‘If the alternatives were better, there would be no support for ISIS’

During his long career focusing on counter-terrorism, former British diplomat Richard Barrett has worked on countering the appeal of terrorism. He has identified a sense of personal or community injustice as a recurrent factor which draws people to terrorism. Even though he acknowledges that it would be unrealistic to believe that good governance could easily be applied in places where it is in short supply, “it is a pretty effective antidote to the appeal of terrorism,” explains Barrett.

In the Western countries, where good governance is less of a key issue, effectively countering the appeal of terrorism has been, paradoxically, that you can be pretty radical in your views without breaking the law. Even though Barrett wouldn’t recommend it as a counter-terrorism policy, he argues that tolerance and freedom of expression are values which counter the appeal of terrorism. “The voice of former terrorists pointing out the freedoms of society has also been effective in Western countries.”

The question of good governance is important to Barrett, who claims that, in some respects the Caliphate offers those living under its rule better governance than they received from the state before it took over. This factor ought not to be forgotten, or underestimated, argues Barrett.

“The impact of corruption and the lack of rule of law is enormously important in people’s lives.” Demand for “justice” is in many cases – if not always – a priority for people in developing countries who are not members of the elite or belong to a minority, argues Barrett. Extremist groups have always found it easy to tap into this vein of disaffection. “It follows therefore that ISIS or the Taliban or other similar revolutionary groups make the swift delivery of ‘justice’ a key feature of their rule.”

Barrett, who’s worked for both the Security Service MI5, and the Secret Intelligence Service MI6, was head of the United Nations Monitoring Team covering Al-Qaeda and the Taliban for almost ten years, says that it has been identified that, compared to other areas, the levels of corruption, burglary and disorder are lower in territories under the control of extremist groups. The delivery of justice is able to make up for many of the shortcomings of the state, argues Barrett. “If the alternatives were clearly better, there would be no local support for ISIS,” using another acronym for Daesh.

Barrett calls for more long-term policies. He argues that we might need to accept that the Caliphate may be here to stay and consider the returnees as a resource to understanding the group rather than seeing them as a threat. According to Barrett we need to better understand the basis on which Daesh is able to attract and retain support, if we don’t we will not be able to effectively deal with the group.

The objective should not necessarily be to obliterate it, which in general is regarded as impossible, but to turn it into something that better fits with the aims and ambitions of the people who live under and around it, explains Barrett. “This means understanding and channeling its support towards a government that rejects the excesses of ISIS. My argument is that because there is nothing to replace it, we should aim to change the Islamic State rather than destroy it. That means understanding how to isolate and remove the current leadership. For that we need a better understanding of who they are and how they operate.”

The relationship between Daesh and Al-Qaeda is also important to keep in mind. Even though the two groups are currently rivals, they share the same objectives and methodology, explains Barrett. At the moment the disagreements between the two groups are primarily over leadership and tactics. “Once the current leadership of the two groups changes, then the likelihood of their merging will increase.” But the speed of this process will also be influenced by events on the ground, in particular how successful each group is in attracting support and controlling territory, concludes Barrett.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.