Abadi’s reforms and the storm brewing in Iraq

Haidar Al-Abadi, Iraq’s Shia prime minister, recently introduced a raft of reforms with much aplomb to try and calm increasingly angry voices from the Iraqi people. Although largely Sunni protests had already erupted prior to these in 2012, they were brutally suppressed by Al-Abadi’s predecessor, current Vice President Nouri Al-Maliki. While the murder of peaceful protesters by the virulently sectarian Al-Maliki led to the uprising of Iraq’s Sunni dominated provinces, and eventually opened the door for the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) to re-enter the Iraqi arena in force, these protests have broad based Iraqi Shia support and appear to have already won concessions from the government. The reforms passed almost three weeks ago largely abolished various extraneous government posts, including Al-Maliki’s shared vice presidency, and promised to tackle the corruption of officials and ministries.

However, several disturbing events have since taken place that cast doubt upon the sustainability of these achievements. First and foremost among these developments are the threats made by officials fearing to be exposed and brought down by their corruption. Al-Maliki recently stated that any attempt to prosecute him for his years of mismanagement, embezzlement and corruption whilst holding the country’s top position will result in him exposing officials involved in serious crimes, including assassinations and murder. This threat was made with particular reference to a parliamentary investigation into the fall of Mosul to Daesh forces last year, and suggestions regarding Al-Maliki’s culpability for the biggest disaster yet inflicted upon the post-2003 Iraqi order. Rather than seeing these threats as further evidence of Al-Maliki’s knowledge and subsequent silence over serious and heinous crimes and ordering his arrest, Iraq’s political class, marginally less corrupt than Al-Maliki himself, seemingly took his threats seriously and folded.

On the subject of murder and violence, demonstrations in Basra have been called off after organisers received threats from Iran-backed Shia militias that they would disperse them with deadly force. Silencing these protests using extreme force would undoubtedly alienate the Shia populace which the Shia power holders rely upon and who have obvious and close links to these militias. Nevertheless, the mere threat of force is enough to deter many demonstrators who have seen what these militiamen are capable of doing to Iraqis. After all, the wanton murder of Iraqi Sunnis and the destruction of their lives, homes and businesses would be a familiar sight to normal Shias who access news sources other than the state media, and are painfully aware of the furthering sectarian schism occurring in their country as a result of the warped politics of their political elite. Moreover, hints of the violence that can be unleashed against them have already been demonstrated, when government forces forcibly dispersed protesters in the province of Babil, wounding seven demonstrators.

Whilst the sectarian Iraqi government felt comfortable slaughtering Sunni demonstrators throughout 2013 and beyond, they know that using too much force on their Shia coreligionists will cause them to lose the positions of power that have made them grow fat and rich at the expense of common Iraqis for the past 12 years. They can try to paint any and all Sunni dissenters as Daesh sympathisers and members and largely get away with it, but what will they say about the Shia protesters? It would be a tall story indeed to claim that the Shia are somehow crypto-Daesh fanatics masquerading as Shia. As such, and to avoid a wider confrontation, the militias and complicit officials acting from the shadows have decided to kill off the brains behind the demonstrations instead. Just yesterday, four protest organisers were assassinated across three Iraqi provinces. Khalid Al-Ukaily was shot dead outside his home in Baghdad, Musallam Arrukabi and Waleed Atta’i were both killed in the southern city of Nasiriyah, while Sheikh Sabah Al-Karmoushi was murdered in Basra after his car was rigged with explosives. Although they are dealt with differently, it is clear that Shia dissent is as intolerable as Sunni dissent.

Al-Abadi also needed to fall back on religious support to maintain his thrust to push through his reforms. Shia’s highest religious authority, the Persian Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, had to personally give his endorsement to Al-Abadi’s reforms in order to avert a Shia-on-Shia potential civil war. This is a disturbing development, as many will remember that it was Al-Sistani’s fatwa, or religious edict, that provided the religious impetus for the formation of the sectarian Popular Mobilisation Units militia. In an unstable, confessional political system such as Iraq’s, having a senior religious figure constantly interfering in and directing politics is dangerous, particularly as the reforms actually reduced Sunni representation in government. Furthermore, Al-Sistani is arguably making these moves as he is concerned that the Iranian clergy are trying to supplant his authority as the leading Ayatollah. He had plenty of other opportunities to issue strongly enforceable edicts against corruption and violence, yet did nothing more than issue the occasional loosely phrased condemnation, if that.

All of these political and social developments obviously cannot be separated from the ongoing war against Daesh. The Iraqi government and wider political process lost its legitimacy a long time ago, but it is now also losing the support of those who kept its bloated corpse propped up on the throne of power. In late May, Al-Abadi announced that Ramadi, the capital of the Anbar province in the Western Iraqi desert, could be recaptured from Daesh forces “in days”. It has been many days, indeed months, since that announcement and in the meantime the self-proclaimed Caliph of Daesh, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, must be laughing at the feeble attempts of the Iraqi regime to dislodge him even with the help of dozens of advanced countries including the United States. This is not the first time that the Iraqi authorities have been left with copious amounts of egg on their face. Prising Tikrit from Daesh’s grasp, a city defended by a couple of hundred fighters versus a force of 30,000 Shia militiamen, took about a month and a half after an overly optimistic announcement that it would be liberated within 72 hours.

With the continuing failure to deal with the Daesh crisis even after bombastic promises, as well as continued rampant corruption and a seeming slowing down of Al-Abadi’s reforms amidst continuing protests, the Iraqi political process is in danger of finally collapsing. If the government mishandles the protests and continues to allow the targeting of its organisers, they may have a bigger problem on their hands than just Daesh.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.