clear

Creating new perspectives since 2009

Syria is a microcosm of geopolitical challenges

November 7, 2015 at 4:15 pm

The Syrian conflict has become a multidimensional crisis with global ramifications. The mounting refugee crisis has started to poison the already tense relations between EU member states still recovering from the Greek financial debacle. Against the backdrop of Turkey’s ambivalence with respect to Daesh/ISIS, the Russian onslaught against Syrian rebels adds a dangerous element of uncertainty to what is a volatile cocktail. Furthermore, the US decision to send in its Special Forces has perhaps set the stage for an explosive situation. To understand the complexity of the problem at hand, we will attempt to examine some of the challenges at stake.

Tens of thousands of innocent civilians have been killed since 2011 as a consequence of Assad’s relentless bombing campaign. Barrel bombs are dropped daily and there is indiscriminate use of heavy artillery, in addition to an economic blockade and sporadic chemical attacks; all have combined to bleed the country dry.

Millions of people have been internally displaced and countless others forced into an uncertain exile. A world heritage site, enriched and deepened over millennia, has been destroyed; an ancient civilisation ruined. Syria has become a magnet for extremists of all stripes, its landscape turned into an international arena subject to daily assaults from a range of competing foreign antagonists. Every power involved is trying to outdo the other in this geopolitical maelstrom, but nothing is being done effectively to save Syria, the nation, or rescue its people.

The Russian intervention is just another critical chapter in this Kafkaesque drama whose plot is interwoven with the most abject form of political ignominy and petty calculations. Thus, the Syrian people are being sacrificed at the altar of dangerous geopolitical games played out for pragmatic and limited goals by world powers. Every major country, be it a world or regional power, seems to be motivated solely by narrow self-interests.

Putin’s recent heavy-handed involvement is no exception. Yet, notwithstanding its negative implications, Russia’s abrupt jumping into the Syrian quagmire may, paradoxically, speed up the search for a political compromise.

The departure of Assad himself is not a major issue any more as most, including Russia, agree that he must leave after the transitional period. Even the Saudis have come to terms with his staying for a minimum of 6 months after the transition period begins, while the Iranians admit openly, for the first time, that he cannot stay forever.

The major hurdle now is not so much Assad’s departure as the kind of transitional authority that should replace him. Hence, the bone of contention now revolves around the type of institutional mechanisms that would confer executive powers to the transitional authority, for it is precisely this provisional entity that would eventually oversee the establishment of a new constitution and the organisation of the first free elections in Syria.

Afterwards, it is the new institutional configuration of the post-Baath political regime that would be a challenge. This is a major concern for Assad’s current allies, such as Russia or Iran, because the country’s future foreign policy and geo-strategic alliances will be at stake.

Russia has softened its attitude following the recent defeat of its client in the northern province of Hama, which, if anything, denotes the resilience of the rebels as well as the determination of their allies to arm them. By admitting that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is not a terrorist organisation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov understands henceforth that it is a force to be reckoned with.

Moreover, on the eve of the Russian military escalation, Assad controlled less than 25 per cent of Syrian territory. As a result, Russia’s airstrikes are unlikely to be decisive in causing any significant shift on the ground to Assad’s advantage. The shortage in manpower and low morale of his remaining forces are a serious impediment. As such, a military campaign based on aerial bombardment will not change the status quo much at all except, perhaps, by preventing the rebels from gaining more territory.

Lavrov outlined Russia’s proposals in a plan for resolving the conflict in Geneva on 23 October. In addition to a freeze on fighting between Assad and the rebels and a pledge from the Russian President Vladimir Putin that his Syrian counterpart will not participate in future elections, the nine-point plan will enable Russia to keep its military bases in Syria under a UN Security Council resolution. Such a predisposition to concessions, however partial, indicates the realisation by Russia that a prolonging of the conflict may not be in its best interests.

This is all the more so given the plummeting oil and gas prices; the rising cost of its military expenditure in Ukraine; the delivery of 500 TOW anti-tank missiles to the FSA; and possibly the forthcoming introduction of MANPADS (shoulder-launched surface to air missiles) in the battlefield; all mean that Russia’s capabilities may soon be tested to the limit. There is also the possibility of antagonising crucial economic partners, such as Turkey and the Gulf States.

The rebels rejected the Russian plan knowing that they could extract more concessions due to the balance of power on the ground. However, their adversaries may, incongruously, overestimate their own assets, and thus have a different perception of the actual equilibrium of force.

In any case, boxing-in Russia could be detrimental to the search for a solution to the Syrian crisis, given its potential to inflict harm. Ending the suffering of the Syrian people, and preventing a total disintegration of their homeland, not Russia’s isolation, ought to be the ultimate objective. In the same vein, the US invitation to Iran to participate in the next round of Syria talks is an admission that a consensus-based solution is the only way out of the stalemate.

Thus, the Syrian National Council should keep the door open with the Russians, and even the Iranians. The initiative of Mouaz Al-Khateeb in opening lines of communication with Moscow, while simultaneously extracting more support from regional allies, is a step in the right direction. Political disputes cannot be resolved by military means alone, but military pressure, if applied intelligently, can be effective in extracting political concessions.

In coordination with the US and other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, a Turkish-led military intervention to create a safe humanitarian corridor for refugees in northern Syria should be envisaged. The offer of incentives from Germany to speed up visa requirements for Turkish citizens, increase aid and facilitate Turkey’s bid for EU membership might bolster the position of the country and help its government tackle the issue head-on.

The US decision to deploy Special Forces in Syria, albeit risky given the close proximity of Russian forces, could actually be a boon for the anti-Assad camp. If utilised properly, it could boost an alliance that has remained thus far incoherent. The US and Turkey are both determined to unseat Assad notwithstanding their disagreement with regard to the Kurdish issue, a cause of concern and friction between Washington and Ankara. They also ultimately want to pave the way for a political solution for this multidimensional conflict with increasingly dangerous global ramifications. In the same way, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Turkey has begun to warm up recently after a relative freeze following the 2013 coup d’état in Egypt that ousted President Mohamed Morsi.

Potentially, therefore, this collective undertaking could, in addition to putting pressure on the Russians, greatly reduce the reach of Assad’s barrel bombs, and thus effectively lessen the suffering of civilians.

This is corroborated by the Syrian Human Rights Committee which reported a “large decline in the overall number of casualties in Syria [due to barrel bombs]” after the announcement of the Turkish military operation in northern Syria on 24 July. It is worth noting that about 85 per cent of the civilians killed have been victims of Assad’s forces.

For as long as Assad is in power, the main focus of the Syrian rebels will be his removal, not his outright military defeat. It is also important to remember that these rebel factions, with the exception of Daesh/ISIS, are recognised as legitimate by local communities. So, whatever the political and religious disagreements with them may be, these groups, contends Marie Peltier of French magazine l’Express, do fulfil a protective role for communities besieged by pro-regime forces.

Today the Syrian people are in dire need of help, more so than ever before. An end to their tragedy is an absolute necessity dictated by political and moral imperatives. However, achieving that goal requires Saudi Arabia and Iran to end their squabbling and think beyond their narrow self-interests for the sake of peace.

Mohamed El Mokhtar Sidi Haiba is a social and political analyst, whose research interest is focused on African and Middle Eastern Affairs. His work has appeared in Palestine Chronicle, Al-Ahram Weekly, Third World Network, The Turkish Weekly and Middle East Eye among others. follow him on twitter.

Mahmoud Yamak is currently a graduate student in Petroleum Engineering at Texas A&M University and a political commentator with a special interest in the geopolitics of the Middle East. He previously contributed articles to The Daily Sabah, Palestine Chronicle, Al Araby Al Jadeed and Turkey Agenda. Follow him on twitter.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.