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Hamas’s options and the fate of Gaza

January 15, 2015 at 2:56 pm

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First of all, we cannot accept the continuation of the situation in the Gaza Strip which is suffering from an ongoing blockade and the closure of border crossings, in addition to the deterioration of living conditions, power outages, a lack of staff salaries and security explosions. It is unacceptable for any friend or brother to keep Gaza in the largest prison in history, regardless of the justifications or pretexts, and use the people’s livelihood and salaries to achieve individual or sectarian purposes.

Despite the fact that it has been over five months since the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and over seven months since the formation of the national reconciliation government, the reality in the Gaza Strip has not changed. On the contrary, matters have become worse. The siege and closure of the crossings have become worse than at any other time, the reconstruction of the Strip has been postponed until further notice, and the issue of the salaries of the employees appointed by the Hamas government still hasn’t been resolved. This has led to the Fatah-aligned employees, who are committed to Ramallah’s decision for them to remain in Gaza, to stay at home while continuing to receive their salaries. The situation at the borders and crossings has also worsened.

The situation has escalated to the point where is poses a security threat which, after reaching the festival platform and the homes of Fatah leaders, reached the home of the government spokesperson and the ATMs. Warnings and threats have also been made to ministers and bank managers. All of this has put Hamas, which is practically considered the governing authority, responsible for stopping the disorder and explosions and finding and prosecuting the perpetrators.

Indicators are increasingly signalling the near explosion or collapse of the Gaza Strip in the event that the situation remains the same. The question that comes to mind now is not whether there will be an explosion, but when? How? Who will it target and who will it benefit?

There are those who say that the problem boils down to the fact that after its power model failed and the Muslim Brotherhood government fell in Egypt, Hamas must continue the path it stated by dissolving its government, ending its individual control over the Gaza Strip, and enabling the government to carry out its duties, form its institutions, reinstate its employees and control the border and crossings. This is an Arab and international condition that cannot be achieved without opening the crossings and really embarking on reconstructing Gaza. According to those promoting this idea, Hamas must concede in order for Gaza to live.

There are those who say that Hamas has done what is required of them; they dissolved their government, agreed to form a reconciliation government, which is in effect the president’s government, and expressed its willingness to allow the presidential guard to be stationed at the border and the police at the crossings. So they believe the ball is now in the government’s court.

Hamas’s options have become even more limited in light of its multiple crises and the increased likelihood of Qatar staging a coup against it after the Qatari- Egyptian reconciliation. It is between a rock and a hard place, having to choose between moving forward until the end with its policy of holding the national unity government and evading its responsibilities as the actual governing authority in the Gaza Strip, or the option of handing over everything to the PA while preserving the resistance’s arms and the Qassam Brigades.

This option is unlikely because Hamas is aware that repeating the Hezbollah model in Gaza is difficult since Lebanon’s political and sectarian situation, as well as its regional and international relations and geographical location, are all different from Palestine and the besieged Gaza Strip. The Strip is suffering the effects of the intense rivalry between Egypt and Hamas as well as the fact that the condition to lifting the siege and the reconstruction of Gaza is the disarmament of the resistance, or at the very least limits its ability to preserve and develop them.

There is a third option which is to revolt against the current situation by forming a “national committee” to govern Gaza and announce its vote of no confidence as well as its refusal to form a new government. However, this committee will actually act as a new government for Gaza. This does not solve any of its problems as it does not turn a new page in its relations with Egypt, nor will it open the Rafah crossing or lead to an influx of funds to reconstruct Gaza, even if the other factions, with the exception of Fatah, approve this idea. Therefore, Hamas is using this idea as a means of pressure and as a tactic and instead continues to hold the national reconciliation government responsible until God destines something else to happen and the situation changes, especially in light of the return of some heat to the Iranian-Hamas relations.

However, these relations will never go back to the way they were because Iran learned its lesson and will not quickly rekindle relations with Hamas as it does not want to anger its Syrian ally or increase the factors of tension and discord between the two sides. Such tension may hinder the possibility of reaching a suitable agreement in Iran’s negotiations with the global super powers on the nuclear issue. In addition to this, Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, cannot take an entirely different position than the group’s position on Iran.

Hamas’s fourth option is to use the resistance’s weapons against Israel, but, despite its legendary steadfastness in the latest war and their heroism, it did not lead to achieving the people’s and resistance’s demands and instead caused heavy losses. Therefore, Hamas does not prefer this option in the near future, despite its appeal. They will play this card as a last resort or in the event that Israel wages a new war on Gaza.

As for its fifth option, Hamas can blow up the situation with Egypt on the military and security scale, or on a popular level, which previously occurred when hundreds of thousands of Gazans stormed across the Palestinian-Egyptian border. However, by choosing this option, Hamas would be playing with fire and it is very costly, so it is the last thing on Hamas’s mind because the Palestinians reject this option.

Hamas utilises the unity government’s neglect of the Gaza Strip as well as the resulting bitterness felt within the popular and political circles to score points against the Palestinian president and Fatah. It was also used by Hamas to persuade other factions, including those within the framework of the PLO, to take a firm stance against the marginalisation of Gaza, which ultimately led to a joint and meaningful meeting that included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP and DFLP), but this meeting was boycotted by Fatah. It resulted in a call, which did not have much value, for forming a committee to follow-up on the reconciliation agreement, the reconstruction issue and elections.

Hamas also plays on the internal disputes in Fatah, especially between Abu Mazen and Mohammed Dahlan’s wings. Some of Hamas’s circles have threatened, albeit indirectly, that security disorder and lawlessness will return and that the extremist jihadi organisations will rise to power, including the Islamic State (ISIS) organisation.

Regardless of Hamas’s intentions, its plans and its options, allowing the situation in Gaza to remain the same, even without any further deterioration, does not leave many options for Gazans. Even the option of migration is unavailable to them, as by attempting to do so, they put themselves at risk of death in the sea. They are also at risk of finding salvation by joining extremist organisations, if not ISIS, then a Palestinian alternative may be established.

In spite of everything I have mentioned there is a way out that is based on providing great political and popular pressure to reach a situation in which Hamas is willing to give up its unilateral control over Gaza and allow a real unity government to replace it. It also needs to distance itself from the Muslim Brotherhood, respect the will of the Egyptian people by recognising their president, express their willingness to respect the principles of partnership and pluralism, and respect human rights and basic freedoms.

Hamas must also use the benefits and rights provided for in international law and UN resolutions in exchange for accepting it as a main partner in the PLO and PA and on the basis of ending its policy of monopolisation and domination of the authority, decision-making and policies. In addition to this, the illusion of establishing a Palestinian state through negotiations must be abandoned and they must demonstrate their competence and good intentions. Building institutions and adopting common political denominators and strategies enables them to confront the challenges and risks facing the Palestinian cause and utilise the opportunities available to them.

This article was first published in Arabic by Masarat.ps

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.