined its ideological features.

Al-Qaeda was later forced to change its political strategy after growing pressure in the political domain limited the group’s movement. Therefore, Al-Qaeda was forced to adopt the strategies of other groups in the region such as the Islamic Maghreb, a group founded in 2006 whose political ideology greatly advocates for jihadist combat and killing. Al-Qaeda also began to follow the example of Tawhid, which was founded and led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and is considered to be a branch of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. After two branches of Salafist Jihadism merged in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and another emerged among the youth in Somalia, not to mention the religious confrontations that occurred in some Muslim countries like Morocco, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia, groups within this school of thought were forced to base their recruitment on intellectual links rather than organisational affiliations. This change is what allowed for Salafist groups to grow and continue existing despite the ideological differences that existed from one country to another. The features of these types of groups have continued to evolve and have become more and more extreme in their nature with ISIS being the most prominent example that we can see today.

Ideological organisations

At the beginning of the second decade of this millennium, the strength of these political currents faded with the emergence of the Arab Spring because the momentum of the popular struggle did not give ideological groups a chance to participate in the change until the Salafi current was reconfigured to suit the democratic game. This was the case for the Salafist party that served as the foundation for Al-Nour Party and the Islamic group that formed the Construction and Development Party before the July 3 coup in Egypt. It has also become evident that governing Arab regimes have participated in their fair share of conspiracies to derail the Arab Spring as it is embodied by the Syrian struggle and the sectarian conflict in Iraq.

Recent events have played a large part in the emergence of a new generation of ideological organisations, ones that are different from their predecessors because they focus on the concept of Islamic geography and have turned a blind eye to the western and Zionist enemy in the region. Instead, these groups have focused their attention on Syria and Iraq and have been focusing their energy on recruiting members from and to this region.

ISIS has built its strong foundations on the presence of sectarian violence and it has justified its presence due to the ruling regimes’ lack of ability to provide for its people. It is also important to mention that ISIS’ violent tactics have developed because of its arsenal of sophisticated weapons. ISIS was able to win over much of the young population due to the extreme polarisation that it has caused among the members of its society and it has gained momentum because the western world, most notably the United States, turned a blind eye to its activities. Thus, it comes as no surprise that this organisation did not begin by confronting members of the Syrian regime but instead chose to achieve societal integration by recruiting what were once considered to be partners in the popular revolution.

The emergence of ISIS in this new organisational way in addition to its recruitment motives confirms that we have entered a new era and that this era is, in fact, a continuation of past movements as opposed to a break from them because the ideological foundations, the political vision and the enemy remain the same. The differences between these groups have to do with their classification as opposition groups as these differences are based primarily on minor variations in political visions. ISIS, and other groups of its kind, is flexible enough to be able to deal with political shifts and transformations and it is this outlook that allows them to counter their enemies. The emergence of ISIS with such force demonstrates the failure of the military strategy during this era. The idea of conventional war in the region has failed when considering the 2006 war in Lebanon, the wars in the Gaza Strip, the struggle of the Egyptian army in the Sinai and of course the struggle of the Syrian people with the help of Hezbollah and the revolutionary guard. The combat strategy that is practised in all the instances I have just mentioned is acutely similar and one must not forget that international intervention and cooperation in the region is based on individual interests.

Factors of growth

Although security approaches to fighting ideological organisations are necessary, they failed to successfully fight and defeat groups such as Al-Qaeda because they focused primarily on appearances and failed to address the root causes for the group’s emergence. For example, countering groups of this nature has previously focused on combatting members of the group instead of focusing on the environment that led to this situation such as the division of Iraq along sectarian lines.

We often forget that ideological power cannot be confronted solely with armed force. The first factor we must consider when thinking about how to deal with the emergence of such groups is to remember that they have very little to do with Islam and that their affiliation with the religion remains somewhat shallow. The political ideology of these groups is based largely on a hyperbolic interpretation of religious texts and the people who are best equipped to confront these groups are scientists and intellectuals who take into account the exaggerated nature of this ideological interpretation. Our first hurdle in achieving this is the lack of a unified [ideological] Sunni front due to political affiliations and subordination to the ruling authority.

Al-Azhar failed to unify the Sunni population because it is not independent from the ruling power in Egypt and because its senior sheikh is merely a civil servant rather than a personality outside of political power. Moreover, Wahabi sheikhs also failed in this regard because they have pledged their allegiance to Gulf rulers. Leading ideological Muslim thinkers also failed in this regard because they are afraid to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Sufis also failed to unify Muslims because of their animosity with Salifists. Thus, it is essential to have one uniform school of Islamic thought that would take over the issuance of fatwas and the interpretations for all Islamic requirements. We are in need of open-minded intellectuals who are able to interpret religious doctrines with clarity and fairness through non-violent educational programs for the new generation.

The second factor is political and it is due to the failure of the “post-independence state” to establish sovereignty. States in the region were unable to rid themselves of the influence of occupation and remain open to the world in a way that would be able to maintain a national identity. The Arab states have failed to achieve economic development, social justice and political freedom in a way that reflects the ethnic and religious diversity of their people. Arab regimes have been unable to distance themselves from sectarianism and establish a state based on the culture of co-existence and true citizenship after decades of despair and apathy. Western support for the ruling regimes contributed to the failure of the post-independence state and ensured the survival of dictatorships at the expense of the people.

In this regard, it is useful to analyse how we can limit the emergence of such groups while keeping in mind social and economic factors because a significant number of ISIS’ members are educated middle class members of society as opposed to only marginalised societal factions. One need only look at the second and third generations in western armies to see that it is a wrong approach to think that soldiers enlisting in the army are all marginalised. There is no future for ISIS in the future of our societies because their ideological platform is very limited, too limited in fact for the overwhelming moderate societal majority that does not condone violence. ISIS now finds itself in the midst of many enemies including Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, as well as Arab and western factions.

ISIS has succeeded in justifying foreign intervention in the region due to its extreme sectarian policies. It has also strengthened the validity of the Iranian nuclear file and the negotiations surrounding it while also allowing the Syrian regime to negotiate with world powers despite its terrorist actions.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 15 September 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.