Hamas and Saudi Arabia

Since he was handed the reins of authority in Saudi Arabia, King Salman Bin Abdulaziz has adopted a new and clearly different policy to that followed by his predecessor King Abdullah. We have seen distinct differences in how Saudi Arabia is dealing with the situation in the region, as the new policy focuses on giving priority to combatting what it calls the “Iranian threat” above everything else. The government in Riyadh has even changed its positon on the Muslim Brotherhood, which, since the “Arab Spring”, was regarded as a threat no less dangerous than Iran.

Saudi Arabia has found that it cannot fight on more than one front at once – Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorism, especially after the achievements made by ISIS – so it has opted to focus on one front; Iran. It has also sought to repair its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, which cooperates with the Saudis in Syria, and which now (allegedly after Hamas’s mediation) is cooperating with them in Yemen. This encouraged Riyadh to adopt this new policy with regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, considering that the movement, along with Hamas, has distanced itself from Iran and supported the legitimate government in Yemen in a clear message of support for Saudi Arabia and Operation Decisive Storm, launched by the Saudis.

The Saudi-Hamas rapprochement could not have been possible if it weren’t for the Hamas-Iran dispute regarding the Arab revolutions, especially since Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria is an important ally of Tehran.

It is true that there has been some improvement in Hamas’s relationship with Iran recently, but this has not reached the level of the relations that the two enjoyed in the past. Tehran provided enormous military, political and financial aid without which Hamas wouldn’t have been able to survive and engage in the three wars waged by Israel in Gaza intended to deal a fatal blow to the Islamic Resistance Movement (but not necessarily enough to overthrow its authority in the coastal territory, because an alternative to Hamas rule would mean unknown and may be worse than the resistance group). As such, Israel’s policy towards Hamas focuses on weakening the movement without overthrowing it in order to ensure the presence of two rival “Palestinian Authorities” exhausted by their own internal conflict. However, Israel also aims to keep Hamas powerful enough to ensure its commitment to the truce agreements made with Tel Aviv.

The story of the rapprochement began with the Saudi king’s agreement to a proposal to host a Palestinian reconciliation meeting, attended by the leader of the Hamas Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal, which was presented during former US President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Riyadh in March. This signalled that a change was being made; that a transition from estrangement to hosting meetings and contacts, albeit limited for the time being, was being made. The Saudis stipulated that both parties – Hamas and Fatah – must consent to the hosting of a Palestinian reconciliation discussion; there must be a strong possibility for the meeting to succeed; and Egypt’s past role as a mediator must not be offended. This means that the veto power will be in the hands of Mahmoud Abbas, who only wants reconciliation on his terms, which Hamas will not accept.

King Salman told Carter that both Abbas and Meshaal had asked for such a meeting, along with the other Palestinian factions. The Saudi monarch also said that they could try to reach a “Makkah II” agreement provided that the Egyptian role in sponsoring Palestinian reconciliation, which has been in effect since the division, is not affected.

There have been exaggerations made by various parties and those with different views regarding the objectives and extent of the change in Saudi Arabia’s position towards Hamas. They also speculate whether this was an actual indication of a shift in Saudi Arabia’s position towards the movement since the change was very limited at the time, and the Saudi monarch could have actually sent the invitation for the meeting. This would have put the Palestinian factions on the spot and they would not be able to ignore or decline the invitation.

We have also witnessed a Hamas delegation, led by Meshaal, visiting Saudi Arabia to perform the minor pilgrimage. Hamas portrayed this visit as a break in the estrangement and a new start for its relations with Riyadh. There were meetings with Saudi officials, including the king, the crown prince, and deputy crown prince. The movement said that this will be followed by another visit next month. Meanwhile, the Saudi Press Agency was content to point out that a Hamas delegation sent Eid greetings to the Saudi monarch, without mentioning any meetings, whereas the Saudi foreign minister issued a statement saying that the delegation only performed Umrah, which is their right as Muslims, and noting that the visit was not of a political nature. He stressed that Saudi’s position on Hamas will not change, and that the same applies to its support for the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and Egypt’s internal security.

This is further evidence that a breakthrough in Hamas-Saudi relations has not occurred, and that perhaps even the opposite may have happened, as the visit did not achieve its goal. This is because Riyadh wants Hamas to be completely biased in its favour in confronting the Iranian threat. Otherwise, why would Saudi media outlets ignore the visit at a time when they showed great interest and welcomed the visit of Samir Geagea, who Saudi is encouraging to stand up to Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon?

The statements made by Meshaal and other Hamas officials after the visit to Saudi suggested that the movement is keen on establishing good relations with Riyadh, Tehran and all other parties because the Palestinian cause is a collective cause and Hamas does not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states or fall into the circle of regional and international disputes. Hence, Hamas denied vehemently the claim by Iran’s Fars news agency that the movement has agreed to send 700 fighters to help Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen. Hamas paid a heavy price for its position on events in Syria and does not want to repeat the same mistake.

The movement also understands that replacing its Tehran alliance with a Riyadh alliance would mean that it would not be able to maintain its armed resistance to the Israeli occupation, the main issue that has made Hamas what it is today. Allying with Riyadh may give Hamas financial support but it will not be a resistance movement because Riyadh, Doha and Ankara want to tame the Islamic group in order to make it acceptable to America, the international community and Israel. The “Sunni axis” will not give Hamas weapons to resist Israel, a country with which Saudi Arabia shares a mutual interest in prioritising the Iranian threat. This is especially true after the emergence of the nuclear deal opposed by both Riyadh and Tel Aviv, which may strengthen Iran after it is recognised as a nuclear state, its bank accounts are unfrozen and sanctions are lifted.

Although there has been an improvement in relations with the leadership in Riyadh, this will not be a real breakthrough unless Hamas moves from the resistance camp completely and joins the “Decisive Storm” coalition camp and the fight against Iran and the “Shia threat”.

There is no doubt that there are various disputes and factors that will influence Hamas’s decision. There are those who are opposed to Hamas co-existing with the new Arab and regional reality, but others support it, even if it is at the expense of the group as part of the national Palestinian liberation movement. This reinforces the fact that Hamas is a Palestinian extension of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Within Hamas, we hear voices praising Iran’s support and calling for priority to be given to an alliance with Tehran. Others call for the establishment of an Islamic-Arab project, led by Saudi Arabia, as well as for Saudi involvement in the reconciliation process, even at Egypt’s expense. We also hear moderate and balanced voices acknowledging the fact that the Palestinian cause is a fair, just and collective cause that needs everyone’s support. The death of this cause lies in each party being biased against another. I do not exaggerate when I say that Hamas’s fate and future relies on how the situation between these conflicts and trends is resolved.

Hamas, Fatah and the other factions will not be able to maintain an effective and independent role that serves the Palestinian interests and which seeks to restore the cause as the top priority if they do not unite. Their division makes them easy pickings and a ball that is easily tossed around by the major players who want to use the Palestinian parties and cause to benefit themselves. The Palestinians can only avoid this fate, which will only end in further division and fragmentation, by uniting on a national and democratic basis and by means of common interests and a political partnership that gives each party their rights. Unity is not only the shortest and fastest way to survive; it is also the only way to survive.

Translated from Masarat, 28 July, 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.