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Turkey and military intervention in Syria

July 3, 2015 at 1:35 pm

Since the Kurdish People’s Protection Units took control of the border city of Tel Abyad, Turkish newspapers have been filled with headlines calling for military intervention in Syria. Reports quote leaked conversations about military plans for such intervention, and high-level security meetings have been and are being held for this purpose.

At the same time, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has intensified his rhetoric and assertion that he will not allow the establishment of a Kurdish state in Syria along Turkey’s southern border. So is Turkey really prepared for military intervention, or has nothing new actually happened and is this talk no different to what we have heard over and over again over the past few years?

Since Turkey embraced the Syrian opposition and severed its ties with the regime in Damascus it has worked to achieve two main goals. First, to overthrow the Syrian regime by supporting the political and armed Syrian opposition, calling for the establishment of a security buffer zone, and working to attract international support for military intervention. Second, not to allow the formation of a Kurdish faction that is independent of the main Syrian opposition and trying to drive the Kurds to join the armed struggle to overthrow the regime.

Turkey’s aims led to efforts to create a fait accompli on the border by calling for the establishment of a security buffer zone, which will serve as a refuge for displaced Syrians, a base for the opposition and cover for air strikes to cripple the regime’s air force. There has been no positive response from the West, particularly the United States.

Indeed, there are contrasting agendas in Ankara and Washington regarding the Syrian crisis. The war against ISIS has created a large split in positions due to different visions and strategies. As a result, the conflict has become more complicated and the regime has not been overthrown. Instead, with the support of its allies (Iran, Hezbollah and Russia), the Assad regime has survived, taking advantage of America’s retreat, which has been maximised by the Russians.

The Kurds have benefited from the exhaustion and depletion of the regime militarily and the withdrawal of its forces from the Kurdish area. They have established an autonomous body with its own military, security, administrative and economic institutions. They have also imposed a fait accompli on the ground, which has resulted in victories against the expansion of ISIS. The Kurds are a force to be reckoned with and trusted allies of the international coalition fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

Hence, Turkey and, perhaps, other countries have found that, so far, the Kurds have benefited the most from the Syrian crisis. They have succeeded, for the first time in the history of Syria, to extend their geographic control and develop a political entity separate from the regime and the opposition.

This has caused growing Turkish concerns that the Kurds will continue to expand and try to link to other areas in the far north-west, with a possibility of accessing the Mediterranean Sea, thus changing some of the oil pipeline maps in the region.

The truth is that Turkey now sees that its southern border has become part of the Kurdish entity in north-east Syria. The features of this entity are forming on the ground, similar to what happened in the Kurdish region in Iraq. Perhaps what has increased Turkey’s concerns in this regard is that the Democratic Union Party, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK, is running this project, while the Turks believe that the PKK leadership, based in the Qandil Mountains, is actually behind it all.

However, what irks Turkey the most is not only the Kurdish growth, but also its deep feeling that its historical ally, America, is behind this and that the ultimate goal is the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region. Turkey will be the biggest loser if this happens and Ankara insists that it will not accept it, no matter what the cost. Its priorities in the context of the Syrian crisis may thus be changed.

Without a doubt, this intensifies the Turkish political challenge with regards to Syria, thereby intensifying the debate regarding the options proposed to address and deal with the Kurdish challenge, not only on the border with Syria, but also inside Turkey itself. This is especially true after the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party’s performance in the parliamentary elections and the talk of ending the peace process between the government and the PKK. The talking points include the possibility of a limited military intervention, specifically in the Jarabulus area due to its importance in preventing geographical contiguity between the Kurdish north-eastern areas. Such an intervention would send a message of support to the Syrian opposition forces, such as the Free Syrian Army and the Army of Conquest, in their fight against Kurdish expansion.

Ankara could also find a basis for a military presence in the border area, and try to attract NATO support for this in order to create a new security reality in the form of a decisive message to the Kurds that Turkey will not allow the establishment of a Kurdish entity.

Politically, action could be taken regionally, especially with Iran and Russia, by saying that it aims to prevent the division of Syria and the establishment of a Kurdish state in the region. This could pave the way for a buffer zone, leading to a route out of the Syrian refugee crisis, which is an increasing burden for Turkey.

However, there are reports that suggest that this scenario has been initiated on the ground by means of the security measures taken in the border area, which will be covered by 20,000 troops. This area is 150 kilometres long and 35 kilometres deep, stretching from Tel Abyad to West Jarabulus. These measures will be taken in order to block the Kurdish project.

Despite these details, as well as others, there are some who are talking about the difficulty of military intervention because the army, specifically the Chief of Staff, refuses to get involved, seeing it as a risk, and perhaps even a conspiracy aimed at dragging the country into a quagmire that targets Turkey itself.

There are those who believe that Turkish military action would be nothing more than an expression of its political tools for dealing with the Kurdish issue in the region as a whole. Such a policy is ironic: how can Ankara deal positively with the Kurdish region of Iraq, while it rejects any openness for the Kurds in Syria? Beyond this irony, the Syrian Kurds believe that there is an issue that they do not understand regarding Turkey’s insistence on presenting itself as being against their aspirations. This enhances their belief that Turkey is supporting ISIS against them. They also believe that Turkey portrays them deliberately as separatists who want to divide Syria even though neither the Kurdish parties in the Kurdish National Council nor in the Democratic Union Party have ever called for this. Indeed, the latter rejects the issue on the grounds that its political philosophy believes that Kurdish independence no longer fits with the reality of the region. Instead of independence, the party proposes local or federal government.

None of this seems to be convincing enough for Turkey, which believes that its security is threatened by the Kurdish entity which is turning into a de facto state. Ankara believes that it must take action on the ground to put an end to this, while many believe that the military option will open the floodgates to a number of repercussions.

For a start, military intervention will put an end to the reconciliation or peace process with the Turkish Kurds, who communicate across the borders with their fellow Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Iran. Such intervention will cause Kurdish violence in Turkey to erupt at what is a sensitive time. It will also increase internal Turkish divisions, and perhaps the possibility of a clash between Erdogan and the military establishment, which has not forgotten that he is the one who contained the army and removed it from political life.

The Syrian regime will benefit the most from Turkish intervention, as it will attract popular Arab sympathy, and maybe even some official support from some Arab countries. This is due to the fact that Turkish military intervention will be seen as an attack on an Arab state.

The reactions of Iran, Russia and Iraq may not be what Turkey expects; they may not simply be condemnations and threats. It may escalate to concrete measures that will blow up the internal Turkish situation. The danger of this matter is highlighted by the fact that these countries border Turkey and almost encircle it. This means that retaliation will be both easy for them and difficult for Turkey.

The American position is a major concern for Turkey, especially as Ankara believes that the US alliance with the Kurds in Iraq and Syria is being reinforced day by day due to the coalition in the war against ISIS. There are also those who believe that the US administration hopes that Turkey will be dragged into the Syrian quagmire for reasons concerning the differences in their respective Middle East agendas. There are beliefs that such involvement will result in a reconsideration of the overall Turkish policy and maybe even getting rid of Erdogan himself.

Turkey is certainly facing a serious challenge and wherever it stands, it finds itself losing. It is caught between the hammer of responding to the Kurdish expansion and the anvil of making a difficult decision and fearing its repercussions.

Translated from Al-Jazeera net, 30 June, 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.