Ennahda: Shifting from religion to political

A political party in modern democratic societies is supposed to be efficient in civil society and is expected to be based on a set of principles that direct its understanding of reality and future decisions. It should carry out its activities in an atmosphere of openness and transparency, competing with its opponents to attract followers in the aim of gaining power according to a chosen political, economic, social and cultural programme. A political party must not exercise a monopoly over religious guardianship, claim possession of absolute truth or even pretend to be the sole guardian of national values.

In reality, most political parties with an Islamic background in the Arab world see no harm in mixing religious and political issues; preaching while mobilising communities for electoral purposes. They try to integrate religion into the party to show followers that their decisions are made with religious context in mind. This leads to the monopolisation of a common heritage by one party: giving it a clear advantage in the whole electoral process and influencing the behaviour of the electorate.

Looking closely at Ennahda’s literature and political behaviour, one can notice that during the period of oppression under both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, the Ennahda movement clung to its missionary statements, especially in its foundations. It insisted that one of its basic roles is helping the rebirth of the Islamic character of Tunisia and contributing to the establishment of Islam on a political and cultural level in the Maghreb, Arab and international scenes in the face of people’s distance from religion.

The movement’s primary purpose was to face the policies of forced secularisation which the ruling regime tried to impose. Ennahda became an advocate of the country’s Arab identity. However, despite its awareness of the importance of giving prominence to the political aspect of its activities in response to the aspirations of the people for freedom, dignity and diversity, the movement continued to mix religious preaching and political activism.

This enabled Ennahda to attract a large number of supporters and sympathisers who were fed up with the authorities’ marginalising of religious issues, their continued harassment of those who preached religion and their oppression of people’s private and public freedoms.

Apparently, after the revolution, Ennahda realised that people did not rise up in order to establish a theocratic state. They had revolted in protest against tyranny and the hegemony of one-party, nepotism, injustice and the unfair distribution of wealth. The rebels longed for the establishment of a democratic republic, a fair state.

So the movement got engaged in the political struggle after the revolution trying to minimise the harmful effects of mixing religion with politics. Thus, its political programme did not include any reference to the establishment of the promised Islamic state, recognised freedoms and gender equality. It also called for mosques to be removed from the hands of politicians.

In its summit last month, Ennahda declared its decision to stop its missionary activity instead devoting itself to political work. In this respect, the movement’s leader Rached Ghannouchi declared that his party is in transition towards becoming a political party that would be devoted to political activism. This party would be specialised in reformation starting from the state, leaving civil society to tackle other domains.

We can see from this that the party’s recent history was marked by confusion between what should be and what should not be i.e. preaching and associative activism.

This transition is of major importance in that it enables the movement to give a true image of its identity. This shift indicates Ennahda’s choice to be part of the political scene as a true political party with pragmatic proposals and not as religious entity with a missionary vocation.

In committing itself to this choice, Ennahda is favourably responding to the essence of the Tunisian Constitution which forbids any party from being founded on a religious basis and which bans any mixture of political activism with associated work.

This shift is an additional step towards not pretending to possess absolute truth or to speak in the name of Islam. In separating the missionary from the political, Ennahda is somehow leaving the classic model of traditional Islamic movements based on associating religion with all aspects of life. This made Ennahda obsessed with internal renewal more than holding onto religious postulates. In its self-renewal it is objectively responding to the dynamics of Tunisian society and the civil and progressive forces.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.