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Analysing the geopolitical human impact in the new Middle East

March 22, 2016 at 5:31 pm

The map of the Middle East has been changing constantly since antiquity, with the consequent mass displacement of people and enormous human suffering. Furthermore, the region has been going through a series of political makeovers from the time of the Crusaders to the present day.

The end of World War One on 11 November 1918 added to the geopolitical challenges in the region. The dominance of the Ottomans across the larger part of the Middle East was left in tatters after the collapse of the empire in 1920. Its defeat culminated in the implementation of an agreement that was signed by Britain and France during the war, with the backing of Tsarist Russia. Called the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement, it was named after the authors of the deal, Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot, and set out how the Middle East was to be demarcated should the Triple Entente (Russia, France and Britain) defeat the Ottoman Empire in the war. The Ottoman-controlled area included Syria, Palestine and Iraq. Britain gained control of areas roughly comprised of the coastal strip between the Mediterranean Sea, the River Jordan, modern Jordan, southern Iraq (Mesopotamia) and Haifa and Acre in Palestine. France was allocated control of what is now south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently, independent countries were created with new borders, national flags, national anthems, a military and a constitution; Sykes-Picot effectively marked the birth of the nation states in the Middle East. The new borders divided the people of the region; ever since, many have neither integrated nor accepted the new identities dictated to them by the Western powers. As a result, people in the Middle East – especially in Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon – still refer to all of these countries collectively as As-Sham, and many hope that the borders might be redrawn so that they are one state again.

The end of the Second World War in 1945 led to another humanitarian catastrophe in the region with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and a refugee crisis that exists to this day. Furthermore, the capture of Arab lands by Israel changed the geographical realities in the region. Most Palestinians were internally displaced and others ended up in the neighbouring countries as refugees under difficult conditions. Significantly, the presence of Palestinian refugees in such countries has also created social and cultural difficulties for the local population and has heightened enmity due to competition for government resources. Their presence continues to put a strain on the struggling economies of the host countries. The enforced exodus of over 200,000 Palestinians from Kuwait in 1991 increased the human suffering, after the then leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Yasser Arafat, came out in support of Saddam Hussain during the first Gulf War.

The new Iraq and the future of minorities

The invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies in 2003 led to socio-political and economic paralysis. Sanctions were imposed on Saddam Hussein and his government and Iraqi oil exports were banned from being sold in the international markets. That was the beginning of Iraq’s woes and it has struggled ever since to stabilise, experiencing an increase in sectarian violence along the way. Moreover, the capture and subsequent execution of Saddam and the collapse of the Baath Party-led government added to the growing socio-political and economic challenges. Many Sunni Muslims, a majority Muslim sect globally but the minority in Iraq, felt excluded by the new government. Their resentment and exclusion resulted in the proliferation of insurgent groups intended to defeat and replace the Shia dominance of Iraq. The election of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki in 2010 exacerbated the political turmoil. He purged Sunni Muslims from meaningful government positions and was seen to favour Shia Muslims, especially when it came to the provision of public services. In his article “How ISIS spread in the Middle East” (published in The Atlantic), David Ignatius argued that Iraqi politicians concluded (probably correctly) that the Obama administration had decided to leave the country to its own machinations. Indeed, the re-emergence of Al-Maliki saw a rise in insurgency in Iraq and the emergence of Daesh.

Kurdish secession aspirations also grew during the premiership of Al-Maliki. According to Aziz Ahmad of Newsweek, the emergence of Kurdish sovereignty was reinforced in October 2014 when 156 Kurdish fighters, known as the Peshmerga, crossed from Turkey into the northern Syrian town of Kobane to fight off a Daesh offensive. As Turkish leaders celebrated their own Republican Day, Kurds flocked to salute the Peshmerga in scenes that invigorated Kurdish nationalism. The military gain made by the Peshmerga fighters gave it impetus and emboldened their aspirations for an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq, with Erbil as its capital.

Iraqi Kurdistan is culturally and religiously exclusive and still lacks the common traits of a traditional nation state. Furthermore, it is demonstrating increasing hostility against other religious sects in Iraq, particularly the Sunni Muslims. Iraq has basically disintegrated into three entities: Shia Iraq, Sunni Iraq and Kurdish Iraq. It is impossible to contemplate the unification of Iraq given the deep-rooted animosity within these groups. Hence, there remains a serious challenge given the new reality of displacement and resettlement due to the disintegration of the state and the creation of exclusive religious and cultural enclaves.

Al Raqqa and Kurdistan – the new realities in Syria

Al-Raqqa in Syria was one of the first cities lost by the Syrian government to Daesh, and the group went on to declare it as its capital. Once a sprawling multi-cultural city, Al-Raqqa now has an overwhelmingly majority of Sunni Muslims. The non-Sunni minorities who still live in the city are forced to pay Jizya (protection tax) to the Daesh administration. Hundreds have left Al-Raqqa to go to other places in Syria or across the border into Turkey seeking refuge from Daesh.

Other cities like Aleppo, Homs and Hama have had their infrastructure destroyed by the Syrian army and Russian air force, leading to the mass displacement of Sunni Muslims. The destruction and killing in these cities has created a deep-rooted rift between the ruling Shia Alawites and the Sunni Muslims in Syria; President Bashar Al-Assad is an Alawite. There are other minorities that have faced displacement in Syria because of their culture and religious affiliations, namely the Yazidis and the Christians. Most of these minorities are now scattered around Syria and Turkey.

The new demographic spread and reconfiguration is creating new borders within Syria. In October 2014, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces crossed the Turkish border to help defend the Syrian town of Kobani against Daesh. Since then there has been an exchange of intelligence and military training of the Kurds in Syria, particularly the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), by the well-resourced Peshmerga. The YPG has been fighting Daesh and the Syrian army, and recently declared that it intends to create a Kurdish federal state in Syria. It is related closely to the Worker’s People’s Army (PKK), which has been waging its own self-determination guerrilla war against the Turkish government. Recently, there have been several cross border attacks by the Kurds in Syria and Turkey has responded by bombing certain Kurdish strongholds in Syria.

Again, in the case of Syria, what is of great concern is the threat that the new culturally- and religiously-exclusive federal states will present to other minorities inside the country. Secondly, the exclusive cultural and religious enclaves in both Syria and Iraq might also disturb the economic and socio-political development in the main urban areas which depend on multiculturalism in order to prosper.

Conclusion

The new demographics in Iraq and Syria have led to the drafting of new borders in the region. These are not necessarily in the form of those found in the typical nation state; nevertheless, they serve to separate cultures and religious sects. This reality will intensify the militarisation of the region as the people attempt to protect their borders and newly-found freedoms. They will also lead to the displacement of more people and prolong the current wars, increasing the prospects of future wars in the process. The role and importance of humanitarian organisations will thus increase.

As natural resources are not distributed evenly across the region, certain areas possess more than others. This is likely to increase the prospect of conflict.

Syria, like Iraq, will be demarcated into several territories consisting of Sunni Muslims, Kurds and Alawites, and even the Druze. The Iraqi state was dismantled long ago; there have been states within a state operating since the end of Saddam’s rule. The country is firmly under the dominance of Shia Muslims, with Sunnis – both moderates and radicals – in the majority in certain area; in Mosul, for example. The prospect of peace, therefore, seems remote.

The advent of YPG and Peshmerga forces in Syria and Iraq will not lead to a lasting political solution in these countries. Most importantly, the concern is that the political realisation of these states might encourage separatist movements across the greater Middle East which could easily ignite more wars in the region. This will not only put a huge strain on the humanitarian agencies operating therein, but also increase the need for their presence for years to come.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.