Obama's real geopolitics in Syria

One perception prevalent in Turkey, but also in many Arab countries, is that the Obama administration has, since the onset of the Syrian conflict, not been clear on its strategic goals, on its alliances and on its plans to resolve that conflict. One particular crisis now escalating between Ankara and Washington is the US position on the escalating clashes across the Syrian Turkish borders involving one particular organization known as the YPJ. While Turkey has listed it on its terror list, the Obama administration has been extending military and political support to the group, generating harsh criticism from Turkey. But this particular tension is part of a larger and more complex crisis which involves Russia, the Assad regime, Iran, and the entire web of the Syrian armed opposition to Damascus. The two crises, the narrower issue of the YPJ and the larger context of Russian and Iranian involvement and the US response in Syria, seem to spiral into deeper military conflicts on the ground, risking a regional war with grave humanitarian consequences. So how did the Obama administration’s position on Syria and Turkey evolve since 2011, and what is really behind the YPJ impasse? Is there a set of “real geopolitics” adopted by the Obama administration that is less seen than the declared policies?

When the revolt erupted in Syria in March 2011 against the Assad regime, President Obama was fast enough, after few weeks of peaceful demonstrations across the country, to back the civil society revolt and ask President Assad to step down from power. The initial US position was fortified by the geopolitics of the time. Turkey in the north, Jordan in the south, US Coalition forces still in Iraq, and the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. Assad was boxed in and his political exit was still negotiable. But his removal from power through political pressure was not pressed before the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Once American forces pulled out, geopolitics changed dramatically in 2012. Iran’s support to Assad rushed through Iraq, and Hezbollah crossed to Syria. In return, the opposition militarized rapidly and the uprising mutated into a civil war with zones of control split between the regime and its opponents. As of 2012, a political removal of Assad became impossible. To change the regime, a military action became the only possible option. Hence by early 2013, negotiations for a solution started.

Turkey, recipient of a large number of Syrian refugees, along with Arab moderate countries, backed the opposition to Assad. Iran and Hezbollah backed the latter. The Obama administration continued to ask Assad to leave, yet at the same time extended just minimal support to the armed opposition, while keeping the door open for talks. The fundamental shift in US policy towards Syria, however, occurred when President Obama drew red lines regarding the use of chemical weapons in the summer of 2013 and threatened of the use of force against regime forces. That was the moment of reckoning for Washington. Would the administration ever use military force against the Assad regime? The answer was clear as President Obama changed course, relied on the Russians to provide a diplomatic path, and preferred to resort to negotiations instead of a regime change by force. Washington developed a two track policy some of its partners found contradictive: on the one hand accepting a diplomatic track in Geneva and Vienna but on the other hand continuing to arm the opposition. The administration’s explanation was that backing the moderate opposition was a way to pressure Assad to choose a path to exit—but via diplomacy.

In reality, Washington’s geopolitics shifted in the fall of 2013. The major change was the engagement of the administration in talks about what later became the “Iran Nuclear Deal.” One of the results of that track was a cessation of confrontation with Tehran and, by ripple effect, with Iran’s ally in Syria. Even the arming and training of Syria’s opposition became limited so that the US would not be fully engaged in backing forces which could drag Washington into a regional clash with Iran, for fear of losing the Iran deal. The US, for example, stood by Turkish backing to the Syrian opposition, but was not favorable toward a Turkish military intervention in northern Syria for fear of upsetting the Iranians.

This delicate balance between talks and support to the opposition was shaken with the rise of Daesh in July 2014 and its takeover of parts of Iraq and Syria. The Obama administration was put under tremendous pressure by the US Congress to either take ground military action against Daesh, which Obama had dismissed, or back local partners in both countries to take action against the network, while providing air support. Washington again modified its geopolitical posture. Help was extended to the Iraqi armed forces in the center and south, parallel to Iranian influence in the country, and some help was extended to the Peshmerga in the north. In Syria, American action was limited to airstrikes since no partnership would be possible with Assad. Both Turkish and Arab military operations on Syrian soil were discretely ruled out, mainly because of the Iranian veto.

A last geopolitical situation developed when President Putin, after the signing of the Iran deal, deployed military assets in Syria, engaged in air strikes, and provided full support to Assad’s forces. The Obama administration has since been under two types of pressures. One remained the priority to not upset a nascent deal with Tehran and the second was the administration’s determination not to clash with Russian forces in Syria nor encourage its allies, both Turks and Arabs, to enter a conflict with Russia over Syria.

As a result of these multiple geopolitical shifts, rarely admitted, but clear on the ground, Turkey felt the consequences on multiple levels. The United States, directly and via NATO, continues to be formally engaged in the defense of Turkish soil—if attacked from the outside. That is a red line beyond the policies of Washington and Ankara as long as NATO is around. However, when it comes to Turkish operations in Syria or terror attacks against Turkey, the Obama administration is more nuanced. Here is the gist:

Both the United States and Turkey Ankara consider the PKK as a terrorist organization. Turkish actions against the group are accepted by the US, even outside Turkish borders. But Ankara considers an ally of the PKK, the YPJ, a Kurdish fighting force in Syria, as a terror group as well and has been taking action against it, though in a limited way. The Obama administration does not see eye to eye with Ankara’s position, because in practicality on the ground in Syria, the YPJ is part (the largest part) of an anti-Daesh coalition operating across the Hassaka region. American military assets are deployed in that area to insure training, backing, and at times small operations against Daesh. In short, there is a sort of an impasse between President Erdogan and President Obama on that particular matter. Ankara considers the YPJ as “hostile” and Washington considers them as “partners.” It would be catastrophic if Turkish forces acting against YPJ hurt US assets in the area or if the American military provided direct assistance to forces engaged in clashes with Turkey. This is a scenario that both sides are attempting to avoid, and there are as of yet no solutions to the issue.

But behind the bottleneck situation regarding YPJ, there are greater challenges, for the United States is relying on the local Hassaka militias to fight Daesh because it cannot rely on Turkey’s own forces operating in Syria. The real opposition comes from the Assad-Iran axis. The latter has vetoed any Turkish direct intervention in Syria and has informed Washington of their opposition. The reason behind the axis of obstruction is their calculation that once Turkish forces seize territory from Daesh it would add it to the Syrian opposition areas and create a large “Turkish protected zone” facing the Assad zones. Hence, the equation is tough for the Obama administration principally because the latter, while backing the Syrian opposition in a defensive posture but standing with Turkey only if its territory is attacked, has no other option than relying on the YPJ led alliance in the northeast. From that posture, the Obama policy is to not allow a fratricide conflict between its two allies, Turkey and Hasaka.

What makes the matter more complicated is the Russian backing of the Assad-Iran-Hezbollah offensive targeting Aleppo and aiming at reaching the Turkish borders. Ankara perceives this advance as threatening to its national security as its Syrian partners could be destroyed and replaced by hostile forces. Even worse, from Turkey’s perspective, would be a realpolitik understanding between the axis and the YPJ to control all of the Syrian-Turkish borders. Unbearable it would be for Turkey to have a “hostile” force—allied to the PKK—seizing the southern Syrian frontiers entirely. In Ankara the perception is eerily clear: There could be an undeclared understanding between the United States and Russia that these borders would be divided between Assad and the YPJ. But the Obama administration denies such an understanding, despite the fact that realities on the ground match this projection.

Since the Russian-Turkish incident in the air, a new more sinister menace has risen. Putin has signaled that his air assets will serve as dome to protect the advancing axis forces towards Aleppo and the border. The message to Ankara is a warning to not shield its allies in Syria with airpower. But Turkey has also signaled that its airspace will be defended. Washington is hurrying to stop the escalation and to draw a virtual line. It will stand with Turkey on land or in the air, but not inside Syrian airspace. It would tolerate Turkish strikes on PKK assets in Syria and welcome air strikes on Daesh. However, it warns against any Turkish sorties to protect the Syrian opposition

The USand Turkish positions towards the YPJ enclave in Syria at this point are linked to the much larger equation involving Russia and Iran. To analysts in Washington, the real impetus against Turkey’s action against the perceived YPJ-PKK challenge and against Turkish backing to the Sunni opposition in Syria is the regional power now in control of the geopolitical game in the Levant: the Iranian regime.

Iran has a direct stake in the outcome in Syria. It wants a geopolitical bridge from Tehran to Beirut, passing by Iraq and by an Assad controlled Syria. Tehran does not want Turkish or Arab Sunni interference in Syria. Toward that purpose it was able to pressure Obama with the Iran Deal, bring in the Russians, use all of its cards to keep Turkey away from Syria and Iraq, and deter the Gulf from any inroads in the area. In short, Turkey finds itself at odds with a United States protecting the YPJ, only because Iran has succeeded in buying its influence in Syria and Iraq, precisely from the current American administration

Dr Walid Phares is the President of the Global Policy Institute and a Professor of International Relations at BAUI University in Washington.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.