Hamas, the others, and the reconciliation

Since Hamas won the majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council seats, all of the vital and influential forces in the region felt that a political earthquake had occurred. They felt as if the purpose of holding the general Palestinian elections ten years after the first elections was not fulfilled and its goals were not achieved. Instead, the results were the opposite of what these forces wanted.

The voters in the elections, which were meant to strengthen the approach formulated by Oslo, end the Al-Aqsa Intifada and rein in or oppress the resistance programme, disregarded the Oslo equation and gave a big yes to the resistance project and to Hamas. The elections protected this project and gave Hamas the right, based on the popular mandate, to form a government based on its vision and agenda.

We know that from the moment the results were announced, efforts and measures were made to serve one purpose, i.e. preventing the project and those running it to make any achievements and to deal a blow to the popular support of this project. Efforts were made to eliminate this project from a position of influence and participation in formulating the official Palestinian decisions. Many meetings were held and pre-emptive decisions were made, both in the former PLC and in the Palestinian leadership institution. In addition to this, a number of Arab and regional governments directly and indirectly contributed to obstructing this new democratic experience in Palestine. In the arena, the new government, which everyone refused to participate in due to their suspicions or convictions that it was only a matter of time before this government collapsed, and that it would be a repeat of the “Mosaddegh government” [Mohammad Mosaddegh was democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 until 1953, when his government was overthrown in a coup d’état]. The political and financial siege on the government was backed by a state of security chaos brought about by the security agencies, which are supposed to protect the law and order, but they were the source of chaos and anarchy.

The US pumped money and guidance to accelerate the collapse of the government, even after a national unity government was formed and we conceded our right to have the majority number of ministers, as well as our right to formulate a complete political programme for the government for the sake of national consensus and to bring about security and stability for our people. However, what they had wanted to achieve was not achieved, even after Hamas was completely eliminated from the scene. The chaos and violence of weapons and assassinations returned, and one of the Hamas political leaders was a victim of this. This forced us to make the difficult decision of preserving the security of the citizens and ending their bloodshed, albeit by means of a painful surgical operation that some believed to be a historical opportunity to move with the Palestinians’ decision from the position of legitimate and constitutional majority to a government outside the confines of law and order, and disregarding all the principles of partnership and national responsibility.

The day after the events of 14 June 2007, two positions emerged; the position of Hamas’s leadership, in which we expressed our complete willingness to take a step back and sit at the negotiations table in order to restore the unity of our people, and the position that was very clearly and explicitly against negotiations and dialogue. We confirmed the sincerity and genuineness of our positions by means of our actions and we went to all the capitals in the region in order to achieve a true reconciliation in Cairo, Senegal, Yemen, Makkah and Doha. However, those who signed the agreements did not adhere to them and they fought on the television screens amongst themselves regarding the signatures. Then the first war on the Gaza Strip occurred at the end of 2008 and lasted until early 2009. This put into motion the cycle of negotiations in Cairo, which we saw as a true opportunity to achieve real reconciliation, especially given Egypt’s role and status, which we do not deny.

We were certain that Egypt could achieve this, so we went in all seriousness and insistence to restore the unity of our people and end the state of division, but on strong and feasible foundations that leave no lit stones under the ashes that may ignite at any time. This caused us to insist on a number of points within which may lie fuses that may detonate at a later time, but we were flexible with many of our constitutional and legal rights in order to put the national interests first.

I read the article written by General Mohammad Ibrahim titled “Egypt, the others, and the Palestinian reconciliation”. Although we respect him and appreciate him as a person, as well as Egypt’s role, I felt that I must clarify some facts. It is not true that Hamas refused to sign the Cairo agreement in October 2009 and then later signed it in May 2011. We did, however, insist that a page including the principle of political partnership be added to the agreement, and that consensus be the condition for all the main measures. This page was considered part of the agreement after the parties sponsoring the reconciliation in Egypt refused that the paper be opened. However, when these amendments were accepted, we signed the agreement, and unfortunately, the insistence on not opening this paper, despite our agreement with the Fatah team is the reason these years were lost. In addition to this, the original paper did not mention anything about forming a government, but rather a committee that carries out limited tasks, but the government added some amendments to this.

Also, yes the Doha declaration’s problem was the leadership of the government, not the formation of the government.

In addition to this, the fact that he states that Hamas is the main obstacle with regards to the complications in the situation, as it tried to impose its pre-conditions before reaching a reconciliation, confirms to us what we would have achieved through Egypt, and that we wouldn’t have made any achievements on the Palestinian-Palestinian level or on the level of prisoner exchanges.

Hamas, who won the legislative elections and nearly two-thirds of the seats in parliament and who won in the municipal elections, has made every effort to end the division, However, the main problem is the refusal to accept Hamas as a political partner despite the political and popular weight it possesses. It is the largest organisation in Palestine, and this confirms the fact that all of the issues that Hamas backed down from and conceded regarding its presence and representation would have been overcome and the issues in which it only demanded its existence have been and still are pending.

Finally, Hamas has been and continues to be serious in achieving reconciliation based on what was agreed upon in the agreements and principles, most important of which is political partnership. Any attempts to turn the reconciliation from a national agreement on how to manage general Palestinian affairs to a means of eliminating Hamas’s role will not be successful. Hamas is an integral component of the Palestinian people and it does not suffer from the hatred and concerns that others only seeking their existence suffer from. We seek to achieve the goals, aspirations and objectives of our people and we are hopeful and certain that God willing, we will succeed.

Translated from Quds Net, 1 March 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.