Hamas declared a terrorist organisation…Why now?

At first glance, the decision made by the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters to label the Islamic resistance movement Hamas a terrorist organisation seems to be completely farcical. However, if we look at this farce closer, along with the details of the decision, the current and future course of events, and the impact of these events, we would believe that there is a “scheme” behind the decision. This drives us to believe two possibilities, first, that the Egyptian government intends to launch a military strike on Hamas, or other Palestinian organisations in the Gaza Strip. The second possibility is that this decision may be linked to a future regional agreement, currently being arranged by the Saudi leadership, who received the Turkish and Egyptian presidents earlier this week.

I believe that the first possibility is unlikely at the moment due to the large cost of an airstrike for the Egyptian government, as well as the unfavourable results of the strike launched by the Egyptian army on Libyan targets. In addition to this, the results of such a strike may have adverse results that the Egyptian government can do without. Moreover, the arrangements being made by the Saudi leadership in the region do not encourage the Egyptian government to launch such a strike.

This brings us to the second possibility regarding the Egyptian government’s desire to minimise the cost it needs to pay in the context of the arrangements Saudi Arabia is trying to make in the region. The following points prove the probability of this theory:

The Egyptian authorities announced the decision to declare Hamas a terrorist organisation suddenly, as it did not announce that it was looking into the matter or that it was on the court’s agenda. It also wasn’t mentioned on the agenda of “expected events” prepared by the media outlets and world new agencies. The media outlets suddenly reported the news, citing “judicial sources”. What drove the judiciary to hastily make such a decision?

The same court decided on January 26 that it would not be involved in looking into cases similar to declaring Hamas a terrorist organisation, what changed?

How will Egypt benefit from this decision at this particular time (if there was no plan behind it)? Certainly nothing. However, the disadvantages of this decision are countless on an internal, regional and foreign level.

What was the decision preceded by the Egyptian president’s visit to Saudi Arabia, in coincidence with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Saudi Arabia? Is this a coincident? I do not think so, especially since Egyptian newspapers close to the government reported news of Saudi efforts to achieve a rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey.

Therefore, the most logical explanation for the decision is the Egyptian leadership’s knowledge that Saudi Arabia is preparing for an agreement to achieve reconciliation between Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar in order to prepare the region to fight the Iranian expansion in the region, beginning in Yemen and extending to the Levant.

What does Hamas have to do with this? That is a good question. The answer to this question is that in order to go along with the “comprehensive” deal, the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey may set the condition that Egypt must lessen its pressure on the Gaza Strip and Hamas.

However, in order for the Egyptian government to avoid fulfilling these conditions, or in order not to make significant concessions, it is imposing new restrictions on the Gaza Strip, including this “dangerous” decision to declare Hamas a terrorist organisation. Hence, Egypt will consider cancelling this judicial decision (and perhaps partially opening the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza) a significant concession in itself.

Does all of the above mean that the region will witness serious changes in the near future? Not necessary; Saudi’s efforts are only attempts on its part, the results of which are still unknown. Although Saudi Arabia is a major player, it is not the only one on the field, there are many other players.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.