The potentials for failure in the strategy for facing ISIS

June 10 was the turning point of the management of the conflict in both Iraq and Syria. It was also a shock that stunned many world leaders and researchers concerned with the region’s affairs.

On that day, a small number of lightly armed forces raided the city of Mosul, the second most important city in Iraq as well as the city with the second highest population. These forces consisted of 800 fighters from the Islamic State (ISIS) organisation using 4×4 SUV’s mounted with medium-artillery machine guns and some anti-tank missiles. The defending forces consisted of three military units and one security force unit from the Iraqi Interior Ministry, amounting to over 40,000 fighters.

ISIS, and other armed groups supporting the organisation, achieved successive victories as it was able to take control of most of the Sunni provinces in Iraq (Al-Anbar, Nineveh, Salahuddin and Diyala). Although these victories were overwhelming and quick, the international reactions remained reluctant and did not match the danger of the situation in Iraq.

The second surprise occurred when the ISIS forces launched an attack on Kurdistan and reached 40 kilometres from Erbil. At that time, US President Barack Obama gave orders to allow the execution of an airstrike to be carried out by fighter jets and drones. He also agreed on sending US troops to protect American interests and to act as consultants until the number of US troops reached over 1,200.

The limited American airstrikes were able to force ISIS forces to withdraw from a number of areas they had occupied. They also helped the Peshmerga forces progress to the plains of Erbil and Mosul.

The third surprise, which forced President Obama to instruct his advisors to work on a military strategy to address the danger of ISIS (he had previously stated that the US did not have a military strategy to face the group), occurred when ISIS expanded towards the West, taking control of the Rabia and Al-Qaem crossings and diminishing the political borders between Iraq and Syria. ISIS later managed to control the Division 17 and 93rd Battalion headquarters as well as the Tabaqa military airport.

President Barack Obama guaranteed four key elements in his strategy to face ISIS:

The first element was expanding the airstrikes by means of an organised campaign in co-ordination with the Iraqi government, but the US president stressed that this war would be different than past wars and would not include the deployment of American ground forces.

The second element was the support of the forces fighting ISIS on the ground (Iraqi forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga and the armed moderate Syrian opposition). The third element was the need to continue the efforts to combat terrorism in order to prevent ISIS from carrying out any attacks. This can be achieved by working with partners in order to cut off the sources funding ISIS and put an end to the flow of foreign fighters into and from the Middle East. As for the fourth element, it includes continuing to provide humanitarian aid to those affected.

In order to enhance the legitimacy of its strategy, the US administration resorted to the formation of an international alliance consisting of 40 countries. The contribution of most of these countries is limited to political support for the alliance, while 10 countries participated in the airstrike. Despite all of this, the airstrikes are still ineffective and the ISIS forces are still achieving more and more victories and taking control of more areas. It is also engaged in a critical battle in Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani) and is threatening to take full control of Al-Anbar. Meanwhile, its forces have reached 10 kilometres from the western border of Baghdad. What are the reasons behind the failure of the American strategy so far? I will try to answer this question in this article.

The seeds of the American strategy’s failure lie within it, particularly in the first and second elements. Any review of military history would clearly demonstrate the inability of air forces alone to win a war, especially if the airstrike is launched against unorganised fighting groups.

Concentrated and continuous airstrikes can cause great losses for the other party but it will not eliminate it. General Dempsey acknowledged this in his latest statement in which he noted that the deployment of ground forces to ensure the destruction of ISIS forces has not been ruled out. In addition to this, the US administration insists on eliminating ISIS in Iraq and containing its strength in Syria, which implies that two different strategies are being followed in one arena.

President Obama relied on local forces to invest the results of the airstrikes, but such reliance was misplaced for the following reasons:

First, the recent battles have proven that the Iraqi army does not possess any elements of an organised army. It suffers from a fatal weakness in the command and control system, lacks competent leaders who are experienced and qualified because they were chosen based on giving privilege to those who are loyal rather than those who are knowledgeable.

In addition to this, most of the army members belong to the same sect, making it a sectarian army rather than a national army and sectarian armies are usually plagued with corruption and nepotism and do not understand the meaning of sacrifice during critical moments. This is what happened during the Mosul battles when the leaders abandoned their leadership responsibilities and fled to Erbil, leaving behind their soldiers to face a bleak fate. Rehabilitating the Iraqi army based on national foundations would take years and political reforms that ensure there is no exclusion or marginalisation.

Despite the national inclinations possessed by the Peshmerga forces, they suffer from structural and leadership problems, as well as a combat doctrine based on which armies are founded. This is due to the type of missions and wars it has engaged in since its establishment, as it adopted the style of guerrilla war in its fights against the Iraqi army throughout the past conflict. This limits its fighting capabilities in its battles against ISIS. In order to overcome these weaknesses, the Shia Popular Crowd Units were established and the establishment of a regional national guard is in the works in the Sunni provinces.

The armed Syrian opposition suffers from fragmentation, as it is made up of over a thousand fighter factions spread out amongst extremist Islamist groups, such as ISIS and Al-Nusra Front, moderate Islamist factions such as the Syrian Islamic Front, and the more moderate Free Syrian Army Brigades.

The Free Syrian Army is considered the weakest of the armed groups and there are many reasons for this weakness. Such reasons include a lack of an effective organisational structure and the ineffectiveness of chief of staff leadership and the Supreme Military Council, as they do not exercise even the lowest level of control and command over the formations operating in the field. Therefore, Obama’s strategy will face many obstacles and difficulties in preparing and training the required number of soldiers (15,000) in Turkey and Syria as well as forming an effective leadership that would be responsible for planning and managing future military operations.

In addition to the aforementioned difficulties, there is the matter of the appearance of indications of deep conflict that suggest a potential division between the alliance countries down to the US administration’s position towards Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. The US administration insists on continuing the military campaign only against ISIS, while other critical countries in the alliance, led by Turkey seek to also hit Syrian regime forces as part of the military campaign in order to topple the regime. This is one of the main reasons that prevented them from ground intervention to rescue Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani).

The conference scheduled to be held at the Andrews Air Force Base may witness great efforts to unify the positions of the alliance countries in order to prevent the occurrence of serious divisions amongst its ranks. The American military delegation which will be visiting Ankara next week will also seek to convince the Turkish government of the need to allow the alliance to use its air bases.

We must also take into consideration the strength of ISIS, which lies in a range of key factors and can be summarised in the following points:

• ISIS presented itself as a defender of Sunni Islam in the face of the marginalisation and exclusion efforts suffered by Sunnis in various areas. This secured ISIS with a good number of fighters and reasonably good popular support from the Sunni Muslims.
• It adopted bloody, violent and harsh methods in order to shock and terrorise its opponents.
• The failure of the Arab Spring revolutions, with the exception of the Tunisian revolution, to achieve freedom, democracy and social justice for Arab citizens.
• ISIS’ control over large areas that extend from Jarabulus in Syria in the West to Jalawla in Iraq in the east. This area is larger than the United Kingdom.
• Self-sufficiency in terms of funds, machinery, equipment and weapons. The spoils of war it obtained from the Iraqi forces after raiding Mosul and from the Free Syrian Army after taking control of its stores in the town of Azaz, as well as the spoils it obtained from the Syrian army after taking control of Unit 17 and the 93rd Battalion’s headquarters and the Tabaqa military airport have all contributed to its great strategic stockpile.

As for the economic dimension, ISIS is considered one of the richest armed organisations in the world. Estimates regarding its revenue vary, but they range between $3 and $5 million a month, and this is enough for self-funding. In addition to this, ISIS has also managed to take control of several oil fields in Syria and Iraq, as well as many granaries and fish lakes north of Babylon.

In addition to this, it also has an effective command and control system that is capable of operational planning and efficient management of simultaneous crucial battles as well as adapting to new developments on the ground in order to prevent the enemy from achieving quick and decisive victories. This is not possible without having experienced military leaders and fighters.

All of this leads us to reach the preliminary conclusion that the battle of the international alliance forces against ISIS will not be easily resolved and won in light of the current data available and that the forces will face great challenges, even in the event that a decision was made to send ground troops because they will have to face a complicated and painful guerrilla war.

This article was first published in Arabic by Al-Jazeera.net

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.