Ambiguous Egyptian-Russian relations

Russian interest in Africa, mainly its north, began in the 18th century, with interests in the Mediterranean coast as part of an expansion policy that was based on military, political and economic considerations. At that time, Czar of Russia, Peter the Great, followed a policy that was able to transform Tsarist Russia into the Empire of Russia, thus becoming one of the most important powers in addition to the Ottoman Empire. However, it did not amount to achieving the ambitions of colonialism in North Africa, because the Ottoman Empire on the southern borders of Russia prevented that from happening. Russia’s dealings with Africa evolved to diplomatic, economic and cultural relations and reached their peak in the 1960s.

Africa gravitated between eastern and western polarisation which helped form its political, cultural and economic composition. Now, after changes in the nature of relationships, and after structures of the region changed with a new map that is different to the one that had prevailed during the era of the alliances of the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia is once again back after the withdrawal of the US. This time, Russia came to the area with the glow of regional competition, after a long absence, which could make it a major and single player until the US rearranges its cards. Russia has put all it weight on playing a role in which it would regain its presence in North Africa through deepening and expanding the economic and investment cooperation and mutual relations that date back to the 1960s, where Russia contributed to the establishment of several mega-projects, the most important of which was the High Dam.

Russia has chosen several points that represent its interest and activity in North Africa with a major interest in Egypt. This came after tensions in the Egyptian-American relations, so Russia and Egypt signed several agreements, including one granting Egypt a modern air defence system. This step is considered a Russian warning to the United States that it is on its way to annex one of its biggest allies in the region, which used to enjoy strategic and military relations based on mutual interests. American ships used to be granted priority when crossing the Suez Canal and could use its airspace in exchange for annual military aid equivalent to $1.3 billion, which America froze in protest against the ousting of the first democratic regime in Egypt that came after the January 25th Revolution and the coup against legitimacy. This was followed by hesitation by the US and a silent acceptance of the coup regime.

It is clear that the US made a decision to change its policies towards North Africa for many reasons, not including Russian competition for a foothold. Those reasons are represented in its conviction in the futility of existing regimes’ ability to find a balance in the region, especially with the opening of new routes for US-Iranian understandings. There are also economic and strategic reasons which made America move east towards Asia to make new alliances.

The new Russian return to the region is not only limited to economic relations; there are arms deals, security cooperation in fighting terrorism and intensification of trade. Other than Egypt, there are other promising stations which began with diplomatic visits, such as Algeria and Morocco. The most important characteristic of the return of Russia to North Africa in this period is the lack of any ideological programmes in the new agreements and cooperation charters.

When Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev funded the construction of the High Dam in the sixties with nearly $1 billion, and supported the Egyptian army during the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, with Russian weapons and equipment, he demanded loyalty in exchange and his ideas prevailed and became popular in Egypt.

Russia put a foot in Egypt; this initial presence achieves a number of goals. First, Egypt is considered the strategic gateway and suitable entrance towards Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa where the pristine wealth of uranium, gold, cobalt and oil exist. These natural reservoirs may become a reason for future conflict between Russia and America, especially after America withdrew from North Africa, but only after having strengthened its presence in sub-Saharan Africa and secured waterways for Gulf oil through Bab-el-Mandeb.

For the Russian and American powers, Africa is an area of future investment that requires an agreement between the two of them, especially as other powers, such as China, are present and penetrated Africa from its centre. China was engaged in exploring and manufacturing Sudan’s oil, before the separation of the state of South Sudan in 2011. Today China is spreading its activities after most oil wells became part of South Sudan. In addition to the new state, China has other markets in central Africa and the east. It only cooperates in economic and trade sectors and infrastructure construction in Sudan.

Russia chose Egypt for its geographical location linking three continents. Thus, it will show off its ability to develop economic interests, especially with African partners. So will Africa be for Russia alone, or will politics play its games?

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 20 May 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.