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Jordan's reliance on Al-Sisi

December 15, 2014 at 3:02 pm

Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi made a quick visit on Thursday to Amman where he received a warm official welcome (the masses were clearly unhappy) which sent a clear message of complete support from the Jordanian “decision-making kitchen” for Al-Sisi and his portfolio and internal policies.

Ten days before this visit, King Abdullah II made sure to visit Cairo and meet with Al-Sisi before going to the United States to meet with the US President Barack Obama, Congress, and American thought centres. One of the most important tasks, if not the main task of the Washington meetings was to support Al-Sisi, promote him in the American circles, and to defend his policies.

The King realised the level of dispute and difference of opinion regarding Al-Sisi in Washington and he was aware that there is a large group of politicians who cannot digest what Al-Sisi is doing to the opposition and his obvious coup against the democratic path. It is ironic that the New York Times published an article to coincide with the King’s visit that harshly criticised Al-Sisi after former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was found innocent. The article described the new government in Egypt as even more dictatorial than Mubarak himself and that this court ruling is the “last chapter” of the democratic spring in Egypt.

The goal behind Al-Sisi’s visit to Amman, in addition to confirming and stressing the alliance between the two parties, is also to get the King’s opinion on the result of his visit and the opinion of the American circles regarding what is happening in Egypt, as well as getting advice on how to address the next stage.

Could Amman really be adopting Al-Sisi and his government to this extent? The answer is yes, not only after the military coup, but even during the stage leading up to the coup, during which he coordinated with Al-Sisi as a part of a group of Arab partners working to overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule and stop the train of Arab revolutions. Anyone observing the events in the Middle East would realise by merely comparing Jordan’s policies during President Mohammed Morsi’s rule and the crises that were fabricated during the time regarding Egypt’s gas crisis and the Egyptian workers, the Kingdom’s paternal and intimate relationship with Al-Sisi. The answer to Jordan’s deep reliance on Al-Sisi seems quite straightforward and clear, either by looking at the regional scene or the domestic-internal scene.

Regionally, Jordan is a key and effective partner and one of the engineers of the conservative Arab camp in the region which includes some Gulf countries. This alliance’s task is to protect the “status quo”, prevent democratic development and change, confront “political Islam” especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and hinder the other alleged axis, the Turkish-Qatari axis which supports these transformations and developments and merge the Islamists in the region.

At an earlier stage, the priority of the conservative axis (formerly known as the axis of moderation) was to confront what was called the “axis of opposition” (Iran-Syria-Brotherhood). However, after the recent developments in the Arab Spring, and the severed relationship between the Brotherhood and Iran, the Arab conservatives have re-arranged their priorities, making their first threat the Turkish and political Islam camp, even putting it ahead of the regional Iranian project.

Internally, the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood is an important factor that explains Jordan’s support of Al-Sisi, as the Brotherhood raised the ceiling of its speeches during the height of the Arab Spring (2011-2013) and relied on the Brotherhood governments in Egypt and Tunisia while waiting for a similar government in Syria. Therefore, its relationships with King Abdullah II became turbulent, suspicions reached an all-time high between the two sides, this allowing Jordan to rely on Al-Sisi and his success in thwarting the ambitions of the Islamists in Egypt, who form the most popular and powerful opposition force amongst the masses. Al-Sisi also made efforts to rein in their hopes regarding regional changes, hence weakening the Brotherhood and fragmenting its popular and political strength.

As clear as these factors are in explaining Jordan’s reliance, questions remain regarding the other variables and changes which give this issue a more mysterious and complex aspect. Despite the extreme position regarding the Brotherhood, a position the King no longer bothers to hide, the Jordanian equation differs from the Gulf or Egyptian equations. The Brotherhood is an organisation that is enrooted in history and society and it has other social dimensions, such as the fact that it is the most prominent representative of Jordanians of Palestinian origins, which makes the decision to ban or outlaw the organisation an irrational and unrealistic. On top of all of this, the alternative to the Brotherhood is the growing radical jihadi Salafist trend and eliminating the Brotherhood would serve the interests of this trend, which would constitute a serious and dangerous internal security threat.

One of the most important complications regarding Jordan’s reliance on Al-Sisi is that there is a large popular trend that is not necessarily supportive of the Brotherhood that greatly opposes this foreign policy which makes the gap between public opinion and foreign policy very wide. This gap reflects on the growing confidence and trust issues between the state and society, causing there to be great doubts regarding the official call for adopting political reform, while the internal and foreign policies are heading in a completely opposite direction.

Jordanian political analysts have added another factor to this complication that is no less important than the aforementioned factor. This factor is the fact that this goes beyond Jordan’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and is related to the nature of Jordan’s foreign policy which has always been known as moderate. Jordan has also been known to remain committed to more than one diplomatic option and equally deal with other Arab partners, which has historically and traditionally contributed to the “soft power” of Jordan’s diplomacy. This has bridged the gap between the positions of the masses and the state, but this is clearly absent from the current foreign policy.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 15 December, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.