Is Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution already obsolete?

Tunisia is lauded for its democratic development after the Arab Spring, but now it is engulfed in a political power struggle and personal rivalries between office holders. The country’s constitution is increasingly coming under threat. Indeed, just 18 months after the legislative and presidential elections in Tunisia in 2014, senior advisors to President Beji Caid Essebsi have started to call for amendments to the governing document.

They believe that the current political regime – a semi-presidential political system – is leading to an institutional deadlock. The alleged weakness of Prime Minister Habib Essid’s cabinet in tackling security, economic and social issues, as well as the limited powers of the president, are pointed out as the main reasons for this blockage. Essebsi’s advisors argue that the key solution is to increase the president’s powers by amending the 2014 Constitution in a move towards a parliamentary regime with presidential leadership.

Until now, attempts to change the constitution have been unsuccessful, so the president has been pursuing a different approach to achieve his goals. In late May, he declared Essid’s cabinet to be a failure and called for a new national unity government. The quickest way to form this would be if the current government resigned and a new prime minister was chosen.

However, is there really institutional deadlock in Tunisia? Is it possible that after less than two years the prime minister and his cabinet can be declared failures for not reaching the five-year goals of the legislature? If the answer is yes, then does it justify the call for him to be replaced? Furthermore, if a replacement is needed, is the Presidency of the Republic the right institution, constitutionally speaking, to lead and steer the process?

Tunisia’s president is discontented with his limited powers

First, we assume that there are no solid and accurate arguments in favour of the institutional deadlock thesis. In fact, Beji Caid Essebsi simply seems to be dissatisfied with the limited prerogatives that the constitution provides to the President of the Tunisian Republic. The call for an amendment of the constitution seems to derive from his wish to “rule alone and not to share his powers”, as he reminded journalists when he was appointed as head of government in 2011.

Second, if indeed the government of Habib Essid has failed, the responsibility for this should be identified according to the constitution. The lack of a clear strategy and a national plan to combat terrorist attacks, which have strong repercussions on Tunisia’s economy and society through reduced investment and tourism as well as rising unemployment and social movements, should be imputed to both Essebsi and Essid. Article 77 of the constitution states that the President of the Republic “is responsible for determining the general state orientations in the domains of defence, foreign relations and national security.”

Tunisia’s economic and social challenges will not be resolved in one or two years and they necessitate, as key preconditions, political stability, enforced governance practices and a better rule of law. In their absence, even a national unity government will not be able to reach sustainable solutions. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, BTI 2016, which analyses democracy development worldwide, makes this very clear in its latest Tunisia report: “To encourage domestic investment and lure foreign businesses into the country, the rule of law must improve. Concretely, this means guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and rooting out corruption. Well-resourced independent constitutional bodies, a free media and a strong civil society can serve as additional checks on the powerful.”

President Essebsi wants a more submissive head of government

It seems that the call for a national unity government is a strategic tool allowing President Essebsi to kill many birds with one stone. Among other things, he can appoint a more submissive person as prime minister and appease his secular Nidaa Tounes Party as well as his son, Hafedh Caid Essebsi, who is a contested leader in the party and one of the most fervent opponents of Essid.

If the president’s strategy succeeds, he will become de facto and contra legem the centrepiece of Tunisia’s political regime. While this would not yet install a full-fledged authoritarian regime, it still constitutes a significant erosion of the separation of powers, and conjures up the ghosts of strong Presidents like Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Habib Bourgiba. At that stage, we could consider the 2014 Constitution to be obsolete.

Finally, Essebsi does not seem to be the right person to lead Tunisia towards legal certainty, efficient governance and political stability. On 4 July, he confirmed that he does not intend to observe the constitutional limitations to his prerogatives. He also tried to impose an unconstitutional economic reconciliation mechanism that supplants the transitional justice mechanism and tends to release corrupt businessmen and officials from judicial accountability.

There is also the confusion regarding Essebsi’s status as President of the Tunisian Republic in relation to him being a leading figure in Nidaa Tounes. Last, but not least, there is the putsch in preparation against Prime Minister Essid. Hence, it is difficult to imagine that the national unity government would be Tunisia’s political lifeboat.

As Hauke Hartmann put it recently, “Democratically governed countries usually offer better conditions for long-term foreign investment than autocratic ones – particularly more stability, greater legal certainty and more efficient governance.” President Beji Caid Essebsi represents a serious threat not only to Tunisia’s democratic transition and political stability but also to its economic recovery and social peace.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.