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The ground attack on ISIS: Context and consequences

February 12, 2015 at 4:15 pm

US General John Allen, advisor to the American president and special presidential envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, has said that “Iraqi troops will begin a major ground offensive against the militants in the weeks ahead.”

Perhaps General Allen’s statement raised more serious questions regarding the expected ground military operation than it actually answered because the phrase “Iraqi troops will begin a major ground offensive” is not so much a political or media statement as it is a statement reflecting a very narrow military concept. This is because an offensive begun by any force means that this force is pitting itself against another force that differs in military capacity or national affiliation, which raises specific questions. Are there any forces associated with one or more countries that will join Iraqi forces in leading this attack? And if so, what is the nationality of these forces? Or are there non-state actors that will support the Iraqi troops on the ground?

In an interview with Haider Al-Abadi, shortly after being sworn in as Iraqi prime minister on 9 September 2014, he confirmed that one of the most important strategic constants adopted by the ruling Shia collation in Iraq is eliminating the role of Gulf states in the war against Al-Qaeda and ISIS.  Accordingly, Al-Abadi cut off the aircraft from some GCC countries on their way to launch airstrikes on Iraq, limiting their activity to bombing targets in Syria, especially Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani) and Raqqa.

Despite the fact that Al-Abadi’s position was not even questioned by the US, it was notable that a country for which an international coalition was formed in order to provide assistance to would strongly refuse GCC help, which is noted in the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation of the League of Arab States. Meanwhile, the same country is accepted a strong role played by Iran, seemingly overcoming the negative legacy of the eight year war between Iraq and Iran.

Since the beginning of his term, Al-Abadi has announced a package of goodwill measures, especially with regards to limiting arms to the hands of the state – in other words curbing the role of Shia militias in the war on Sunni terrorism – good intentions alone does not instil immediate trust from the other side. Many observing the situation in Iraq have noted that during Al-Abadi’s time Iraq has witnessed a horizontal expansion and spread of Shia militias in various parts of the country (and not merely in contested areas), especially in Diyala, Baghdad, and parts of Salahuddin and the provinces.

Now, the militias are at the doors of Anbar province ostensibly in the guise of waging war against ISIS. These militias are also expanding the roles assigned to them, as well as the number of weapons they possess and the number of their members. The fatwa issued by leading Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s urging Iraqis to join the army to fight against ISIS, led to the formation of the People’s Militia under the pretext of protecting Shiite shrines. At the time, some said that Al-Sistani’s intention was to neutralise Iran’s role in Iraq by linking the armed force to his circle of influence.

Haider Al-Abadi, on the other hand, seems to see nothing wrong with the presence of the commander of Iran’s Al-Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, in the country. In a speech given at a security conference in Munich, Germany, he said that Soleimani’s presence was in the context of a deal made between Baghdad and Tehran to confront ISIS. He also stressed that all Iranian advisors who have thus far travelled to Iraq are have done so in the context of this security agreement.

It is likely that Al-Abadi was trying to gauge the position of the international community on Iran’s growing military and security role in Iraq, which is in direct conflation with the sanctions imposed on the country by the UN Security Council. These sanctions include prohibitions on dealing with certain people, including General Soleimani himself.

On the other hand, has the Iraqi army been able to rise to the occasion of the major combat tasks entrusted to it? What is the current status of the 12 brigades to which General John Allen referred? Have they reached a level of training and armament that qualifies them to move to the battlefield and engage in purging large cities like Mosul from well-trained ISIS forced accustomed to street battles? ISIS’s preparation and training has included digging trenches and building barricades and fortifications, making the tasks of these brigades extremely difficult.

Independent military analysts have noticed that American, Iraqi, and perhaps even Iranian military planners are focusing on Mosul as the testing area for these brigades. It was this city that the government forces lost to ISIS on 9 June 2014, and it is considered a hard test if the attack fails to achieve its set objectives due to the potential effect on the moral of the fighters.

However, on what is Al-Abadi’s government pinning its hopes of making a significant military achievement in Mosul, the city with special symbolism due to the fact that it is where Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi named himself the “Caliph of Islam”? Maybe the Iraqi government is pinning its hopes on the presence of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, whose morale grew after the victories it made with the support of the international coalition in the outskirts of Mosul and in the battles of Sinjar. This was helped by the fact that they received advanced weaponry from a number of Western countries such as the United States, Canada, Germany, and Britain.

Iraqi state forces are still suffering from a fatal flaw in that there is a lack of accurate figures on the size of the armed forces due to the presence of tens of thousands of ghost soldiers, the first batch of which (over 50,000 ghost soldiers) was announced by Haider al-Abadi late last year.

Analysts are reporting indicators that suggest a significant percentage of the army are of Shia denomination, partly as a result Resolution 91 issued by US civil administrator Paul Bremer in June 2003, which absorbed existing Shia militias into the army. This changed the make-up of the army from a Sunni-dominated command structure and Shia soldiers imposed under Ba’thism to a Shia command structure and base after Resolution 2 provided for the dissolution of the Iraqi army under the guise of de-Ba’thification in May 2003. The result of this US-instigated overhaul was the loss of the army’s top command structure and the imposition of a sectarianised representational political system that is now being reflected in the army itself.

The expected ground operation announced by General Allen is considered a deciding battle in the international fight against ISIS on every level. This is despite the fact that Allen has said that Iraqi forces will lead the ground attack to “restore Iraq” and that the coalition forces will provide them with support.

However, an attack on Mosul is potentially more dangerous than on any other area because of the presence of four different armed militias in Nineveh province. The first of these is the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which the Kurds treat like an army, not a militia. The presence of these forces is considered an escalation of the conflict, not to mention the national aspect. The second militia is the Yazidi militia established by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces to act as its branch in the areas known as “the disputed areas”, while a third Christian militia was formed to fight a battle restore Mosul from the hands of ISIS. The fourth is the People’s Militia itself.

All of this military mobilisation means one thing: a contested battlefield in which each party is fighting for their own goals. We can be certain that there will be no democratic dialogue between guns and tanks, especially if the area is inflamed by the fire of combat from all sides. Each party wants to win at any cost, despite the fact that no matter how much courage they have, it is not enough to achieve a victory alone.

If the Mosul battle begins, then we will see a repetition of the situation in Ayn Al-Aran in Syria – this time on a larger scale in terms of the length of the battle, the extent of destruction caused to the city and the extraordinary number of refugees fleeing the fighting. The same may well happen in Tikrit, albeit on a smaller scale. Until more is known about the military push, however, the question of control of Anbar province will remain on the shelf.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.