The October War: legitimate questions and missing answers

The 43rd anniversary of the 1973 October War will be marked next week; this war deserves some serious reflection in light of the situation in the Arab world today. This includes very dangerous fissures and the fact that the Israeli enemy is reinforcing its presence and gaining more acceptance, and even encouragement, from some Arab regimes. The purpose of such reflection is not merely to mark the anniversary of the most honourable and noble war fought by the Arabs against the Israeli military machine. It is also to re-read, re-think and re-evaluate the lessons learned from the war, which still provokes a great deal of controversy and disagreement to the extent of violent clashes in many instances. The debate revolves around a number of questions that seem legitimate and focus on three main aspects.

What was the nature of the war and was it organised and planned to be a war of mobilisation or liberation? Was there a specific and clear agreement in this regard between the partners in Cairo and Damascus, based on which military coordination was arranged? This is important, given the stark contrast between the Egyptian and Syrian battle fronts and the lack of territorial contiguity between the two that would allow for operational cooperation and mutual support.

There are no definitive answers to any of these questions from any reliable sources. All we find are justifications, assumptions and, at times, accusations between the allies in the war, Egypt and Syria. Researchers have no other option but to attempt to make conclusions from some of the available facts.

In terms of the war’s nature regarding its limitations or comprehensiveness, we always refer back to Hafiz Ismail, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s national security adviser, who sent a letter to the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, on 7 October, on Sadat’s orders. Discovered after the war, the letter told Kissinger, “We do not intend to deepen the engagements or widen the confrontation.” This means that the strategic decision, from the beginning, was to wage a limited war to get things moving due to the stalemate on the political front and to create the appropriate conditions for political moves under the cover of a military achievement. Of course, this was not made public; it remained restricted to a tight circle of senior Egyptian officials. It is highly probable that the matter was not proposed to the Syrian leadership. As such, controversy will continue to surround the issue due to the lack of definitive answers, until all parties reveal official documents concerning this important aspect of the war.

Furthermore, there are questions about the war’s military achievements. Was it a military victory, defeat or neither? There is still controversy about this, even though each side claims the victory.

As far as combat performance on the battlefield is concerned, there is concrete evidence; on the Egyptian front, for example, the war was fought before the eyes and ears of the entire world. It began at 2:05pm on 6 October 1973, when 220 fighter jets took off, followed a few minutes later by the roar of artillery along the Suez Canal. This air and ground preliminary fire was the preparation for the attack by ground forces. From that moment and for eight consecutive days and nights, the fiercest battles were fought between the Egyptians and Israelis. The largest water barrier in the history of traditional wars was crossed by the Egyptian forces who took control of the Bar Lev Line forts on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and beyond, for up to 15 km. Dozens of fighter jets were shot down and hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles were destroyed; many Israeli soldiers and officers were captured.

By 13 October, the Israeli military machine was defeated. It was a solemn scene witnessed by the whole world. The Egyptians who took up arms for the sake of liberating their land earned the sobriquet given to them by military observers and analysts: the Famous Five Infantry Divisions. At this point, the distress signals had gone out from Tel Aviv in the name of the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, and addressed to the US to save Israel. As Kissinger mentioned in his book Crisis, Meir was given President Richard Nixon’s message that Israel must acknowledge that it was defeated in the Sinai Peninsula.

At this point, the war moved to the strategic political level, as Sadat had refused on 12 October to accept a ceasefire. This prompted Nixon to support Israel with advanced air weapons. Despite this, Sadat decided to push back and sent the armoured division into action on 14 October, which ended in failure. Eventually, Egypt had to deal with things in terms of conflict management, leading to a ceasefire on 22 October. The Israelis broke the truce first and then accepted it, and it was followed by the “101 km negotiations” and the start of the peace process under US auspices. This ended eventually in the Egypt-Israel peace treaty coming into effect in March 1979.

Another controversial aspect is whether the October War, given the fact that it was Egypt’s most important conflict against the Israeli enemy, led to the achievement of true peace or if it just provided individual solutions for Egypt and then Jordan, and thus reduced the Arab-Israeli conflict to being simply a Palestine-Israel issue. This is of special concern given the growing tendencies towards normalisation with the Israelis and the fact that it is a neighbour which everyone must accept.

This topic remains the subject of widespread controversy that comes and goes. Despite the fact that all of historical Palestine, Syria’s Golan Heights and Lebanon’s Shebaa Farms are still under the occupation of the Israeli army, Arab leaders more concerned with their own authority have distracted the people with internal wars, sectarian differences, doctrinal conflicts and Arab-on-Arab bloodshed in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and other places.

Nevertheless, the 1973 October War is a rare example of the people’s courage, heroism, willingness to make sacrifices and ability to be successful under the most difficult of circumstances in order to achieve the liberation of their land and the restoration of their honour. These are values that we must regain. It was also a stark example of the weakness of governments and leaders and their lack of qualifications and ability to manage difficult situations and rise to the level of their people.

The October War experience, with all its positives and negatives, must remain vivid in the minds of successive generations so that they might realise that if they are determined then they can confront the Israeli enemy, or any other enemy who threatens their country. However, real glory will only come with the liberation of all the land and the restoration of Palestinian rights. Only then will true, comprehensive and just peace be achieved, rather than the false peace we endure at the moment, which is tainted by surrender.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 29 September 2016‎

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.