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Is this a Saudi-Iranian dispute?

January 19, 2016 at 9:44 am

Arab media has recently been talking a lot about the danger of sectarianism and sectarian alignment and about the necessity of averting this slide and avoiding embroilment in it. As a matter of principle, this an enlightened and rational discourse that favours, or should favour, the notion of the all-encompassing national state that makes no distinctions among its citizens whether on the basis of religion, sect or race. Such discourse, exactly in this sense, should be a model to be followed by all: states, societies, parties and elites.

But as a matter of fact, and in as much as it is a discussion of a specific case; the destructive Iranian interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, it is a sort of ambiguous whispering that does not explain in a direct fashion who is sectarian in this confrontation. In order for this discourse to align itself with its original enlightened meaning and pave the way in the direction of the target it is heading towards, its folks should answer specific questions that are imposed by the specific condition this discourse is pursuing without being explicit and candid about: which is the state that turns sectarianism into a fundamental element in determining its religious and political identity by means of obligatory constitutional texts? And which is the state, in this specific case, that turns sectarian militias into a main tool while playing its role in the region and that provides political clout to sectarian militias that are created by it, or whose creation is encouraged by it, and that in either case provides them with funding, armament and training in some Arab countries but not in others?

The truth that cannot be doubted is that Iran is the only Islamic state that determines its own political identity on explicit and direct sectarian basis, without equivocation, using constitution text, particularly article 12 of its constitution. In fact article 71 goes as far as prohibiting the Shura Council (quasi parliament) to pass any law that contradicts any of the principles of the state’s official sect rather than contradicting with the constitution despite the fact that this constitution is sectarian in most of its articles.

In contrast, and contrary to Iran, we find that none of the Arab states, without a single exception, refers in their constitutions when determining the state’s identity to the sectarian issues, neither closely nor remotely. When defining their identities, these states are content with pointing out either that “their religion is Islam” or that “it is an Arab Islamic state”, and that Shariah (without mentioning a specific sect) is either one of the sources of legislation within it or the source of legislation, or that it rules in accordance with Shariah, as is the case with Saudi Arabia, which states so in its governance statute which is considered the state’s constitution.

It may well be said that determining the state’s identity is the internal affair of each state; that it expresses its will by virtue of being a sovereign state, and therefore no one has the right to impose on Iran, or any other state, how it should determine its own identity, even if it were to opt for sectarianism as one of the determinants of its identity. This is true. However, Iran uses its sectarian identity as a basis for determining its role and its regional alliances. It choses its allies on a sectarian basis and renders the sectarian militias an official tool for performing that role and a common denominator that brings it together with its allies.

Consequently, the impact and repercussions of Iran’s definition of its sectarian identity using constitutional texts are not limited to within its own borders and therefore cannot be said that its own choice derives legitimacy from its own sovereignty because it went well beyond its own borders and has become a launching pad for its foreign policy and a pretext to justify its interventions in the affairs of neighbouring countries as it spreads the effects and destructive repercussions of such an identity outside its own borders. This is now evident in the case of Iraq, which has been suffering from civil wars and sectarian cleansing for more than 12 years in consequence to the American occupation which destroyed the state there, and in consequence to the Iranian influence that brought along the militia machine and installed it as a parallel and competing force with the state that was itself rebuilt on sectarian foundations. And before that, there was Hezbollah in Lebanon, which almost devours the entire state with overt Iranian encouragement and armament about which the leaders of this party have been boasting.

Similarly, we have had the Iranian intervention in Syria via Shia militias brought into the country by Iran from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan in order to keep Bashar Al-Assad in his position as head of the state for no other reason apart from being an Alawite. It is doing so in fear of the rise of the Sunni majority that, once in power, may break the sectarian belt Iran is endeavouring to enshrine from Baghdad to Beirut via Damascus.

The destructive effects of Iran’s sectarian identity are, in this case, what threatens the Arab states and their sovereignty and not the other way round. This is so because Iran stems from this sectarianism in order to transform itself into state not only for Persian Shias, but also for the Arab Shias in the region. And this, as it deems, would permit it to intervene politically as well as militarily in neighbouring Arab states (such as Iraq and Syria) transgressing in this way the borders and sovereignties of those states. What is even more serious than that is that it does not seek to achieve this just by means of politics and religious and cultural activities alone. In fact it is endeavouring, in addition to that, to spread the culture of militias in the neighbouring countries at the time when it criminalises the mere notion of the creation of militias on its own soil.

If the phenomenon of armed sectarian militias is the antithesis of the state and a source of danger that threatens its unity and sovereignty, it is then obvious that Iran’s investment of much of its resources in creating and spreading these organisations and funding them in the Arab state is aimed at nothing more than undermining these states and using these organisations as conduits for intervention in their internal affairs so as to influence their foreign and domestic policies and choices. The latest manifestation of this influence was Lebanon’s abstention several days ago from signing the Arab League’s resolution that rejects Iranian intervention. The pretext for this abstention was that the resolution named Hezbollah. Thus, a party who was created and is being funded by Iran in Lebanon is in fact imposing a sanction on the sovereignty of an Arab state restricting its ability to adopt a position that enjoys Arab consensus.

Why reiterate all of this while it is already known to everyone? The question may seem legitimate. But the assumption that “all this” is known to everyone is what actually causes bewilderment in the face of Arab attempts to characterise what is going on in the region as an exclusively Saudi-Iranian conflict rather than an Arab-Iranian conflict. Apart from the fact that such characterisation completely betrays the reality of what is going on, it does unwittingly – at least by some – serve the Iranian discourse that endeavours to insinuate that Saudi Arabia alone objects to Iran’s role and its wanton interventions in the affairs of the Arab states.

One such use of this characterisation has been that of Jamil Matar, one of Egypt’s most brilliant political writers. He published an article last Wednesday in the Egyptian Al-Shurooq newspaper entitled: “We and the Saudi-Iranian Dispute”. Since the word “we” in the title refers to Egypt, it gives the impression that Egypt has nothing to do with the “dispute” between Saudi Arabia and Iran and that Iran is clashing with no one other than Saudi Arabia, and consequently this “dispute” is confined to the two countries. The question is: how can such characterisation be accurate while the destructive effects of the Iranian role are harming more than four Arab states, not including Saudi Arabia, thus far? This in spite of the fact that the nature and size of Iranian interventions point to the fact that Tehran considers itself to be in an Arab-Iranian conflict.

The cohesion of this sectarian conflict is what imposes this by virtue of the fact that the sect is a cross borders expression of a religious vision. This is a cohesion that is imposed by the sectarian nature of the “Islamic Republic’s” regime. Iran is the one who made that constitution binding for it, a constitution out of which it emanates in its foreign policy as an extension of its internal policy, and is consequently engaged in conflict with the Arab states on this basis. Of course one should not be dragged with Iran along that pathetic route. Instead, it should be confronted with the antithesis of sectarianism.

It is true that Saudi is the one that is now leading the effort to confront the Iranian interventions, but is not because it is an affair exclusive to Riyadh and Tehran. Rather, it is something imposed by the nature of the phase. Iraq was the one leading this confrontation before it fell under the yoke of Iranian influence only to be followed by Syria. This is what confirms that what is going on is indeed an Arab-Iranian conflict.

Egypt’s regional role markedly regressed before the January 25 Revolution. But this regression doubled following the revolution. The regression left the Arab field open for Iran to meddle. This, once more, confirms the nature of the conflict. Confining the confrontation with Iran to Saudi Arabia does not only contradict reality but it amounts to a kind of escaping the reality of what is going on. It also prolongs the duration of the conflict and does not help to put an end to it.

Translated from Arabi21, 17 January 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.