What are the wider implications of Turkey's Syria adventure?

The recent rapprochement and normalising of relations between Ankara and Moscow was supposed to put to bed the strains in the relationship after last November’s downing of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M jet by a Turkish F-16. The failed coup attempt, the rise in ISIS attacks on Turkish soil, the impact of Syrian refugees and the ongoing difficulties with the Kurds – both the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria – had necessitated a recalibration in Ankara. The fostering of new strategic relationships had become a necessity.

For Vladimir Putin it was one less distraction and difficulty, better securing his navy’s position and its ability to enter and exit the Black Sea via the Bosporus. Turkey would benefit from closer relations, having shifted somewhat from the US and NATO, especially after their lukewarm support during the coup (and the widespread belief that the US, at least, had foreknowledge of the putsch).

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s St Petersburg visit would also bring news of the revival of the previously scrapped Turkish Stream project, bringing a direct gas pipeline from Russia via the Black Sea before entering Greece. Both sides would benefit financially and guarantee the strategic development of economic and energy security. Moreover, the increase in the ultra-nationalist presence under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) umbrella and centres of power, particularly in the military, taking the spaces left behind by the purges of Gülenists, is likely to lead to an increase in pro-Russian sentiment, while the anti-Kurd stance continues. A greater degree of separation from Washington was, and still is, on the cards.

However, the news that Turkish tanks and Ankara-backed rebel forces had entered the Syrian city of Jarabulus in order to clear ISIS from the border region and claim land for the rebels is a net gain for Washington, as much as it is for short-term Turkish objectives. The US receives support in its fight against ISIS while demonstrating its support for Turkish interests. For Ankara, if successful, the strategy will protect the Turkish border, strengthen Ankara-backed rebels in the war for Aleppo and reduce the chances of further ISIS attacks in Turkey.

Nevertheless, an expansion in Turkey’s role not only increases the risk of direct conflict and tensions with Russia, possibly through a repeat of the November 2015 scenario, but also highlights the zero sum game that Ankara and Moscow are playing in Syria. Any difficulty between Turkey and Russia may well threaten the progress they have made in diplomatic, economic and energy agreements. This is by way of jeopardising the prerequisite of any strategic relationship – cooperation.

While both now share similar objectives regarding ISIS their other goals remain symmetrically opposed. Turkey wishes to see the fall of Assad and the control of Syria pass to the Sunni Muslim majority that will side with Turkey going forward, regardless of Ankara’s recent conciliatory tone. Moscow uses its Syrian bombing campaign to prop Assad up, in order to maintain its naval base at Tartus and guarantee Iran’s links to and dependence on Russia. It would also like to avoid the US and Turkey expanding their presence in the region, in turn strengthening their positions on Russia’s southern flank. The loss of Tartus would intensify Russian fears over Black Sea access, continuing its reliance upon good relations with Turkey. Its boldest foreign policy actions – from the Georgian war to the Ukrainian war and annexation of Crimea – have centred on the Black Sea. Russia’s recent naval expansion and control of Sevastopol has extended its power projection within the Black Sea, in direct opposition to its historic nemesis Turkey.

For the Turks the key to the incursion are the Kurds. While Erdogan maintains and strengthens relations with the Iraqi-Kurdish region, Turkey desperately wants to finish off the PKK and ensure an end to Turkish-Kurd secessionist hopes. The success of the YPG in the Syrian conflict raises the possibility that a post-war autonomous Kurdish region within Syria could be established unilaterally or through negotiated settlement. Turkey would see such an outcome as a precursor to the inevitable formation of an independent Kurdistan. By driving ISIS out of the border region and forcing a Kurdish withdrawal east of the Euphrates, Turkey would achieve its double objective of helping its Syrian rebel allies and stopping further Kurdish dominion over the border, thus securing its southern flank.

The fact that the Americans are providing air support and instructing the Kurds to fall back suggests that they are attempting to mend relations with Ankara after the post-coup attempt recriminations and Turkey’s Russia recalibration. Turkey is unlikely to have entered Syria the way it did without significant planning and agreement from Washington.

The US won’t extradite coup suspect Fethullah Gülen, but they will use their influence over the Kurds to give Turkey a potential win. With a retreat of the YPG in Syria, in the medium term, Turkey would have more breathing room in its engagement with the PKK, even though the group’s attacks in Turkey’s Kurdish regions will continue in scope and intensity in the short term.

The move also indicates that Washington fully comprehends the importance of Syria to Ankara and its issues with the Kurds. While the US has generally utilised the Kurds as a regional agent, exploiting their aspirations vis-a-vis Kurdistan, their interests will be disregarded if they conflict with more important short and medium term US objectives. Naturally, the US places more value in its relationship with Turkey than it does with the Kurds.

Furthermore, the Americans are attempting to limit the progress in the Russia-Turkey relationship after Erdogan’s trip to St. Petersburg. The Turkish incursion in Syria may precipitate a strained relationship between the two former imperial powers.

However, the news that Turkish and rebel forces have engaged with the YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, a town 38km south of Jarabulus, is not a positive development for Turkey or the conflict as a whole. If the fighting continues beyond August, it complicates the entire conflict further. The sight of two of America’s allies fighting will benefit Moscow in Syria and beyond. For Washington and Ankara, the campaign may end up being a net negative, a by-product of a miscalculation. John Kerry’s ceasefire talks in Geneva with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlight the fear that both parties have over further escalation; they will both want to solidify their gains.

The US will need to use its influence to ensure a Kurdish withdrawal if it wants to assist Turkey in its objectives. The expansion of anti-ISIS forces will not be worth it if the Turks and Kurds don’t stop fighting beyond Manbij. The SDF and YPG could decide to advance with their objective of linking the Kurdish-controlled zone east of the Euphrates to the isolated pocket in north-west Syria around the town of Afrin. If they do, they will be calling John Kerry’s bluff over his threat to end US support. Washington still needs Kurdish forces in Syria.

Alternatively, the 150km distance between Manbij and Afrin may be too much even for the SDF and YPG, hastening a withdrawal. At worst, fighting will continue either until Turkey expands its bombing campaign or until the United States applies sufficient pressure.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.