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Notes on the formation of a national committee to deal with the ICC

February 10, 2015 at 5:27 pm

The Palestinian president issued a presidential decree providing for the formation of a national committee to follow-up with the ICC, calling it the Supreme National Committee for Coordination with the ICC. This is a positive move because it reflects a Palestinian desire to follow-up and activate its membership in the ICC instead of giving in to the American and Israeli threats and pressure as well as the European advice and urge.

There is much to be said about the formation of this strange committee, as over 40 Palestinian figures, most of whom are members of the Fatah executive and central committees, security services leaders, and representatives of Palestinian ministries and state institutions. According to the presidential decree, these members will head the committee. The committee will also include members of human rights organisations, representatives of the Fatah Advisory Council and members of other Palestinian factions, including one member of Hamas.

Despite the large number of members in the committee, which make its work difficult, the committee does not include anyone who specialises in international criminal law or even international law. There are several individuals who have contributed and played a major role in previous experiences, especially in the national committee that succeeded in giving the Palestinians access to the Hague Court, a treasure they hadn’t expected and haven’t used well, but they are all absent from the committee. The committee is also missing representation from the Palestinians in the diaspora in spite of the fact that there are many refugees and Palestinians spread across the world, many of whom possess the experience and qualifications to contribute to the committee. In addition to this, they are free from any pressures put on the Palestinians in occupied Palestine.

We also notice that the committee does not reflect any true representation of the universities, specifically the law schools. Some may say that this could be done in the specialised technical committees, but this does not justify the absence of qualified individuals in the national committee that will have the power to make decisions.

The problem is not limited to the formation of the committee. The true dilemma lies in the fact that the committee is dominated by an official and political nature, making it subject to the considerations and obligations of the political leadership. This makes the committee prone to pressures, especially since it does not possess true authority, as its technical, consultative, negotiating and media-related jobs have been lifted and instead it is “drafting and preparing the documents and cases to be submitted and referred by the State of Palestine to the ICC via a technical committee headed by the Foreign Ministry. The Supreme National Committee will then decide its priorities in this regard and will have the authority to form technical and legal committees when it sees fit.”

The decree is not clear enough in terms of the committee’s powers and authorities, and therefore it allows for multiple interpretations. This includes the interpretation of the aforementioned quote that the committee will decide when and how it wants to follow-up the submission and prosecution of cases related to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and on-going crimes such as settlements.

However, the situation is almost entirely in the hands of the authorities, state and officials, i.e. the same faced we see in the various cases and committees. This deprives the Palestinians in allowing for the participation of various qualifications that may enrich and contribute to achieving the renewal and change needed. It also deprives the Palestinians from the ICC’s most important advantage, that it is a court for individuals meaning that every Palestinian individual, organisation, or the Palestinian state could resort to the court in order to prosecute Israeli political and military officials who committed or contributed to any crime against the Palestinian people in general, or specifically against the Palestinians in Gaza who suffered under barbaric attacks and war crimes calming the lives of over 5,000 Palestinians and double that number in casualties. They have also suffered the destruction of their homes, organisations and infrastructure since late 2008, lasting until the latest attack in July 2014.

The Palestinian leadership will hesitate before taking any measures because of the political, moral and material losses it may suffer. It will also put any measure in the context of continuing to rely on the option of resuming negotiations after the Israeli elections next March, especially if the “Zionist Camp” wins or joins any future Israeli governments. They are also relying on the delusion that Obama is at the end of his second term so he may be able to offer something new, such as pressuring Israel to accept a settlement that restores the minimum amount of Palestinian rights. However, this is merely a dream that will never come true.

The committee is formed by order of the presidential decree, and its head is a member of the Executive Committee. Its meetings are only held at the request of the head even though the presidential decree should include a clause requesting that the committee set an internal agenda to organise its work and meetings, instead of leaving everything to the leader, who can call for a meeting whenever he wants and who can fail to do so until further notice.

We understand that the committee needs political cover, but what is the point of filling it with so many politicians and all the security services’ officials? If the purpose of this was to benefit from the capabilities and information possessed by the security services, then this could be done without its leaders being members of the committee.

What is required is the formation of an official committee and another civil committee, provided that there is close coordination between the two in order for them to be integrated and a distribution of roles allowing for the freedom of action for each role, without causing negative affects to the official position which is bounded by obligations and commitments, as well as under pressure.

We must also make sure that this does not restrict the freedom of the civil committee, which is supposed to be free and unrestricted. Imagine if the BDS committee was formed in the same way that the national committee for the ICC was formed; it certainly would not be able to achieve half, or even a quarter of the achievements it has made so far.

Another option is to form a mixed committee (official-civil), but it must be given real power and it must have an independent character, allowing it to make decisions and take actions independent of any official consideration. A large number of its members and its leader must be specialists in this field.

Based on the above, the formation of this committee is not very reassuring and it reminds us of the absence of professionalism and collective democratic action, and the transparency, accountability, responsibility and monitoring it requires. The absence of this increases the likelihood of adding yet another paralysed committee to the group of paralysed state institutions, including the Central Council and the National Council, which has been absent for so long.

It has been a long time since the National Assembly was held, and the Central Council is held at unscheduled times without even being able to exercise all of its power as the leading mediatory committee between the two meetings of the National Council. Moreover, during this time, the PNC elections haven’t been held nor has anyone resorted to the national consensus government, the only alternative that can partially compensate for the elections and ballot box’s lack of legitimacy, especially after the terms of all the committees and the officials in the PA and PLO have expired.

Translated from Masarat, 10 February 2015

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.