Fear of January and reviving Egyptian Jihadism

Since Mubarak’s oppressive deep state toppled the January 25 Revolution on 3 July 2013, it has been living in fear, not only because it is an unpopular industry aiming to create forced or voluntary servitude systems, but also because it has become a chronic illness that has become intrinsic to the coup. The process of rebuilding the wall of fear that crumbled after the January revolution was very costly, as it affected the nervous system of the same repressive police state.

With the arrival of the fifth anniversary of the January revolution, the levels of fear and terror rose amongst the regime, as the security agencies intensified their precautionary measures and carried out widespread arrest campaigns, arresting anyone anti-coup. However, the state of concern and panic dominating the military-police mentality is causing it to be unable to understand the developments and shifts in the anti-coup tactics. The state continues to prohibit peaceful demonstrations and protests, considering them dangerous militant actions, but it is no longer capable of understanding the deep developments and changes occurring within the groups, who view the phase of peacefulness as outdated, and who moved from peaceful rebellion to revolutionary violence and then to jihad.

It does not seem that the January 25 Revolution’s fifth anniversary will witness great popular uprisings, but this should worry the repressive police authority. The Egyptian situation is different to its Tunisian counterpart, which did not witness a blatant coup. In the case of the Tunisians, their popular protest movement was natural to correct the path of the revolution in the context of achieving a democratic transition. Their demands are not limited to freedom, as they seek to integrate their freedom with justice and dignity.

As for the Egyptian case, it is on the verge of resolving its options in a more radical manner. After the January 25 anniversary Egypt will face rebellious and bloody options that range from revolutionary violence to jihad. There is no doubt that the new wave of violence in Egypt will not be similar to the previous wave of violence that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, as the new Egyptian jihadism will be more dangerous, more deadly and more widespread.

The coup’s security mentality still insists on adopting an eliminatory policy against the January revolution forces and continues to use anti-terror discourse to deter rebellion. However, it does not take into consideration the tactic of utilising less extremist groups to combat the more radical groups. The state believes that by labelling the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists and continuing to classify the organisation as a terrorist organisation since 25 December 2013, it will intimidate all the other rebellious groups. However, relying on this tactic may have been partially possible if the government had achieved a democratic transition in the context of a merger process based on the principle of moderation and the creation of a non-political Islamic trend capable of creating hope that diffuses extremism.

Despite the operations of systematic murder and legalised detention committed against leaders of the Brotherhood, the group remains adhered to its peaceful approach. However, this has not pushed the coup-led government to reconsider its decision. The arrogance of the military and security institutions has pushed them to believe that they are capable of maintaining security and providing stability. The calcified institution did not notice that the Brotherhood’s position on separating peacefulness and de-legitimisation from violence is what kept Egypt from falling into a state of violence and chaos, in addition to the emergence of jihadist movements with different approaches.

Under Al-Sisi’s rule, the Muslim Brotherhood, with the approach of the fifth January 25 Revolution anniversary, is on the verge of determining its options as it did during Abdel Nasser’s era. However, it will occur under different circumstances. While the Brotherhood had dominated the Islamic scene during Abdel Nasser’s rule, during Al-Sisi’s rule, the Brotherhood is only one of the players in the arena, as the Islamic scene in Egypt consists of many competitors.

If the older, foreign leaderships are committed to the peaceful option, the younger leaders at home have lost their patience. There have been heated debates over the past two years within the Brotherhood which have resulted in the prominence of two Brotherhood trends on opposite sides of the spectrum. One side adopts violent revolutionary confrontational tactics, while the other relies on the principle of non-violence.

With the growth of depression, frustration and hopelessness in change, and the continued acts of oppression and torture committed against the Islamic movement in Egypt, the younger generation has become more radical and the issue of the Brotherhood’s youth turning to a more revolutionary approach is no longer far-fetched. This will create a popular environment more accepting and supportive of violence and the jihadist ideology.

After acts of revenge committed by the government took on primitive forms following the coup, groups such as the Molotov Movement, Ignite Movement, Magholeen Movement, Execution Movement, Helwan Brigades and others which have no influence other than creating chaos, launched acts of revenge against the police and thugs as well as setting fire to police cars.

The Islamic revolutionary state took many paths towards clearer and more established organisational structures, and the Al-Eqab Al-Thawri group is considered an example of the professional development. It declared its presence in January 2015, to coincide with the revolution’s fourth anniversary, considering itself a legitimate extension of the revolution.

Since its establishment, the group carried out over 170 attacks in 16 municipalities. During the same time, Al-Muqawama Al-Shaabiya movement emerged, and they issued tapes and songs along with statements and speeches made by Al-Eqab Al-Thawri similar to the style of Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing.

The shifts towards radicalism are not limited to the Brotherhood youth, as Salafist revolutionary groups such as the Ahrar Movement, which emerged in 2012.

The choices made by the Muslim Brotherhood’s youth have become more radical. The statements made by the youth on the internet have become more violent in terms of discourse, as the youth spokesperson appointed by the group in 2015, who goes by the pseudonym Muhammad Muntasser, uses radical revolutionary language. In one of his statements, he called for “a revolution that beheads the rotting bodies.” There were also statements issued by sharia scholars closer to the Brotherhood calling for resisting the state by all means, and 159 scholars signed a document called Nida Al-Kinana which stated the need to resist the Egyptian government, considering the government an enemy of Islam and working to “eliminate the government by all legitimate means”.

The Muslim Brotherhood supported this document, and in this context, a number of religious books and studies emerged supporting violent action against the state. One of the most important books that emerged was titled “Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup”, published by a religious committee partnered with the Muslim Brotherhood in early 2015. It is supported by the Brotherhood’s revolutionary faction.

It seems that the radical Islamists’ revolutionary options are varied at this time, ranging from various intellectual and ideological approaches from the Brotherhood to Salafism and Jihadism, including its solidarity, radical and enabling approaches.

In the context of the competition and conflict regarding jihadist representation between Al-Qaeda and Daesh, a number of Egyptian jihadist groups that identified with Al-Qaeda’s ideology emerged. The Al-Murabitoon group is considered the latest version of this, as the group emerged after similar groups failed to establish a branch base and suffered dismantlement and dissolution after a number of security blows. The most prominent of these groups is the Soldiers of Egypt (Ajnad Misr) group, which publically emerged on 24 January 2014, and issued a number of statements taking responsibility for a series of military operations.

This group grew weak and suffered fragmentation after the murder of its leader and founder, Humam Muhammad, at the hands of the security forces. Although the movement mourned the loss of its leader on 9 April 2015 and appointed a new leader, Ezz Al-Din Al-Masri, as successor to Magd Eddine Al-Masry, who also executed some operations, the organisation has become a shadow of its former self.

Al-Murabitoon is the new version of the Egyptian Jihadist “Al-Qaedaist” groups. It announced its emergence through a video titled “the day the believers will rejoice”, which it posted on the internet on 21 July 2015.

The video includes a voice recording of its leader, Hisham Ali Ashmawi (also known as Abu Omar Al-Muhajir Al-Masri). Meanwhile, Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis emerged in the public on 5 February 2011. It is an international jihadist group that carried out many operations against Egypt and Israel. After the military coup, the group’s ideology gradually shifted from giving priority to the confrontation of the far enemy, i.e. Israel, to giving priority to confronting the near enemy, i.e. the Egyptian army and security agencies.

The group pledged its allegiance to Daesh and its leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, in November 2014, and now operates under the name Wilayet Sinai.

Thus, Egypt has entered the era of “Jihad”, as the popular incubators are prepared to provide safety nets and protection, as well as support radical options. Egypt is now following in the footsteps of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, and the Islamist groups are now competing to attract angry revolutionaries whose options and approaches are heading towards local and international jihad. The process of isolating, trapping and weakening the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt contributed to the emergence of an Egyptian Islamist Jihadist narrative that is more established and adherent to the limits of the existential conflictual relationship with the Egyptian coup-led government.

Translated from Arabi21, 24 January 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.