What is wrong with the Arab perception of Turkish politics?

Is there a general misunderstanding in the Arab world about what is going on in Turkey? This question has been on my mind for years and I have been striving to come up with possible answers since the beginning of my travels around the Middle East. Being a Turk abroad almost always sees me facing many questions about Ottoman history, the Armenian issue, secularism and Turkish policies in the AK Party era. Surprisingly, questions are no different in the Arab world to those in Europe.

When I travel to the Arab world or meet with Arab colleagues, being a Turk brings out two basic reactions. Either I am treated as the heir of the once mighty Ottoman Empire, a reaction based on the sentiment of Islamic brotherhood; or I feel alienated by questions regarding Turkey’s politics in the region.

As a “representative” of the “good old days” of the Ottoman Empire, the sense of brotherhood within Islamic societies is apparent in such conversations, even if they are sometimes too optimistic about Turkey’s role in the region and Turkish politics. What I see is that they want to remember commonalities among struggling societies. There is a generally positive reaction and I am told that Turkey is a good holiday destination, Turkish food is tasty, and there is a positive image of Erdogan and, almost certainly, Turkish soap operas. You can question whether these positive impressions are substantive or not but, at the end, both participants in the conversation are usually happy to have met.

As a Turkish national based in Qatar, though, more aggressive questions focus on why the Turks are moving through a more Islamic phase in politics; and why is Erdogan becoming a “dictator”? What is the reasoning behind Turkey’s policy in the Middle East? Was the coup staged by Erdogan? Fethullah Gülen had no reason to do it, he is only a cleric. And so on. No one has to empathise with another country but it would be better to have some insight and knowledge before judging and condemning it.

Contemporary Turkish politics is a complex challenge for political scientists and international relations researchers. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the country has been made up of diverse groups and most of the time these communities based on religion, ethnicity or civil interests have been at odds with each other. Summarising the history of a one hundred year-old state is not easy in a short conversation. The media and Arab leaders can influence views within Arab society, but a more profound analysis of several other factors is needed to understand the motivation behind all the negativity surrounding perceptions of Turkey in Arab society.

Why is there a misunderstanding of Turkey among Arabs?

The most important answer to this question is the lack of accurate information. This does not mean that it has to be pro-government or pro-Erdogan, but there must be accuracy in reporting the recent political problems faced by Turkey. After the events of 17-25 December 2013, when Gülenist infiltration in the police and judiciary led to a staged scandal to overthrow the democratically-elected government, the organisation led by Fethullah Gülen was declared to be a “terrorist” group, known by its Turkish acronym FETÖ. I was in Palestine at the time for field research; visiting a university, I attended a class on conflict resolution and by chance the topic for that week was Fethullah Gülen and how he contributed to conflict resolution with his “peaceful” talks and his project of interfaith dialogue. I was shocked. We were in Palestine and Gülen is the only so-called Turkish “cleric” who does not voice support for Palestinians, whereas he is very sympathetic towards Israel. What is worse, is that no one knows about his “contribution” to an underground entity which is accused inter alia of sex tape scandals, wiretapping and stealing examination papers for military schools and police colleges for the purposes of infiltrating state institutions.

Today, the situation is little different to what I witnessed in that classroom. FETÖ is infamous: its members have infiltrated all governmental institutions in Turkey by hiding their links to this criminal cult; women in the terrorist organisation usually wear no hijab to disguise their religious identity (but still explain it with Islamic justifications) and to act “secular”; it has schools in more than 100 countries and uses students for lobbying purposes; it teaches its followers in these schools to get into vital positions in the public and private sector for the sake of the movement; and members should put the movement above their families, job, religion and state. This is a complicated issue which requires a more nuanced and informed level of coverage in Arabic and English to enlighten the public.

The failed coup and what happened after 15 July are crucial to address this perception issue. Due to media coverage in the UAE, Egypt and the Western media which was generally pro-coup, the struggle of the whole nation for democracy was reflected as a fight for power by Erdogan. Was that really what had happened? Definitely not. This was a milestone in Turkish history. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has won elections for 15 years and its massive and entrenched public support triggered considerable opposition in which disagreements in the political scene were obvious. However, on 15 July Turkish society united to embrace democratic values and publicly opposed foreign intervention by an internal threat (FETÖ). What Turkey understood on that night is that there can be disagreements under democratic rule (personally, I believe that there must be disagreements, if it is a democracy) but the coup was a “lose-lose” situation for all segments of society except the putschists and it could destroy all of Turkey’s political, social and economic gains in one night.

On 7 August, all of Turkey’s political parties and 5 million participants joined together to rally in Istanbul’s Yenikapi Square to show their unity against the undemocratic Gülenist terror cult; this was an extremely symbolic moment after the hard days of the failed coup. Hence, this fight was not for the sake of the government, contrary to the commonly-held idea among many Arabs as I understood from their social media posts, tweets and e mails; it was for Turkey, with ideological problems pushed aside as the people moved for more substantial developments and achievements. The political system in Turkey is not for show; it was always here and real, and represents one hundred years of tradition.

Is Turkey’s case so unfamiliar to the Arabs?

Put simply, probably, yes. There is no example of Turkey’s governance in any other country in the region. Turkish democracy is based on a secular and pluralist governance system; there is nothing similar in their own countries to which Arab citizens can relate. The political system is secular but more than half of the Turks are conservative, religious people who support right of centre parties such as the AK Party and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). There are, of course, opposing voices from social-democrats, secular people and armed Kurdish resistance groups. However, election results demonstrate that people tend to vote for conservative parties.

When people vote for the ruling AK Party, nobody forces them to do so. Turkish elections are free and fair, and transparent, unlike those in some Arab states. No one forces these people to vote for the AK Party. This is a significant point because, after the last election, when the AK Party got the highest share of the vote, I was asked by my foreign colleagues about Erdogan “becoming a dictator”. Such questions misunderstand contemporary Turkish politics. First of all, it was a general election for members of parliament and the prime minister, not for Erdogan; he is the president, and is no longer the prime minister. The lack of even basic understanding of Turkish politics is evident even among educated Arab voices.

The clash of interests in the Middle East is another reason why the perception of Turkey among Arabs is complicated. This regional tension surfaced during and after the failed coup, especially when the Egyptian and UAE media covered Turkey-related news through an anti-Turkish lens. Fethullah Gülen was interviewed by Egypt’s Al-Ghad, while NBC News and Sky News Arabia were active, accusing Turkey and Erdogan through coverage filled with inaccuracy and twisted comments. This is a state-level problem which definitely affects public opinion in Arab states.

To be honest, the lack of knowledge about regional states is mutual; Turkish society misunderstands the Arab world too. Of course, it must be noted that there is not just one Arab state and “the Arabs” are not one type of society.

It is not so common to talk about negative comments about Turkey from the Arab world, especially when we look at the increased popularity of the country, Turkish political leaders and products in the region, but there is an unfavourable perception issue. What, then, is wrong with the perception of “the Arabs” for contemporary Turkish politics? The answer is not about being right or wrong but the level of ignorance; there must be more basic coverage of issues in Arabic or English in the Arab world, because it is not like any other place from Turkey’s point of view. Ankara has policies for it, neighbourhood relations are essential and it shares a common history. The more you communicate and get on well with a society, the more you can have accuracy in talking about it.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.