The priorities of the post-Abbas era

It is foolish to address with any seriousness the systematic leaks that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his supporters are spreading regarding his intention to resign. They are only attempts to convince Israel to reduce the level of embarrassment it will cause him and to justify its continued attachment to his positions. He continues in this vein even after it has been proven unequivocally that his political programme is a failure, as reflected by the success of Israel in deciding the fate of the Palestinian territories by means of Judaisation and settlement expansion. Both are taking place with minimal objections from the Palestinians, as Abbas has thwarted any such opposition through his security cooperation with the Israeli authorities. The PA chief is very disappointed with the extremist right-wing government in Tel Aviv, as it pays no attention to the appreciation of the Israeli army and intelligence officials for Abbas’s role in preventing a third intifada and his lack of hesitance in waging a relentless war against anyone suspected of being associated with the resistance against the occupation.

Indeed, Abbas is frustrated because Netanyahu’s government does not treat him the way that he believes he deserves; according to General Tamir Yаdai, the Israeli army commander in the West Bank, there is no other Arab leader who openly expresses his “sanctification” of security coordination with Israel like Abbas does. (Walla News, 9/8) It seems that Abbas has given up on reaching an understanding with Netanyahu, even after top Israeli commentator Rafif Drowkir made his humiliating comment that, “Israel’s top advanced technology experts could not develop a more comfortable partner for Israel than Mahmoud Abbas.” (Haaretz, 19/7)

However, what intensifies Abbas’s frustration and drives him to continue making leaks about his intention to resign is the fact that he is unwilling to adopt real options in order to confront and embrace this reality. He is not a leader who is willing to change the rules of the confrontation if they prove to be useless in practice. This allows him and his supporters to be relentless in feeding the media his resignation leaks.

Despite this, there is an urgent and desperate need for national Palestinian dialogue on the post-Abbas era, as he is over 80 years old and he could depart from the scene at any moment. We absolutely cannot allow the arrangements to be implemented that are being made in more than one capital city and which aim to appoint an individual as his successor who follows the same approach as Abbas.

Hence, we must insist on raising the issue of what will happen post-Abbas, especially since there are names of candidates for his succession being tossed about and they are all his partners in failure and harming of the national cause. There is no need to remind everyone about the importance of the positions occupied by Abbas and how they impact greatly on the Palestinian cause. He is the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, President of the Palestinian Authority and the leader of Fatah. Unfortunately, there are those who are trying to make it impossible for the Palestinians to have a say on the post-Abbas phase by saying that his successor will only be chosen from those who are backed internationally or regionally. However, today’s circumstances are different to when Abbas took over the reins, as all the promises made by him and his former ally Salam Fayyad were broken. As such, the fact that signs of the failure of Abbas’s programme are evident forces anyone who wants to succeed him to be keen on gaining clear popular support. It is a huge mistake to occupy ourselves with the identity of Abbas’s successor though; we must take advantage of his departure, allowing it to become a foundational event for a new phase in the Palestinian national struggle.

Hence, the national forces, the popular structures and all of those affecting the Palestinian arena must insist on delegitimising the PLO in its current institutional and personnel form after the departure of Abbas. They must push for a new institution which is truly representative of the Palestinian people, even if it continues to bear the “PLO” name. Although it is important for the new institution to reflect the true proportional weight of the effective groups within Palestinian politics, it is even more important for a comprehensive national programme to be agreed upon in a manner that does not allow for internal divisions to emerge due to disputes over how to deal with the political prospects for resolving the conflict and resistance work. The comprehensive national programme must reflect the lessons learned from the mistakes made by the Palestinians in the past due to their assumptions which conflicted with the reality and actions that did not live up to national responsibilities.

There is no doubt that reaching a consensus on this programme requires flexibility and political realism as well as a willingness to find common ground. For example, it is no longer possible for anyone to continue to cling to Abbas’s position regarding negotiations with Israel and security coordination. At the same time, the experience of the past three decades suggests the need to agree on the principles of organising armed resistance against the occupation in a manner that allows such action to contribute to bringing the Palestinian people closer to achieving their national goals, rather than growing further from the cause, which has happened on several occasions. There is also a need to agree on the mechanisms for activating the popular resistance and innovating new processes for political and diplomatic struggle.

The list of important issues includes the survival of the Palestinian Authority itself, as its current modus operandi has helped Israel’s right-wing to go on applying its crisis management strategy, by which Israel continues to occupy the land while the PA performs the duties that should be performed by the occupying power in accordance with international law. Hence, we must focus on reaching a consensus regarding the building of a representative institution and a comprehensive joint programme.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 26 August, 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.