A Lebanese ghost in Yemen

There are several scenarios that could unfold in Yemen, especially in light of the recent developments taking place in Aden. The Saudi-led coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm has continued to fight against Houthi militias whose support stems from ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Iran and Russia. At the moment, a long-term solution is unlikely due to the complexities of the civil situation that is reminiscent of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and its level of destruction.

There are many indicators suggesting that the situation in Yemen might evolve into a civil war involving domestic and regional forces: the increasing scope of military confrontations in various Yemeni provinces; heightened political polarisation; and the southern faction’s efforts to secede from the north. Coupled with the presence of large quantities of ammunition and military hardware; the dominant tribal nature of the social and cultural fabric in Yemen; Iran’s attempt to extend its influence in the region; and Russia’s entry on the front line through direct military support for the Houthis, these are all factors which could lead to the “Lebanonisation” of the Yemeni crisis.

The alliances in the country are perhaps the most interesting factor. The political elite in Yemen exerts its power over an inherently tribal society; this is a reality that cannot be ignored. In fact, the current political reality is the result of a traditional political culture that is deeply-rooted in the social fabric. Yemen has had a parliament since North and South Yemen were unified in 1990; however, this has not modernised political life or established a state with institutions upholding the law and advocating the separation of powers between parliament, the judiciary and the executive. If anything, the attempts to modernise or democratise political life in Yemen have done very little except deepen the tribal rifts in society.

The ousted President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, put a great deal of effort into employing and emphasising tribalism as a means to secure his power; he also worked to weaken any sense of patriotism within Yemen’s vital institutions. As president, he relied greatly on his closest confidants and family members within the military establishment to ensure the loyalty of tribal leaders. When the winds of the Arab Spring reached Yemen the people were among the first to revolt. In spite of the enormous sacrifices made by the Yemenis as they confronted the Saleh regime and its security and military agencies, the president was able to emerge with minimal losses because of a Gulf initiative which allowed him to leave power without legal proceedings against him. Even so, Saleh’s departure did not prevent him from continuing to interfere with state affairs, domestically and internationally. His alliance with the Houthis, who took control of Sana’a in September, caused the political equation in Yemen to be turned upside down, placing the country in a political impasse with its own set of implications.

Observers believe that what has made the situation in Yemen more complicated is the fact that the Houthis misinterpreted the current regional transformations. Relying on Iran as a regional power at the current stage ignores reality, not least the fact that Tehran is embroiled in complex negotiations with the West over its nuclear programme. Moreover, the escalation of sectarian politics in countries like Iraq and Syria is a curse that is plaguing the pan-Arab region. The Houthis also failed to consider that the ideological and political doctrine of the rulers in Saudi Arabia would never allow a pro-Iranian political system to dominate its southern border, no matter what the cost. The current President of Yemen, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, still enjoys the support of large segments of the Yemeni public, especially in the southern provinces.

Such misinterpretation is not limited to the Houthis. Many of the conflicting factions in Yemen are interpreting the regional situation differently and commissioning the help of outside parties based on their own view of what is happening. In addition to Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf countries, Turkey has also started to show an interest in events in Yemen. One can perhaps attribute Turkey’s shift to Iran’s growing influence in the region as embodied by the latter’s involvement in Syria and Iraq as well as its decision to support the Houthi movement militarily. Turkey’s approach to Russia over a truce also raises many questions about the implications of the Yemeni crisis.

We can also say here that the concerns over Iran’s growing influence in the region will increase when the developments on the ground in Yemen are considered. Yemen has strategic significance for the foreign policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council members, especially when looked at from historical and political perspectives.

For all of these reasons, it is improbable that Operation Decisive Storm will be limited to a series of air strikes on Houthi bases and a ground invasion could occur at any moment, especially if Russia gets more involved in the conflict. The numerous militias on the ground in Yemen makes it inevitable that a plurality of reactions will result. The Gulf countries’ insistence on preventing the growth of Iranian influence in such a sensitive region, coupled with the Yemeni people’s general rejection of the Houthi coup and the interference of international actors, all contribute to the internationalisation of the Yemeni crisis.

This is why Yemen currently finds itself on the path to the unknown. The ghost of the Lebanese Civil War hovers over it.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 9 April, 2015

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.