Is Baghdad planning the liberation or seizure of Mosul?

In light of the preparations for launching the operation to regain the city of Mosul from the clutches of Daesh, one question must be asked of the Iraqi government: Is the goal to liberate Mosul or seize it? There is a big difference between liberating and seizing.

Asking such a question may be odd when a government wants to regain the second largest city in its country from the grips of an organisation that everyone agrees is a terrorist group that threatens everyone with its brutality. However, close observation of the Iraqi scene reveals that this question, despite its strangeness, is asked based on matters that have been accumulating since 2003. This government was not content with coming to power at the hands of the American occupation; it changed Iraq from a single state to a state of factions. It opened the door to Iranian influence, based on sectarianism unprecedented in modern history. The government also replaced the national army with popular mobilisation made up of an alliance of Shia militias subject to Iranian influence that trumps the influence of the central government in Baghdad.

By doing so, the government linked its future to Iranian influence and to turning Iraq into Iran’s backyard. In consequence, Sunni militias emerged as a natural response to the government’s sectarianism. In the same context, the idea of Kurdistan separating from Iraq took root in the minds of the region’s leaders.

This idea is natural, because if the central government is not big enough for the Sunni Arabs, who share Baghdad’s national affiliation but are seen as sectarian rivals, then it would definitely not be big enough to fit the Kurds, who are both Sunni and have a different national affiliation. There are, in addition, accumulated issues affecting the Kurds in Iraq and the wider region.

What the current Iraqi scene looks like today and the foretold future developments indicate the frayed nature of the political clique ruling in Baghdad. This clique does not realise the fact that its political behaviour, guided by its sectarian goals, is weakening the central government. It is also making it hostage to the divisions and conflicts of countless internal, regional and international interests. To make matters worse, this policy launched the dynamic of dividing Iraq.

This is what Iran wants and is pushing for, as keeping Iraq divided will increase its weakness and enhances the link between the interests of its local allies and the survival and maintenance of Tehran’s influence. For example, the President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, made a statement last week in the presence of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi in Baghdad, that Kurdistan will not announce its separation from Iraq until after reaching an understanding with the central government. Al-Abadi did not comment on this statement; does that mean that the he does not mind Kurdistan separating from Iraq? Or does it mean that the man is in over his head and does not have it in him to fight with the Kurds while he is on the verge of a battle over Mosul?

At the same time, Al-Abadi’s problem with Turkey emerged. He is rejecting Turkish involvement in the battle for Mosul. The government in Ankara sent its forces to the town of Bashiqa, near Mosul, in order to train the Turkmen militia to participate in the struggle for the city. However, Al-Abadi’s government considered this to be a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty by Turkey and demanded that it withdraw its troops.

Turkey, though, insists on being there. Al-Abadi’s problem is that his position and justifications for refusing Turkey’s participation lack credibility, as his government allows Iran to do what no country interested in its own sovereignty would allow. It allows Iran to train and arm Shia militias; send its generals, advisors and intelligence officers to Iraq; intervene in the appointment and distribution of positions and tasks within the state; and even interfere in the selection of the prime minister himself. The Turkish presence in Bashiqa pales in comparison to the Iranian expansion and influence within the various branches of the Iraqi government, and herein lies the weakness of the Iraqi government’s position.

Foreign Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari expressed his astonishment to the Iraqi parliament at the fact that “the [UN] Security Council is not eager to discuss our request to hold an extraordinary session to urge Turkey to withdraw its troops.” According to Al-Jaafari, the Secretary-General’s excuse for this is that “he needs more time.”

The question that Al-Jaafari and his government are avoiding revolves around why Iran is allowed to violate the principle of Iraqi sovereignty in many different ways, but when Turkey is involved it must “respect” that principle. Iraqi officials have repeatedly said that Iran’s presence in Iraq is approved by the legitimate government, while the Turkish presence is not. This is a naïve and opportunist justification for the principle of sovereignty and how to implement it. The state derives its authority and sovereignty from the people, in all of its components, and it is supposed to protect these people’s rights without any discrimination of a sectarian or ethnic nature.

Hence, the Iraqi government’s division of the people into sectarian or ethnic components and targeting one of these components — the Sunnis — at the hands and in the interests of another component — the Popular Mobilisation Forces, and the sect they represent — and then allowing a foreign country (Iran) to participate openly in executing this plan completely obliterates the concept of sovereignty in Iraq. It also obliterates its right to have others respect this principle. The truth that has become clear to everyone is that the Iraqi government is targeting the Sunni population and is working hard to change the demographic composition in central and northern Iraq on a doctrinal level. It can no longer hide the fact that this is being done in order to serve the doctrinal interests of the central government and Tehran, as central and northern Iraq is a densely populated area that stretches to the border with Iran.

Hence the importance and danger of the battle to restore Mosul to all the local and regional parties. In addition to being the second largest Iraqi city, it is also known as the city of the Sunni Arabs, Sunni Turkmen and Sunni Kurds. This is what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in his interview with Rotana Khalijia TV conducted by journalist Jamal Khashoggi last week.

Erdogan’s message is clear, and it is directed not only at the Iraqi government, but to Iran as well. The gist of it is that Turkey will not permit the change of the demographic composition in Mosul after it is regained from Daesh. This is what his Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, said in his response to Al-Abadi. Turkish writer Verda Ozer gave a detailed description of Turkey’s fears in an article published on Sunday (Hurriyet Daily News, 8 October 2016), regarding the change to Mosul’s demographics facilitating Iran’s mission of localising its Shia militias in the town of Tal Afar, populated by Turkmen, subjecting them to Iranian influence and making Tal Afar another Iranian base.

This exposes the weakness and raggedness of the political clique in Iraq in its clearest form. It is a shaken player in a game that does not aim to liberate Mosul from Daesh, but rather seize it in order to expel its Sunni inhabitants and turn it into a city where the majority of the population is Shia. Otherwise, what is the difference between this ancient city being under the control of Daesh or the control of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, if it is going to be run on doctrinal lines either way? The difference is that in the event of the former, Mosul will be in the grips of a Sunni militia that is not subject to the government’s authority, while in the event of the latter, it is in the hands of the Popular Mobilisation Forces militia and under the control of Iran, not the government in Baghdad.

Translated from Alhayat, 9 October, 2016

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.