Will the crisis open the door for Assad's fall?

The Russians will face three political storms this winter and they are in fact part of the greater strategy for political and economic warfare that was adopted by the United States more then ten years ago, even before Russia annexed Crimea. According to Juan Zarate, the American official who was hired to deal with this issue under the George W Bush administration, the US strategy was implemented through the global banking system and a network of allies that limited Russia’s influence and prevented it from returning to a position similar to its Cold War status.

This economic war could be what leads Russia to reconsider some of its global relationships, particularly with countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is as part of a greater strategy to save the country from collapse as it is facing the worst economic crisis in its history, far worse than the one it experienced under President Boris Yeltsin in 1998. These changes could be what open a window for change in Russia’s position in the Syrian conflict and lead 2015 to be the year that brings Al-Assad down. Perhaps Bogdanov’s recent appointment to the Kremlin is a clear indication of Russia’s plans to redirect its position on the Syrian conflict.

The three political storms facing Russia this winter are embodied by the Russian treasury’s decrease in oil revenues, the decline of the ruble and the economic sanctions that have been imposed by the US and the EU on Russia after it annexed Crimea. The global scene is currently witnessing a heated competition between Moscow, Tehran and Ankara. Cairo is expected to enter the line of fire soon.

Russians in the face of the storm:

The Russians strongly feel that they will be able to overcome European and American sanctions simply because it is only a matter of time before the Europeans will have to reconsider their position as they rely heavily on their trade relations with Russia as well as on Russian gas. The large-scale nature of European and Russian trade relations means that Europe is currently suffering a great deal from its current treatment of Russia. Boycotting Russia will cause a great deal of harm to European countries and their economies. It was reported that the last two years were very difficult for the European economy, especially Germany, which is the largest importer of Russian gas in the world. Yet, the main problem remains that Putin’s advisers largely miscalculated the strength of the Russian economy and did not predict that the ruble would decline to nearly half of its value after Crimea’s annexation. Putin’s advisers falsely predicted that Russia had a sufficient amount of federal reserves and would be able to bear the brunt of economic sanctions; however, the Central Bank of Russia was unable to prevent the ruble’s fall as it was able to solve the economic crisis under Yeltsin by raising interest rates.

The decline of the Russian currency began in early 2014 and has yet to stop to this day. At the time that Russia decided to annex Crimea, federal reserves amounted to nearly $414 billion while Russia’s external debt, which increased by 70 per cent, reached a total of $700 billion. The total debt acquired by Russian companies also reached $500 billion and one-fifth of this amount must be paid by the beginning of 2015. This reality is what led to Russia’s economic plight. The Russian government has said that it is relying heavily on China to help it solve this problem and while China has responded by saying that it is more than willing to help its ally, it is also the top beneficiary from the Russian crisis due to the fact that many European companies are locating their headquarters China in lieu of Russia. China is also benefitting greatly from the low price of Russian gas.

Meanwhile, the people are queuing in front of banks in a desperate attempt to withdraw their money and Russia will still have more consequences to pay from its political involvements in Ukraine and former countries within the Soviet Union. The United States will seek its revenge by aligning itself closer to Baltic States and farter away from Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The real economic crisis stems from the decline in the price of Russian gas, as more than half of the country’s national income comes from oil and gas revenues. The price of Russian gas has decreased by nearly 50 per cent. The Russians hope that the decline will not last long because they are currently the third largest exporter of oil and gas in the world. Yet, what we have not discussed is Saudi Arabia’s influence on OPEC and the major difference between the Russian and Saudi economies shows that Saudi Arabia has a rather substantial financial reserve and would be able to bear the backlash from economic sanctions for nearly three years before having to deal with any consequences. What this means is that Russia’s way out of the economic crisis will not come from China or from Europe but from Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom will only accept one outcome: for Assad to step down.

Moreover, this would entail Russia placing pressure on the Iranians who would undoubtedly stand in opposition to this decision. Russia would need to use its realm of influence in Iran to its advantage and try to prolong the negotiations that are currently taking place in regards to the Iranian nuclear file. The Russian economic crisis greatly explains the mysterious depths of Russian-Iranian relations and this position could help shed light on Russia’s support for Al-Assad until this point. Perhaps it is Iran that refuses to allow Russia to stand in opposition to it.

The Tsar and the Sultan face the US:

The meetings that took place between Putin and Erdogan are based on a very important idea: trying to form a solution to the Syrian crisis, especially since both Turkey and Russia find themselves suffering from the consequences of the American backlash. Russia has been largely affected by the consequences of its involvement in Ukraine as well as its economic crisis while Turkey finds itself suffering from the US’ support for the Kurds in Kobani, as well as its attempt to bring Turkey into its fight against ISIS.

Turkish-Russian relations find themselves at a new turning point even without the implementation of a no-fly zone and regardless of Assad’s continued position in power. Russia has reached out to Turkey due to the latter’s heavy dependence on Russian oil. Turkey currently imports nearly 60 per cent of its oil and gas from Russia and it is for this reason that Russia has approached Turkey for help in its time of crisis after the EU opted out of using the Southern Stream Pipeline for Russian gas and instead chose to adopt the plan for the Nabucco gas pipeline. Consequently, Russia expressed its willingness to build a gas pipeline on the Greek-Turkish border in addition to pumping nearly three billion cubic metres of gas to Turkey at a six per cent discount.

In addition, Russia expressed its willingness to increase trade relations with Turkey from $30 to $50 billion a year after the Turkish government hired a Russian company to build its nuclear reactor.

On a political front, what Russia wants is for Turkey to understand its security concerns and its fear of the Patriot missile system presence near the Turkish-Syrian border, especially in the event of a confrontation with the US and NATO. Russia needs Turkish support in the event that Al-Assad falls and it seeks to find a political solution that would be beneficial to all those involved. Moreover, Turkey has asked Russia to end its support for the Alawite minority in Syria and to help protect Turkey from possible chemical strikes in the event that Al-Assad stays in power. Turkey has also asked Russia to withdraw its support for Kurdish groups on the Syrian-Turkish border.

As for the Iranians, they seek to build a unified state that goes beyond political alliances and remains indifferent to the presence of ISIS. Iran seeks to extend its mandate beyond its borders into Iraq and Syria as well as links to southern Lebanon, especially in the event that Russia pressures it to withdraw its support for Al-Assad and he is forced to step down. A state that extends from Tehran to Lebanon would ensure that Iran’s influence prevails in the region, meaning that it plans to remain deeply rooted in Syria, which it now considers nothing more than a collection of militias much like what Vietnam was to America.

Translated from Al Quds Al Arabi, 29 December, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.