Questions and answers for understanding Daesh (part 2)

Question: If we drop the argument that Daesh is created by an outside force and assume that it is a self-creation, then how can we explain its quick growth and the spread of its control, as well as the support it receives, in one form or another, from many countries?

Answer: In addition to its features of risk-taking and terrorist tactics, such as the murders and atrocities it commits in an effort to intimidate its opponents and strike fear in their hearts (this also explains the group’s keenness to spread audio and visual imaging of their acts as far and wide as possible), the intentional, regional and Arab balance of power has also helped the success of Daesh due to the chaos, conflict and divisions in the ranks of both international and regional superpowers. This does not only benefit Daesh, but also many other forces that have used such chaos to entrench their power and influence in the region – Russia being the prime example.

Daesh first benefitted from the collapse of the Iraqi state, which was a direct result of the American occupation. It then benefitted from internal sectarian, tribal and regional divisions in the country, along with the spread of corruption and inefficiency that led to the failure of national consensus.

International, regional, Arab and internal divisions and disputes pushed many forces, at various times and phases, to facilitate the transfer of fighters from other countries to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh and other organisations. This was done with the intention of dealing a blow to the regime in Syria, without taking into consideration the threat and dangers that may arise from such an influx of fighters, such as the control and strength gained by Daesh. This also applies to the countries that indirectly or directly supported Daesh with money, weapons, or the purchase of oil under Daesh’s control in Iraq and Syria.

Such an analysis requires differentiating between seeing the facilitations, money, and weapons given to Daesh as evidence of external support for the organisation and between seeing them as evidence of the group’s power and influence. While it is true that Daesh received support from several countries, none of them can be considered having control over the organisation, as it is simply an uncontrollable force.

Those who accused Daesh of working for those who have supported it (often with the intention of using the group against their own opponents) were themselves embarrassed when the fighting broke out between Daesh and one of the parties it was accused of conspiring with. These individuals could not escape their embarrassment by reconsidering arguments; instead, they resorted to forgetting what they said. When some of them were confronted with their embarrassment, they explained it by saying “the magic turned on the magician”, i.e. the plan backfired. If they were asked how, then they gave a baseless argument.

The question that requires an explanation above all else is: What is the benefit of ruling out the possibility of Daesh being an American creation and exempting America from the responsibility for Daesh’s actions?

The answer is simply that you cannot come up with a comprehensive and cohesive plan to control Daesh and defeat it if you do not see it truthfully for what it is; and you will not know the truth behind the relations of every country with Daesh if you do not consider the contingent balance of power, political situation and sectarian strife that allowed for the organisation to grow and become as strong as it is today. All calculations made without taking such factors into consideration would simply be wrong and any accusation based on such arguments can be dismissed as being made with the purpose of incitement and obscuring the truth.

This is without even talking about the importance of the values of fairness and justice when regarding the enemy. This is not only good manners and part of our faith, but also the proper way to manage the conflict, and is considered the correct evaluation of the situation. However, we continue to find excuses for those who have made a mistake in reading and evaluating the situation during this new historical phase, which is qualitatively different from the phase that lasted from the end of WWII to 2010. This new historical phase we are entering is both confusing and unfamiliar.

I will conclude by saying that when Daesh is linked to a sponsor or a party capable of directing it, and the internal divisions and fractures in the armies and nations fighting the organisation are glossed over, then we are constructing a platform from which to confront the alleged sponsor of the organisation without addressing the wider fissures that have led to its rise to power. Therefore, finding adequate answers to the above questions is not merely a luxury or an intellectual pursuit but a key element in correcting the strategy of blame and confrontation that has characterised many previous analyses.

Translated from Arabi21, 11 November 2015

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