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What next for the Sunnis of Iraq?

August 10, 2015 at 11:03 am

The forgotten victims in Iraq are the Sunni Arabs. Their marginalisation and concurrent victimisation by the Shia-dominated Iraqi government over the past ten years has led many to become disenchanted towards the state and harbour ill feelings towards those running the country.

There were demonstrations and sit-ins in many of the Sunni-populated provinces of Iraq from late 2012 to the end of 2013. The citizens of Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Salahudeen, Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala all protested against the policies of the former Prime Minister, and now Vice President, Nouri Al-Maliki and his Shia-led government. These are policies which are still in effect and have resulted in the death of thousands of innocent Iraqis; policies that are used to target a specific demographic of the Iraqi population, the Sunni Arabs. The much talked about “anti-terror” law within the constitution was, and in-fact still is, being abused and used to detain and sentence to death (without sufficient evidence, and sometimes without any evidence at all) thousands of Sunnis. Data gathered by Amnesty International has shown that between 2007 and 2012 two hundred and fifty-six individuals were executed; a further 1,420 have been sentenced to death and await execution. This makes Iraq one of the top countries for executions in the world.

The demands of the protesters were simple and easily achievable, headed by the request to release all political prisoners and those wrongly detained under the anti-terror law, and for the government to provide simple rights such as electricity, water, healthcare, medicine and security. However, rather than accept them or agree to a dialogue with the representatives of each of the provinces, Al-Maliki decided to meet them with violence and an iron fist. Security was tightened; the army and police were used to provoke citizens and prevent them from reaching the demonstrations and sit-ins. These threats finally became reality towards the end of 2013 when on the 28 December 2013 the prime minister went ahead with his threat to storm the Ramadi protest camp and dismantle it; there were 17 civilian casualties. On the same night, the armed forces, with assistance from the federal police and SWAT teams, stormed the home of Sunni MP Ahmed Al-Alwani and arrested him, resulting in the death of his brother and five of his bodyguards. The situation then worsened significantly, with fighting between the Sunni Arab tribes and the Shia-dominated army in Fallujah and Ramadi. Small and scattered groups attributing themselves to ISIS began appearing and targeting both the tribes and the armed forces. These groups have now merged into something much larger and more dangerous, and control nearly a third of Iraq.

One must therefore ask what the end game is; how can this issue be resolved? It is very clear to see that the current strategy of using the Popular Mobilisation Unit (PMU) to shell and bomb villages and cities indiscriminately under the guise of defeating ISIS is clearly not working. Thousands of Sunni civilians are being caught up in the crossfire, resulting in deaths, injuries and a mass exodus of innocent people as they are forced from their homes. Those who manage to avoid the bombs and mortars are then faced with barbaric revenge attacks by militia members of the PMU or risk being arrested as “collaborators with ISIS”.

For some people the solution is simple; arm the Sunni tribes and support them in clearing this cancer from within their own communities. Who better to defeat ISIS than those who, less than ten years ago, managed to defeat Al-Qaeda and to eliminate it from most of Anbar province? The majority of the leading tribes of Iraq have been pleading with the Iraqi government and international media for the past year to give them the required arms and ammunition to enable them to repeat their Al-Qaeda victories against ISIS.

Military victory for the Sunnis, though, is not enough. Sunni politicians must step up and ensure that this does not happen again. They must ensure that all those who have been exiled and forced to flee from their homes are able to return safely and are duly compensated for any losses caused by the shelling of the PMU and Iraqi army. They must also ensure that in the future the Sunni Arabs are represented fairly in government and are treated with equality and the respect they deserve as citizens of Iraq.

At the moment, it seems that the only Sunni party actively involved in doing this is the Iraqi Islamic Party and the current speaker of parliament, Salim Al-Jbori, with tireless campaigning both behind the scenes and openly for ten years and more for the rights of the Sunni Arabs. For a year now they have been campaigning for the creation of a “National Guard” or something of that sort to enable the Sunni tribes and youth to gather under one banner and fight ISIS, as well as advocating the return of internally displaced persons to their homes. Only recently they reached an agreement that will enable a large number of families expelled from Diyala province to return. The party and speaker have, however, been victims of a smear campaign by former Baathists and other “bad eggs” within the Sunni community who have accused them of colluding with the Americans to occupy Iraq and for caring too much about their positions and money they earn rather than the citizens they claim to represent. This could not be further from the truth.

The short-term solution here seems clear; arm the Sunnis, train them, then support them in fighting and excluding ISIS. In the meantime, Sunni politicians must work together for the greater good of their people. Sunni civilians must not give in easily to lies fabricated by those who lust for nothing but money and power; they need to trust those working on the ground and campaigning for their rights. Long-term, the picture is less clear. Right now the idea with which most Sunnis agree is the formation of their own autonomous region, just like the Kurds, where they will be safe and able to rule themselves far from the interfering hand of the central government in Baghdad and its Iranian proxies.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.